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EDITOR'S NOTE
What follows i s the written product of the "Conference on Jurisdic
tion, Justice, and Choice of Law for the Twenty-First Century," h osted
by the New England School of Law, on October 2 8-29, 1 994 .
Prior to the Conference, five fact patterns raising complex j urisdic
tion and choice of law i ssues were presented to various academic ex
perts. These academi c experts then attended the Conference in October,
where they communicated their particular point of v iew both orally and
in print. Four of the five fact patterns were presented to these panelists
who in turn, acting as members of the j udiciary, rendered j udicial
opi nions. The fifth fact pattern was presented to elicit commentary
rather than j udicial opinion. These written opinions and commentary are
published within.
I n an effort to promote a freer flow of communication and interac
tion among the panelists, the Conference portion of thi s book repl aces
the traditionally rigid law review citation with the more relaxed
practitioner' s form of c itation. To aid the reader, the panelists' names
are cap italized when reference to their Conference contribution i s made.
The New England Law Revierv is grateful to the following panelists
for their written contributions :
Professor Robert G . Bone (Boston University School of Law ) ; Professor
Patric k J. B orchers ( Albany School of Law ) ; Professor Robert D .
Brussack (Un iversity o f Georgia School of Law); Professor S tephen D .
B urbank (Uni versity o f Pennsylvania School o f Law) ; Professor Stan
Cox (New England School of Law ) ; Professor Thomas C. Fisc her (New
England School of Law); Professor Larry Kramer (New York University
School of Law ) ; Professor Harold G. Maier (Vanderbilt Univers i ty Law
School ) ; Professor Linda S. Mullenix (University of Texas School of
Law); Professor Marti n H. Redi sh (Northwestern University School of
Law ) ; Professor Linda J. S ilberman (New York University S c hool of
Law ) ; Professor Joseph William Singer ( Harvard University Law
S chool) ; Professor Michael P. Scharf (New England School of Law ) ;
Professor Michael E. Solimine (University of Cincinnati College of
Law ) ; Professor Allan R. Stein (Rutgers, the State Uni versity of New
Jersey School of Law, Camden); and Professor Russell J. Weintraub
(Uni versity of Texas School of Law).
Special thanks to Professor S tan Cox, New England School of Law,
for initiating and pursui ng the concept of this Conference on c onflicts.
In addition, this Conference would not have been possible without the
financial support of the New England School of Law.

Case One: Choice of Forum Clauses

INTRODUCTION*

This selective overview and response to the panelists ' opm10ns
disproportionately focuses on the Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 3 04 U . S . 64
( 1 93 8) , half of the problem confronting our "Court," and fil ters some of
the panelists' approaches taken to solve it through my own lens of dis
satisfaction regarding c urrent Erie doctrine. I see in the opinions that
follow, not only lack of consensus about what Erie requires, but vary
ing degrees of comfort with the current state of Erie doctrine. Some of
our panelists (Professors MULLENIX and WEINTRAUB) find the Erie
issue relatively straightforward, believing that the purpose of the forum
selection clause is clearly substantive, that no federal statute stands i n
the w ay, and that therefore state l aw must appl y . Most of t h e others
(Professors B URBANK, REDISH, SILBERMAN, and S OLIMINE) see
the Erie i ssue here as more muddied by the approach the Court has
taken i n Hanna v. Plumer, 3 80 U . S . 460 ( 1 965), and subsequent c ases,
but stil l c apable of being resolved in favor of applying state law. S ome
of our panelists (Professors B URBANK and SILBERMAN) seem criti
cal of the way the Court in Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp. , 487 U . S .
22 ( 1 9 8 8 ), handled the Erie problem before i t , but find room enough
between the facts before u s and Stewart to reach a different result. I
share that dissatisfaction with Stewart and believe that eventually the
tension i nherent i n that decision, prefigured by Hanna, should be better
resolved i n favor of state i nterests. Two of our panelists, however,
(Professors B ORCHERS and STEIN)1 would resolve any tension i n
favor of federal interests, Professor B ORCHERS preferring not t o have
any Erie doctrine at all, and Professor STEIN extending the Stewart
rationale to embrace at least all diversity forum selection situations

*

Stanley E. Cox: Assistant Professor of Law, New England School of Law.

1. The panelists are to be congratulated that their discussions of the hypothetical

provoked Professor STEIN's thoughtful written response included in this section of
opinions. Professor STEIN was not an original participant on this panel at the confer
ence, having graciously volunteered, instead, to moderate the personal jurisdiction dis
cussion and to introduce the written product from that discussion.
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involving domestic parties selecting a domestic forum. In their conclu
sions, but more so i n the w idely divergent methods they use to reach
these conclusions, our panelists confirm that basic disagreement still
exists about what Erie means and should require.
At one end of the spectrum, Professor MULLENIX, c ategorizing
forum selection clauses as raising i ssues solely of s ubstantive state
contract law, finds it obvious that Georgia state law should control.2
S he finds i t equally obvious and compelling, both on policy and Erie
precedent grounds, that only the S upreme Court of Georgi a law should
be fol lowed on this i ssue, even though other Georgia appellate courts
currently are reinterpreting and reformulating Georgia law on party
autonomy. Until and unless the Supreme Court of Georgia makes c lear
that Georgi a has abandoned its prior precedents which indicate nonen
forcement of forum selection clauses, all federal courts heari ng d iversity
cases removed in Georgia must refuse to enforce forum selection c laus
es.
Driving Professor MULLENIX ' s interpretation of Erie is an e mpha
sis that Erie is a constitutional dictate ; federal courts sitting in diversity
have no room to fashion substantive law differently from their state trial
court counterparts. Professor MULLENIX is distrustful, and with good
reason, of what happens whenever a federal court is given room to
"di scover" l aw different from what the state's highest appellate court
has made. B y preventing federal courts from applying law differently
than has the Supreme Court of Georgia, Professor MULLENIX believes
she promotes the twin aims of Erie : inequitable administration of the
laws, and forum shopping.
I believe Professor MULLENIX, however, in her desire to rei n in
other panelists' "free wheeling balancing test[s ]," and keep federal
courts in line, promotes too rigid a rule and therefore an arguably
anomalous result.3 In the i nstant case, accepting arguendo Professor
MULLENIX ' s point that forum selection clauses are issues purely of
state contract law (even for underlying tort suits, and even when the
result is determining what court will have j urisdiction to adj udicate), the
state law here is unclear, at least regarding the viability of the Supreme
Court of Georgia precedent. Under my reading of Erie and its progeny,
a federal trial court j udge should be wearing the same substantive l aw

2. Similarly, Professor WEINTRAUB finds "it inconcei vable that on a matter so
signi ficantly related to state views of freedom of contract, state law shou ld not
control." WEINTRAUB, infra. at 554.
3. M ULLENIX, infra, at 541. S i milar concerns are voiced by Professor
BURBANK. See BURBANK, infra, at 536.
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"hat" as i ts state trial court counterpart. A state trial court j udge, faced
with intermediate level appellate decisions on party autonomy, would
not be free to ignore them.
If these intermediate appellate opinions have become the de facto
Georgia l aw regarding forum selection clauses, federal courts that cling
to a sub silentio-overruled or discarded Supreme Court of Georgia
precedent will promote exactly the sort of forum shopping and i nter
ference with state policy formulation that Erie discourages, as Professor
REDISH notes.4 Only the federal courts will refuse, automatically, to
enforce such clauses. Thus, the Supreme Court of Georgi a may be
invited to hear a lower appellate case, not because i t needs to c larify
confusion among its lower appel late courts, but rather to send a mes
sage s ideways to the federal court about misinterpretation of state poli
cy.
Certifi c ation of the state Jaw i ssues, if the federal j udge i s unsure of
the reach of the lower appellate decisions, would seem a more certain
way to confirm the Georgia j udiciary ' s change in poli c y . Thi s is true,
despite the real risks, which Professor MULLENIX notes, of such "ad
v isory" answers failing to develop Georgia policy i n the same way as
controversies litigated ab initio through the Georgia court system.5 Pro
fessor MULLENIX ' s faith that relying only on not-overruled Supreme
Court of Georgia precedent will in the long run produce more u nambig
uous state policy, and leave i ndiv idual federal litigants i n the short run
without the benefits of de facto Georgia law. If faithfulness to substan-

4. Professor REDI S H reads Erie and its progeny as authorizing the federal trial
judge to assume the rol e of the state supreme court when the trial j udge perceives
state law to be in flux. See REDISH, infra, at 545.
5. Exploring the adequacy and propriety of certification procedures to ascertain
and/or formu late state Jaw is a worthy project for another day. For example, why
should a certification statute be e nacted such that the federal trial court i s able to
bypass normal Georgia appe llate review? Why should the statute not instead permit
the state supreme court to "remand" to lower state appel l ate courts for first formula
tion of l aw i n truly unsettled areas? Or alternatively, why shoul d the statute not give
federal diversity litigants a "right" to demand that Georgi a appe l l ate courts of first
resort review any decisions of state law which they think are erroneously rendered by
the federal district judge? Exploring how actual or hypothetical certification proce
dures modify the normal Erie practice, that it is the federal court ' s duty to ascertain
state Jaw, would give additional i nsight into Erie doctrine. Professor M ULLEN I X ' s
skepticism about the values o f t h e certification process seem, generally, t o speak to a
belief that the federal courts systemi call y or as a matter of federalism are better off
with already settled rather than to-be-formulated determinations of state law. Yet, if
these courts are real ly exercising the same substantive authority as their state counter
parts, there must be some freedom to formu late l i ving law.
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tive state law principles i n the individual case i s part o f the goal of
Erie and its progeny, the federal trial court, on our hypothetical facts,
cannot avoid trying to determine the actual state of Georgia law about
the validity of forum selection clauses. 6
Professor B ORCHERS i s at an opposite extreme, both as regards the
compulsions of Erie and the evils of forum shopping. He asserts that
there is a significant federal interest in resolving the validity of forum
selection clauses as a matter of federal law, and accordingly would rule
under Erie's balancing test that the validity of such clauses is governed
by federal l aw in federal diversity suits. In reality, Professor
BORCHERS is stalking bigger game. He w ishes to overrule Erie, and
therefore, in the meantime, ignores it to the greatest extent possible. His
argument that the real choice i s between i nterstate or intrastate forum
shopping, and that we should err on the side of discouraging interstate
forum shopping, applies i n all Erie situations and effectively eliminates
the Erie doctrine.
As a necessary result, intrastate forum shopping is an accepted and
acceptable course of conduct u nder Professor BORC HERS ' s rulings.
The goal i s to make federal non-preemptive common law the best pos
s ible, let the chips fall where they may. Professor MULLENIX, on the
other hand, is decidedly troubled by s ituations where federal l aw on
s imi lar facts leads to opposi te res ults. Her solution to the forum shop
ping abuses i nherent in Court decisions such as Stewart and Ferens v.
John Deere,7 is to encourage Congress to pass preemptive federal statu
tory law governing forum selection clauses .
Federal statutory substantive l aw certainly eliminates inconsistencies
(and also any Erie problems), but at the expense of any abi lity of states

6. Granted, this g ives federal courts abi l i ty to manipulate under the guise of
interpreting state Jaw, which is presumably why Professor M ULLENIX resi sts this ap
proach. 1 do not read Professor M U LLENIX, however, as insisting that there can
never be Jack of certainty about state Jaw content, and thus inherent potential for
some i nconsistency ; she simply seems to wish to cut back on this potential wherever
possible. I would tolerate more potential for inconsistency as being inherent in con
cepts of dual sovereignty, and search for new appellate devices to bring consi stency
when the federal system exercises state power.
7. 494 U .S. 5 1 6 (1990) (ruling that transfer pursuant to U . S .C . § 1 404 could be
i n itiated by plaintiffs who brought half a suit in Mississippi, and thereby, pursuant to
Sun Oil Co. v. Wortman, 486 U.S. 7 1 7 ( 1 988), were able to l itigate in federal cou11
in Pennsylvania a suit that could not have been initiated in Pennsylvan ia state
courts) ; Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp. , 487 U . S . 22 ( 1 988) (rul ing that U.S .C. §
1 404(a ) was widely enough drafted to make the presence of forum selection clauses
nearl y determinative, thereby swallowing Erie federalism concerns).
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to deal w ith what might at heart be state J aw issues . To eliminate fo
rum shopping entirely, federal law must be entirely preemptive and
thereby eliminate all state sovereignty regarding the issue addressed. B ut
do we, using Professor MULLENIX ' s characterization of this case,
really want a preemptive federal statutory law of contracts? The reality
of overlapping state court legi slative j urisdiction is a normal part of
confl icts inqui ries, but, despite occasional efforts (such as current Re
publican attempts at federal tort ''reform"), such lack of substantive
uniformity u sual ly is not thought to requi re that all inconsistencies in
state law be eliminated by passi ng a preemptive federal statute .
The real question is whether federai procedural rules should be
allowed to evade state substantive law, and the real problem may be
that Erie doctrine has become so significantly eroded via mechanical
application of Hanna 's congressional authorization presumptions, that
Professor B ORCHERS is describing the de facto result in many Erie
situations-federal courts go their own way w ithout regard to the un
derlying substantive i ssues i n the suit.8 For those troubled by the i ncon
sistency between federal and state results because of federal procedural
statutes being read too expansively, a less drastic solution than e ither
federalizing all state law or preventing federal courts from exercising
state law-formulating powers, would be to prevent federal courts from
trivializing all Erie inquiries. This means reconsidering and perhaps
reversing prior Court deci sions which have let the federal courts move
too far from what state courts would do on similar facts.
Professor S ILBERMAN, at least partially, advocates such an ap
proach when she emphasi zes that "if § 1404 had been i nvoked and I
were i n a position to do so, I would urge the Supreme Court to recon
sider the path it chose in Stewart." SILBERMAN, infra, at 550. Work
ing within the fact pattern of the hypothetical, she emphasizes how a
more balanced Erie inquiry would proceed . For Professor S ILBERMAN,
it makes sense to consider the l iti gation as a whole rather than the fo
rum selection clause i n isolation. Recognizing that "choice of law and
choice of forum clauses must be viewed together to reflect Georgia's
regulatory policies against limiting l iabil ity i n tort cases of this type,"
she concludes the issue before the panel is one reflecting important
substantive state policies and one which therefore must be governed by
state law. S ILBERMAN, infra, at 55 1 .
Professor STEIN, on the other hand, seems to di vorce the substan-

8. Rather than continue to pay lip service to Erie,
BORCHERS's approach. the courts should si mply abandon it.

under

Professor
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tive concerns underlying this l itigation from the question of w here suit
will proceed. His conclusion i s that a defendant' s motion to dismiss is
not the proper vehicle for enforcement of forum selection c lauses, but
that i nstead § 1 404(a) should be the exclusive vehicle for enforcing
such clauses i n diversity suits i nvolving domesti c parties seekin g domes
tic fora. Accordingly, on our hypothetical facts speci fying exclusively a
state forum, defendant Ski Vacations , i n Professor STEIN ' s view, has
the chance to move under § 1 404(a) for transfer, and might thereby
force the l itigation to proceed in Vermont federal district court. This
result-possible frustration of important Georgi a policies-is , as he
admits, "an odd concl usion for someone who has argued in the face of
black-letter law that state law should exert a greater i nfluence on federal
court access than is generally acknowledged . " STEIN, infra, at 5 70.
Believing that the Stewart Court reached the right result, although
agreei ng that the Court should have offered more convincing logic for
its dec i s ion, Professor STEIN seems willing also to accept that Hanna
properly authorizes Congress to determine j urisdiction, or to use his
term, court access, via rules of procedure. He thus leaves i t to others
(perhaps myself in a future foolhardy work) to argue that there are
inherent problems in Congress legislating away Erie's federalism com
mands w ithout providing any preemptive substantive law.
Having accepted Stewart and Hanna as controlling, Professor
STEI N ' s task is to appl y them to forum selection clauses which desig
nate forums outside the federal system. He correctly notes that Stewart
creates a conundrum, on our facts, for the federal court which would
otherwise desire to honor Georgi a policy of not enforcing such clauses.
If the federal court denies defendant' s motion to dismiss, because this
would seem the right result under Georgia law and because Stewart
does not directly govern motions to dismiss, that same court is l ikely to
be faced w ith a fol low-up § 1 404(a) motion for transfer. Under Profes
sor STEIN' s reading of Stewart, that motion could result in transfer to
Vermont. 9 It would be better from the beginning, in Professor STEIN' s
9 . Professor STEIN emphasizes that transfer is not compe lled. and suggests that
the Stewart case on remand properly applied Stewa rt criteria in finding no obligation
to transfer. See STEIN, infra, at 557 I am not so sure. Given at least two Justices'
emphasis in Stewart that forum selection clauses should almost always be enforced,
and that there is no meaningful difference between the standards that should govern
i nquiries under admiralty versus diversity, see Stewart, 487 U.S. at 33 (Kennedy, J . ,
concurrin g ) ; and given t h e Court's unhesitating expansion o f clause e nforcement i n
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v . Shute, 499 U.S. 5 85 ( 1 99 1 ), I a m doubtful that a
majority of the current Court would see the same difference in standards between §
1 404(a) and other federal jurisdiction dismissals or transfers whi..:h Profe ssor STEIN
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view, to acknowledge that the enforceabil ity of forum selection clauses
in d iversity cases designating domestic fora is always a matter of feder
al law, governed by the rationales which should have been put forth
more clearly by the Court i n Stewart but are implied from that deci sion.
Professor STEIN offers as j ustifications for always proceeding under
§ 1 404 that thi s: 1 ) allows for more flexibility to varied circumstances
than the mechanical knee-jerk enforcement exhibited in Carn ival Cruise
Lines, Inc. v. Shute; 1 0 2) emphasizes that courts are not ousted of j uri s
diction by private agreements, but rather enforce or c hoose not to en
force such agreements by way of exerc is ing their j ur isdiction; and 3)
provides for procedural consolidation of these i ssues and promotion of a
single federal standard. Although he concedes that forum non con ve
niens dismissal provides alternatively good conceptual fit for addressing
a defendant' s motion to enforce a forum selection c lause, Professor
STEIN considers thi s approach foreclosed by the general understanding
that § 1 404 preempts traditional forum non analysis .
I find it difficult t o critique Professor STEIN' s approach, since I do
not so readily accept that decisions such as Stewart, or Hanna, have
taken us down the proper Erie path . In arguing that § 1 404 best empha
sizes the horizontal nature of a covenant to sue in a particular place, it
further seems to me Professor STEIN predisposes towards h i s answer in
the way he sets up this question. Section 1 404 being solely an intra
system statute, can address only what he label s horizontal concerns.
What remain s unexplained, because foreclosed by Stewart, is why mo
tions to enforce forum selection clauses should not take more account
of what the u nderly ing suit is about and why giving effect to a forum
selection clause will not frustrate the state' s law which got the di versity
plaintiffs to the courthouse in the first place. Similarly, only because
courts have assumed that § 1 404 eliminates more traditional forum non
con ven iens doctrine does it make sense to argue, as Professor STEIN
does, that a conditional forum non conveniens dismissal might be appro
priate for a vertical s ituation, 1 1 but not for a horizontal situation. 1 2

advocates. I address alleged lack of Vermont connection to this l itigation.
I0. 499 U.S 5 85 (1991) (forum selection clause enforced as a matter of federal
admiralty law).
II. O n the hypothetical facts before this panel, such a vertical situation would
occur u nder Professor STEIN ' s analysis when a defendant' s § 1404 motion to transfer
is granted, and the case is transferred to Vermont. In federal district court in Ver
mont, the defendant would then be free to renew a motion to dismiss and, § 1404
being then inapplicable, the federal district court would not be prevented from apply
ing more traditional forum non conven iens analysis.
1 2 . The horizontal situation would occur if the defendant moved to dismiss in
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Professor SILBERMAN' s approach to the hypothetical seems to me
more satisfying. Drawi ng to our attention one district j udge ' s attempts
to wrestle with Erie's concerns in light of Stewart's increased pressure
to grant transfer, Professor SILBERMAN emphasizes that i t i s the un
derly ing Georgia policy regarding choice of law and choice of forum
clauses, considered together, which should determ i ne where our hypo
thetical case will be adj udicated. See S ILBERMAN, infra, at 549 . In the
case she cites, when a New York j udge received, via § 1 404(a) transfer,
a c ase originally filed in Puerto Rico S uperior Court, the New York
j udge neither reflexively applied Puerto Rico' s choice of l aw rules, nor
considered himself automatically free to deci de the case as would a
New York tribunal . Instead, the transferee court tried to ascertai n how a
Puerto Rico court would have v iewed the entirety of the litigation, were
it stil l proceeding in Puerto Rico courts. Professor STEIN, on the other
hand, apparently would allow a federal j udge on our facts to rule as a
matter of federal law, see STEIN, infra at 557, whether the l itigation
ultimately will proceed in Vermont state court. Professor S ILBERMAN
rules instead that the Georgia state policies regarding choice of law, in
combination with policies about choice of forum, mean that this litiga
tion should not only remain in federal district court in Georgia, but also
remain subject to Georgia choice of law rules.
Professor STEIN may be right that the complicated analysis he
offers i s required under Stewart and current forum non conveniens doc
trine, and he may also be correctly solving the dilemmas created by
these doctrines, although as Professor S ILB ERMAN notes, at least one
federal j udge has found a different way to navigate between Stewart
and Erie. My inclination is to take such signs of necessary, but counter
i ntuitive complication, as symptoms that something is wrong w i th cur
rent doctrine. Professor STEIN is right to remind us, however, of the

Georgia federal district court, on the basis of the forum selection clause. U nder
Professor STEIN's analysis, § 1404 would preempt traditional forum non conveniens
doctrine if transfer could be made to a district where the selection clause pointed.
Professor STEIN reads the stipulation of state court forum in our hypothetical facts
as not determinative of how a federal court should use the clause for deciding
whether to transfer. Accordingly, no dismissal, even a dismissal conditional on suit
being reinstituted i n Vermont state court, can occur in Georgia federal court.
From the l itigants' perspective, however, these procedural movements surely
seem l ike a waste of time and resources, and e xaltation of technicalities over sub
stance. If the real issue i s whether the case will be litigated in Vermont state court
or not at all, and even assuming that this issue is one which should be governed by
federal law, it is at least counter-intuitive that only a Ve rmont federal court can
make that determination.
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post Stewart procedural reality that § 1 404 motions al most always will
be coupled w ith motions to dismiss, and that accordingly the defendant
has an opportunity to get this litigation out of the Georgia federal court
on our hypothetical facts, despite any strong Georgia state policies to
the contrary.
Contrary to Professor STEIN, Professors REDISH, B URBANK, and
SOLIMINE reason, u nder their versions of Erie analysis, that Stewart
does not foreclose finding forum selection c lauses l ike the one i nvolved
in our hypothetical to be potentially governed by state law. Professor
REDISH, acknowledging that hi s position is significantly undercut by
Hanna, nevertheless concludes that it would be appropriate to apply to
the c ase facts a balancing test derived from Byrd v. Blue Ridge Elec.
Coop., 356 U.S. 5 25 ( 1 95 8 ) . S uch a test emphasizes "the systemic con
cerns of federalism that are necessarily impl icated by any Erie choice."
REDISH, infra, at 547. Since this approach requires comparing the im
portance each system attaches to resolving the issue u nder its own law,
and since Georgia l aw seems i n flux, Professor REDISH would remand
to the district court to determine in the first i nstance both what Georgia
l aw i s , and what pol icies underlie that law . He provides, however, some
guidance in discerning these state pol icies. For example, if the district
court determi ned clauses would not be enforced under Georgia law,
Professor REDIS H would view this as a substantive policy decision to
protect citizens from adhesion contracts and to provide them a forum
for vindicating their rights. He would defer to such state substantive
concerns under his reading of Erie.
Professor SOLIMINE reasons that regardless of which Erie method
ology is applied, the validity of the forum selection clause will be gov
erned by state law. First, he argues that if federal law is assumed to
support more enforcement of such clauses, the i ntrastate forum shopping
counseled against by Hallna should not be here encouraged. Alternative
ly, under a Byrd balancing approach, he contends it would be difficult
to find on our facts a federal procedural interest which would override
the state' s presumed regulatory interest in policing bargai ns. Finally,
Professor SOLIMINE notes that the presence of a choice of law clause
in our facts cannot circumvent the Erie inquiry, emphasizing that the
Erie choice of whether state or federal law should govern "is a structur
al i ssue not amenable . . . to advance determination by the parties."
S OLIMINE, infra, at 573 .
Professor B URB ANK concludes that validity o f forum selection
clauses l i ke the one at issue should be evaluated under state law, deriv
ing support for his position by comparing to the lack of federal regula
tion of personal j urisdiction for di versity jur i sdiction. Professor
-
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B URBANK emphasizes attempting to find federal policy reasons , i n the
absence of more direct congressional intent, for uniform rules of court
access for diversity suits. Whereas Congress has specifically l im ited
access through amount in controversy, and has modified access (once
obtained) through venue and reallocation of business status, it has cho
sen not to limit or expand general access beyond what state personal j u
risdiction law would permit. 1 3 Professor B URBANK interprets this si
lence as evidence of no strong federal desire for uniform access rules,
and accordingly leaves the i ssue of validity of our forum selection
clause to Georgia law by default.
Professor B URBANK thus i mpliedly rejects Professor STEIN' s ap
proach of reading a general federal procedural statute, like § 1 404, as
incorporating within it broader policy concern s about court access.
Without explicitly criticizing Stewart, although noting that the case
curi ously "grounded decision in [§ 1404] without reference to the l aw
governing validity," Professor BURBANK' s approach under Erie i s not
to read such decisions expansively. 1 4 Only where Congress has un
equivocally spoken, or a c learly rational policy j ustification for federal
uniformity can be discerned, does federal law preempt; otherwise, state
law governs.
I think Professors B URBANK and SILBERMAN correctly draw
attention to tension inherent in current Erie practice. I would argue for
reversi ng the current trend of federalizing j uri sdiction i ssues under cover
of procedural statutes. But until the Court itself changes directions, the
approaches of our paneli sts in trying to distinguish Stewart (or in the
case of Professor STEIN embracing it) seem ways a circuit court of ap
peals could address these issues. S ince those federal appellate robes are
the garb our panelists were asked to wear for purposes of thi s first

13. Assuming I am reading Professor B URBA N K ' s argument correctly, there i s

i nherent within i t an assumption about congressional ability t o expand personal juris
diction for diversi ty suits which I would challenge. Under my theory of jurisdiction,
see, e.g., COX, infra, at 642, courts never have more jurisdictional reach than they
have legitimacy to apply their own law. Since, under Erie, in diversi ty jurisdiction
situations, federal courts must apply state substantive law rather than federal substan
tive law, it would be anomalous if federal courts could hear state-law based suits
which could not be heard in the state system. To explore i n any meaningfu l detail
the implications of thi s theory for federal statutes which attempt to authorize larger
juri sdictional reach i s beyond the scope of this i ntroductory essay.
1 4. Professor B URBANK criticizes the result in Hanna as the Court succumbing
to the temptation "to hear federal statutes or Federal Rules speaking when they
appear to be silent, or at least to hear e nough noise nearby to si lence state law."
B URBANK, infra, at 5 3 7 .
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"adj udicati on," their "opinions" make interesting reading as to how
lower courts might be able to navigate through or around current Erie
doctrine in efforts to uphold state or plaintiff rights.
Summing up the decision on the Erie i ssue, under rationales or
variations on rationales recounted above, a majority of our "Court" rules
that Georgia law controls whether the forum selection clause i ndicating
suit in Vermont is valid (Professors BURBANK, MULLENIX,
S ILBERMAN, SOLIMINE and WEINTRAUB). 1 5 On the second i s
sue-whether the clause should be enforced, and the case dismissed-a
four vote plurality finds that the c lause should not be enforced
( P r o fe sso r s B O R C H E R S , M U L L E N I X , S I L BE R M A N a n d
WEINTRAUB), with two more "j udges" remanding for further i nquiry
as to the content of state law on this i ssue (Professors BURBANK and
REDIS H).
Either to buttress their conclusion about the i nvalidity of the c lause,
or, i n Professor BORCHERS ' s case, as necessary part of his decision
(since he believes the c lause is governed by federal standards), three of
the plurality j udges attempt to distinguish Carnival Cruise Lines on the
merits, and argue that our clau se would not survive even that decision,
were that admiralty decision controlling on our facts. Like Professor
BORCHERS , I also consider Carnival Cruise Lines "a m iserable deci
sion that I would cheerfully overrule," BORCHERS , infra, at 534, but I
find the p anelists' efforts to distinguish it on the merits unpersuasive,
and it is only that aspect of the second issue "opinions" upon which I
wish briefl y to comment before concluding this introduction.
Professors BORCHERS , SILBERMAN, and WEINTRAUB all claim,
for example, that underlying Carnival Cruise Lines i s approval for con
solidating l itigation i n one forum so as not to subject the cruise ship to
multiple suits in diverse fora arising out of a single i ncident. This sort
of situation, however, was not factually before the Carnival Cruise
Lines Court. A single plaintiff slipped aboard a single ship and attempt
ed to recover for this discrete inj ury. Moreover, in situations of mass
catastrophe involving those drawn together from disparate areas, it is
not immediately apparent that a shared location more factually connect
ed with the events giving rise to the catastrophe can never be found.
The Carnival Cruise Lines Court, however, was content to endorse
consolidati on on defendant' s designated playing field, w ithout regard to

I 5. "Judge" REDISH remands for fu rther consideration, "Judge" B ORCHERS
rules that federal law applies. and "Judge" STEIN, while overruling defendant's
motion to dismiss, apparently would affirm gr::mt of a motion to transfer brought
pursuant to § 1404, if that situation came before him after reversal and re mand.
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what other possibil ities might be available.
The real rationale underlying Carn ival Cruise Lines, as Professor
SOLIMINE correctly notes, is economic. And although I do not endorse
that rationale, I think Professor SOLIMINE correctly emphasizes that
the rationale cannot be avoided by pointing to contrary facts or policies
in our hypothetical. Just as a cruise line operator wishes to keep com
petitive (or increase profits) by discouragin g dispersed l itigation in every
forum from which it solicits customers, Ski Vacations wishes, with
l imited liability, to solicit customers from around the country to its
scattered resorts. Professors WEINTRAUB and B ORCHERS also argue
that Plaintiff s physical disability (being a quadriplegic as a result of
this accident) prevents her from conducting meaningful trial in Vermont.
My guess is the seriousness of the inj ury would make it worth a con
ti ngency fee attorney ' s while to try the suit wherever recovery could be
had. As Professor SOLIMINE points out, the logistical litigation diffi
culties of the hypothetical case are surmountable. The real unfairness in
forcing Plaintiff to Vermont is the substantively unfavorable Jaw when
the Vermont choice of l aw clause is applied, especially since both the
state of residence (which was also where solicitation for the trip oc
curred) and the state of the inj ury (Colorado) have law more favorable
to Plaintiff.
I sympathize with Professor WEINTRAU B ' s antipathy to assisting
Vermont in becoming "the Delaware of ski res011s by winning the race
to the bottom . . . . " WEINTRAUB. infra, at 556. But it stretches the
facts too far, as Professor SOLIMINE emphasizes , to claim or imply
that Vermont has no significant interest in this litigation. Professor
SOLIMINE properly notes that although Defendant Ski V ac ations' s
principal place of business is in New York, the company operates ski
resorts in upstate New York and Vermont. Even if there were no such
connections, the company l egitimatel y might c hoose a Vermont forum
precisely because of that state's presumed expertise in liti gating inci
dents of this sort. The real personal due process issues are notice and
l ack of meaningfu l consent, and on those issues, as Professor
S OLIMINE again points out, the Carn ival Cruise Lines facts are every
bit as egregious as those before our panel.
Given this identity to Carnival Cruise Lines, the question is whether
that admiralty decision' s logic appl ies to this case. Accordingly, we are
back at our starting point of addressing the Erie issue of whose law
should be fashioned or used to determine the validity of the clause.
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FACTS

Ski V acations i s a New York corporation which operates ski resorts
primarily in upstate New York and Vermont, and has recently opened a
small facility in Colorado . Plaintiff, an Atlanta, Georgi a resident, re
sponded to a local newspaper ad promoting i nexpensive Colorado ski
vacations. An Atlanta agency had placed the ad, responding to Ski
Vacations' s fom1 mai lings advertising special package deals and good
commissions as part of its start up campaign. Plaintiff booked, paid a
deposit on a package trip, and received a confirmation letter from Ski
Vacations ' s Colorado office containing information about the resort.
Incl uded i n the information was a notice entitled "Conditions of Con
tract." Condition 3 indicated that any and all disputes aris ing out of Ski
Vacations ' s provis ion of services or goods, including any tort claims,
must be brought i n Vermont state court and are to be governed by
Vermont law.
Plaintiff went on the Colorado ski trip, paying the balance due upon
arrival and signing a "Conditions of Contract" form identical to the one
received in the mai l . While on the slopes, Plaintiff was inj ured and i s
now a quadriplegic. Emergency treatment was rendered i n Colorado.
Soon after, Plaintiff returned to Georgia and continues to reside there.
Plaintiff brought negligence and strict liabil ity c laims i n Georgia state
court against Ski Vacations for allegedly allowing the use of inappropri
ate equipment and to ski on an inappropriate and poorly designed slope.
Assume significant differences between Georgia, Colorado, and Vermont
Jaw on one or more important substantive l aw issues; also assume Ver
mont law i s most favorable to defendant Ski Vacations on each of these
issues. Assume choice of forum clau ses which oust Georgia of j urisdic
tion were not traditionally honored under Georgia law as against public
pol icy. Recent mid-level cases, however, have approved forum clauses,
indicating some confu sion or uncertainty about the current state of
Georgia l aw on this i ssue. Assume that Georgia normall y enforces con
tract choice of l aw c lauses unless against public policy, but has not
squarely ruled whether choice of law can be pre-negotiated for tort
actions via contract terms. As sume Georgia is a vested rights j urisdic
tion that does not apply renvoi .
Defendant Ski Vacations removed Plaintiff' s suit to federal court on
the basis of diversity and, citing the forum selection clause, moved to
dismis s for lack of personal j urisdiction and/or improper venue. Assume
the federal di strict court sitting in Atlanta granted this motion, holding
that the issue was governed by federal law and that Stewart Org. , Inc.
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Ricoh Corp. , 487 U . S . 2 2 ( 1 988), and Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. , v.
Shute, 499 U . S . 585 ( 1 99 1 ), i ndicate federal policy to enforce such
clauses. Plai ntiff appeals the dismissal .
v.

As the federal Appeals Court sitting e n bane
should we rule on this appeal ?

m

1 1 th Circuit, how

Please address the following two Issues :
1 ) B y what l aw, state or federal, should we determine the validity of
the forum selection clause?
2) Regardless of whether we apply federal or state law, should we
honor the forum selection clause on the stated facts?
Those who decide that the i ssue is properly governed by state law
should assume that there is enough room in Georgia precedents to allow
a ruling either way on these facts.
* * *

BORCHERS, J. * : (reversing and remanding)
Thi s case presents two different i ssues relating to party autonomy.
First, i n diversity cases . does state law or "federal" common l aw 1 gov
ern the enforceability of choice-of-forum clauses? Second, should the
choice-of-forum clause be honored in this case?
I.
It seems odd that the fundamental question whether federal com mon

Patrick J . B orchers: Professor of Law and Associate Dean, A lbany Law
*
School of Union U n iversity.
I . I place "federal" in scare quotes here because the reference is not to preemp
tive federal l aw that would govern both in state and federal court by v i rtue of the
Supremacy Clause. See Louise Weinberg, The Curious Notion that the Rules of Deci
sion Act Blocks Supreme Federal Common Law, 83 N w . U. L. Rev. 860 ( 1 989).
Rather, "federal" common law here is a shorthand way of referring to general, j udge
made rules articulated by federal courts that do not purport to displace state rules as
they might apply i n state court. This kind of common Jaw differs from the preemp
tive sort of judge-made ru le, such as the rule articulated in Clearfield Trust Co. v.
United States, 3 1 8 U . S . 363 ( 1 943). For purposes of this opinion, when I use the
term "federal common law" or some variant, I have in mind the non-preemptive
kind.
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law or state law governs the enforcement of an agreement so ordinary
as a forum selection agreement remains shrouded i n mystery . The un
fortunate state of the matter, however, i s that the S upreme Court posi
tively delights in refusing to lay down intelligible rules, or even princi
ples, in thi s area of the law.
Analysis of the question of which law governs must begi n with the
Supreme Court ' s decision in Stewart Org. , Inc. v. Ricoh Corp. , 487
U . S . 22 ( 1 988). Stewart presented a problem similar to the one here . In
that case, Alabama state l aw denied-on grounds of "publ i c policy"
enforcement of exclusive forum selection clauses. Federal common law
favors enforcement. Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U . S . 5 85
( 1 99 1 ) (exclusive forum selection agreement enforced i n an admiralty
case as a matter of federal com mon law ) ; The Bremen v. Zapata Off
Shore Co. , 407 U . S . 1 ( 1 972). I n Stewart, the Supreme Court appeared
to be confronted with a conflict between federal common and state l aw
requiring a "relatively ungu ided," see Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U . S . 460,
47 1 ( 1 965 ), choice under the l ine of cases beginning with Erie R. R. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S . 64 ( 1 93 8 ) .
Rather than answering that question, however, the S upreme Court
asked and answered one of its own. The Stewart Court decided that the
federal venue transfer statute, 28 U.S .C. § 1 404 ( 1 988), was broad
enough to i ncorporate the exi stence of a forum selection clause as a
factor i n the analysis. Deciding that the federal venue statute covered
the subj ect removed the state/federal choice from the realm of the seri
ously debatable, because the only circumstance i n which a federal stat
ute does not trump state law is i f Congress lacks affirmative authority
to pass it. Stewart said, sensibly enough, that congressional authority to
pass a venue statute was "not subj ect to serious question," Stewart, 487
U.S. at 32 (citing Hanna, 3 80 U . S . 460), and thus federal law appl ies if
transfer under § 1 404 is the mechanism for enforci ng the forum-selec
tion clause.
Stewart, of course, rai ses more questions than it answers. But the
most important one for our purposes i s : What l aw governs enforcement
of forum selection clauses if § 1 404 is not in the picture? In our case,
of course, § 1 404 is not available, because the forum selected here i s a
Vermont state court. The concurri ng Justices in Stewart hinted that
federal common law should govern, but the dissent (which was forced
to reach the "relatively unguided" Erie question by virtue of its nar
rower construction of § 1 404) thought that state law must be supreme.
Stewart, 487 U.S. at 33 ( Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 33 (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) . With thi s obscure guidance, it is not surprising that lower
federal courts have divided sharply on the question. See Northwestern
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Nat '! Ins. Co. v. Donovan , 9 1 6 F.2d 372, 3 74 (7th Cir. 1 990) (federal
law) ; Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Cucci Am., Inc. , 8 5 8 F.2d 509, 5 1 2 (9th
Cir. 1 98 8 ) (federal law) ; Farmland Indus. , Inc. v. Frazier-Parrott Com
modities, Inc. , 806 F.2d 848 ( 8th Cir. 1 986) (state l aw). I n fact, our
circuit has managed to find itself on both sides of the question, because
the en bane opinion for the court in Stewart, reviewed by the S u preme
Court , took the position that the matter was governed by federal com
mon l aw , but a three-judge panel l ater held that state law govern s . See
A lexander Proudfoot Co. World Headquarters v. Thayer, 877 F.2d 9 1 2
( 1 1 th Cir. 1 989).
The most sensible answer to the question i s that the federal common
law rule favoring enforcement should apply." The asserted goal of the
Erie line of cases constru ing the Rules of Deci sion Act is to prevent
"forum shopping" and "inequitable administration" of law. Hanna, 380
U . S . at 468 . B ut i n this context, forum shopping cannot be avoided.
Rather, the choice i s between interstate and intrastate forum shopping.
If federal courts sitting i n diversity are required to follow state l aw on
this subj ect, thi s will make the choice between state and federal court in
any given state less significant. B ut i t will up the ante significantly as
to the state in which the plaintiff chooses to file (whether i n federal or
state court) because that choice will determi ne the enforceabi lity of the
forum selection clauses. As long as the states continue to differ on the
enforceability of these clauses (and there are a dozen or so that refuse
to enforce them under any circumstances, see Patrick J. B orchers, Fo
rum Selection Agreements in the Federal Courts After Carnival Cruise:
A Proposal for Congressional Reform, 67 Wash. L. Rev . 5 5 , 57 n . 7
( 1 992)) parties wanting t o avoid the effect o f such clauses w i l l shop for
fora that will i gnore them.
The choice, then, is not between avoiding and promoting forum
shopping, it i s between promoting i nterstate or i ntrastate forum shop
ping. The lesser of the evils, it seems to me, is i ntrastate forum shop
ping. Intrastate forum shopping is a less serious threat to fai rness be
cause it does not discriminate against civil defendants. If a diversity

2. The record i ndicates that the contract also included a choice-of-law c lause se
lecting Vermont state law. The majority rul e appears to be that choice-of- l aw c lauses
do not govern the validity of companion choice-of-forum clauses. See, e. g., A VC
Nederland B. V. v. A trium lnv. Partnership, 740 F.2d 148 (2d Cir. 1 984); L.A . Pipe
line Co11tr. Co. v. Texas E. Prod. Pipeline Co. , 699 F. Supp. 1 85, 1 86-87 ( S . D. Ind.
1 988); Bense v. Interstate Battery Sys. of Am. , 683 F.2d 7 1 8 (2d Cir. 1 982). Absent
some c lear i ndication to the contrary, there fore, I would hold that the choice-of-law
clause excludes the choice-of-forum clause from its ambit.
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plaintiff prefers federal court, it can file there; if a diversity defendant
prefers federal court, it can remove the case as long as it is sued out
side its home state. See 28 U . S . C . § 1 44 1 ( 1 98 8 ) . The only antidotes
available to defendants for interstate forum shopping are the far less
certain devices of personal j urisdiction and forum non conveniens dis
missals. Application of general standards in diversity cases also benefits
both parties by making the enforcement of these clauses more predict
able. S ubjecting these clauses to the vagaries of local law only compli
cates any calculus of their commercial value and enhances the possibili
ty of surprising results. Thus, even assuming the essential validity and
persuasive value of the Erie line of cases, the result shoul d be that
general principles, not local law, apply.
A deeper question is whether the Erie-and-Klaxon l ine of cases
makes any sense. Historical research has shown that the essential pur
pose of section 34 of the Judiciary Act of 1 789-which came to be
known as the "Rules of Decision Act" and was the foundation for Erie
-was to codify the then-commonly-accepted notion that there was a
"general" law appl icable to general subjects, and local law governed
only "local" subj ects. Wilfred Ritz, Rewriting the History of the Judicia
ry Act of 1 789 ( 1 990) ; see also Patrick J. Borchers, The Origins of
Diversity Jurisdiction, the Rise of Legal Positivism, and a Brave New
World for Erie and Klaxon , 72 Tex . L. Rev. 79 ( 1 993). The reference
in that statute to "the laws of the several states" was surely a reference
to the legal pri nciples held in common-that is, held "severally"-by
the states , and legislative activity contemporaneous with the Judiciary
Act' s passage shows unmistakably that the First Congress thought that
local state laws would not appl y in diversity cases.
The essential insight of the First Congress-which was eventuall y
lost t o our modern legal tradition-is that diversity cases, by bringing
together parties from disparate legal systems, are handled most sensibly
and fairly, in many instances, by application of uniform rules. Conflicts
rules are j ust the sort of subject for which uniform treatment across all
federal courts makes sense. The cost of honoring state law is unfairness
and the promotion of interstate forum shopping, and that cost is too
high.
Accordingly, the enforcement of the forum selection clause should
be governed by federal common law, not local Georgia law.
II .

The second issue is whether this c lause merits enforcement under
federal common law. It does not.
The S upreme Court ' s decision In The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore
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Co. , 407 U . S . 1 ( 1 972) set i nto motion a trend i n the United S tates to
wards enforcement of exclusive forum selection clauses. B ut B remen did
not give an unquali fied endorsement to these clauses. Instead, the Court
held only that reasonable clauses merit enforcement, see id. at 1 5 , and
pointed to the strong bargaining position of both parties and the actual
negoti ation over the clause as evidence that the agreement in that case
merited enforcement.
It is tempti ng to say, therefore, that the clause in this c ase fails the
Bremen reasonableness test because of the disparity of bargaining pow
er, the l ack of actual negotiation, and the severe h ardship to Plaintiff i n
l itigating away from home. The problem with this approach i s t h e Su
preme Court' s decision in Carn ival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499
U . S . 585 ( 1 99 1 ) . Carnival Cruise Lines held that a simi lar c l ause ap
pearing on the back of a cruise ship ticket was enforceable notwith
standing the disparity in bargaining power, the lack of actual negotia
tion, and the hardship to the plaintiff in litigating outside her home
state. Worse yet, Carnival Cruise Lines appears to create a rul e of near
ly per se enforcement of such clauses if they appear in form contracts
produced by l arge enterprises and choose as a forum the p lace where
one of the parties has some significant con nection. This c lause is, of
course, the product of mass production by a large enterprise and the
place it chooses as a forum-Vermont-is one with which the defen
dant has a substantial connection.
Carnival Cruise Lines i s a mi serable deci sion that I would c heerfully
overrule. See Borchers, Forum Selection Agreements in the Federal
Courts After Carnival Cruise: A Proposal for Congressional Reform,
supra, at 57 n . 7 . Other academic commentary is in accord with my dim
assessment of the S upreme Court ' s performance on thi s i ssue . See, e.g. ,
Jeffrey A. Liesemer, Carnival 's Got the Fun . . . and the Forum: A
New Look at Choice-of-Forum Clauses and Unconscionability Doctrine
After Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 53 U . Pitt. L. Rev . 1 025
( 1 992) ; Linda Mullenix, Another Easy Case, Some More Bad Law:
Carnival Cruise Lines and Contractual Personal Jurisdiction , 27 Tex.
Int' I L.J. 323 ( 1 992); William Richman, Carnival Cruise Lines: Forum
Selection Clauses in Adhesion Contracts, 40 Am. J. Comp. L . 977
( 1 992); cf Michael Sol imine, Forum-Selection Clauses and the Privat
ization of Procedure, 25 Cornell Int' I L.J. 5 1 ( 1 992). The problem w ith
allowing enforcement of such clau ses is that consumers l ack adequate
i nformation to assess the costs of these provisions to them and their
value to the other party, and the cost of obtain ing this information-i. e. ,
legal advice-is prohibitive given the s ize of the transaction. The facts
of this case demonstrate this shortcoming. Even if we c harge Plaintiff
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with reading the contract, and assume further that Plaintiff understood
the significance of the clause, Plaintiff still cannot ascertain the cost and
the defendant' s benefit. Consumers are i n a position to compare price,
length of stay, and the other customary amenities of a ski vacation. B ut
a consumer cannot-without obtaining legal advice-discount the value
of the vacation by the probability of i ncurring the cost of an expensive
lawsuit far from home. For this reason, the major i nternational conven
tions on j urisdiction, such as the Brussels Convention, deny effect to
agreements of this sort where one party is at an acute disadvantage as
i n insurance, consumer, and employment contracts .
Even taking Carnival Cruise Lines a t face value, however, there are
some significant differences between this case and that one. First, in
Carn ival Cruise Lines, although the lower court opinion, see Shute v.
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. , 897 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1 98 8 ) , found that
the plaintiff was unable to journey from Washington to Florida for trial,
the Supreme Court refused to defer to that finding. The Carnival Cruise
Lines opinion, therefore, treated as u nproven the allegation that the
clause would be unfair to the plaintiff because of extreme hardship in
attending trial . In our case, however, it is undisputed that Plaintiff is a
permanent quadriplegic and that the burden on Plaintiff by enforcing the
clause would be severe. Bremen makes clear that a he2vy burden of thi s
kind can, in appropriate circumstances, j ustify excusing a party from the
obligations of such a clause.
Second, the Carnival Cruise Lines Court understood the plaintiffs '
counsel to have conceded the issue of "notice" of the clause. !d. at 590.
No such concession has been made here. Other courts have, in the
wake of Carnival Cruise Lines, found preprinted form contracts to be
insufficient notice of the clause. Cf Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Supe
rior Court, 286 Cal. Rptr. 323 ( 1 99 1 ) (remand to tri al court to deter
mine whether printing of clause on the back of a ticket provides "no
tice") . Here, the defendant took no special steps to appri se Plaintiff of
the clause ' s existence. The Supreme Court' s opinion in Carnival Cruise
Lines is di stinguishable for this reason as wel l.
For these reasons, I would refuse to enforce the clause. This requires
me to reach the question of whether the defendant is subject to personal
juri sdiction in Georgia. For the reasons stated in my discussion of the
Brake-0 case, I would hold, as did the Ninth Circuit in Carnival Cruise
Lines, that the defendant is subject to personal j urisdiction. Carnival
Cruise Lines, 897 F.2d at 3 7 7 .
I would reverse and remand for further proceedi ngs.
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* * *

BURB ANK, J . * : (reversing and remanding)
In granting the defendant' s motion to dismiss, the district court
determi ned that federal law governed the enforceability of the forum
selection clause and relied on the Supreme Court' s decision s in Stewart
Org. , Inc. v. Ricoh Corp. , 487 U . S . 22 ( 1 988), and Carnival Cruise
Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U . S . 5 85 ( 1 99 1 ), for a federal policy i n favor
of enforcement . It is a curious fact about these cases that the first
grounded decision in 28 U . S .C. § 1 404 ( 1 98 8) without reference to the
law governing validity, while the second grounded decision in federal
law, without reference to § 1 404. In any event, neither of the S upreme
Court decisions relied on by the di strict court for the content of federal
law tell s us whether federal law applies.
The district court did not make c lear on which of the two grounds
advanced by the defendant, l ack of personal j urisdiction or i mproper
venue, it based the order of dismissal. Notwithstanding a suggestion to
the contrary in Stewart, see 487 U . S . at 28 n . 8 , we do not think i t
matters . Indeed, defendant' s objection might a s easily have been lack of
subject matter j uri sdiction .
Rules regulating personal jurisdiction and venue take account, how
ever crudely , of the i nterests of both plaintiffs and defendants. I n that
sense, each set of rules cofifers rights on prospecti ve plaintiffs as well
as prospective defendants, rights that, i f the law permits, can be traded
in advance (as well as traded or lost after litigation has been com
menced) . Similarly, although parties are not permitted to confe r subject
matter j urisdiction on the federal courts, i t has been c lear s i nc e The
Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Oil Co. , 407 U . S . 1 ( 1 972), that, i n certain
circumstances, they have the power to trade the right to such access as
the rules of subject matter j urisdiction afford . Our first task is to deter
mine w hether the di strict court was correct in deciding that federal law
determines whether Plaintiff effectively traded the right to sue the de
fendant in state or federal court in Georgia.
The resolution of the problem of lawmaking power in this di versity
case is not as easy as some of my colleagues apparently believe. Cer
tainly, i nvocation of neither Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U . S . 64 ( 1 938),
nor state contract law would resolve it. just as federal lawmaking power
exists to prescribe rules of subject matter j urisdiction, personal j uri s-

*
Stephen B. Burbank: Robert G . Ful ler,
Pennsylvania.

Jr. ,

Professor of Law, Uni versity of
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diction and venue for the federal courts, so i t exists to prescribe the
circumstances i n which those rules can be v aried by private agreement.
This power exists for cases that find their way into the federal courts
only because the requirements of the diversity statute are met, whether
directly or through removal. The questions we must answer are whether
the power was exercised in prospective l aw made before the district
entered its order, i f so, whether it was exerci sed by a duly authorized
federal lawmaker, and if not, whether in entering the order of dismissal
on the basis of federal law, the district court was such a lawmaker.
When federal law speaks on a subject, confl icting state l aw must
y ield i f the federal law is valid. At least s i nce Hanna v. Plumer, 3 80
U . S . 460 ( 1 965), the validity of pertinent federal law contained i n legis
lation or the Federal Rules has been hard to dispute and easy to con
firm. Hanna did little, however, to ease the task of those who seek to
displace state law with j udge-made federal law i n diversity actions, and
the Court' s subsequent decision in Walker v. A rmco Steel Corp., 446
U . S . 740 ( 1 980), confirmed j ust how difficult that task i s .
With the source o f the applicable l aw turning o n w hat may seem to
be the fortuity of federal l awmaking arrangements, it is an understand
able temptation to hear federal statutes or Federal Rules speaking w hen
they appear to be silent, or at least to hear enough noise nearby to
s ilence state law. The Supreme Court succumbed to a simil ar temptation
in Hanna itself, 1 and it has taken that approach twice i n recent years,
extending the domain of a Federal Rule in Burlington Northern R. R.
Co. v. Woods, 480 U . S . 1 ( 1 987), see Ralph U. Whitten, Erie and the
Federal Rules: A Review and Reappraisal After Burlington Northern
Railroad v. Woods, 2 1 Creighton L. Rev . 1 ( 1 988), and of a federal
statute in Stewart.
No such opportunity is available to us. Under the terms of the fo
rum selection clause at i ssue here, transfer to another federal court,
under either 28 U.S .C. § 1 404 or § 1 406, is not in the cards . If Con-

l.
The court o f appeals' gloss confim1s what a fair reading o f the [ state] statute
[i nvolved in Hanna] suggests, namely that the statutory provisions in question
were the functional equivalent of a tol ling rule . The Supreme Court ' s attempt
to bi furcate the statute i nto l imitations provisions and notice provisions was
art i ficial , which may explain why Justice Harlan deemed Ragan impossible to
distinguish and was moved to express his disagreement with the result in that
case.
Stephen B . Burbank, The Rules Enabling A ct of 1 934, 1 30 U . Pa. L. Rev . 1 0 1 5 ,
1 1 74-75 ( 1 982) (citing Hanna, 380 U . S . at 462-63 n. J ; id. at 476-77 ( Harlan, J . ,
concurring)).

538

NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[ Vol. 29 : 5 1 7

gress had taken responsibil ity for, rather than displaced p art of, the
doctrine of forum non conveniens, the Court ' s approach i n Stewart
might be open. But federal forum non conveniens doctrine i s j udge
made law, and it provides a mantle of validity no larger than federal
j udge-made l aw concerning forum selection clauses.
In the absence of a perti nent federal statute or Federal Rule, we are
compelled to make the inquiry suggested by Hanna 's dictum, see
Hanna, 380 U . S . at 466-69, the vitality of which was confi rmed i n
Walker. See Walker, 446 U . S . at 744-47, 752-5 3 . There c a n be n o
doubt that dii:ferences in the rules applied b y federal and state courts to
assess the validity of forum selection clauses could materi al l y affect the
character or result of litigation. Upholding such a clause, and dismissing
a lawsuit filed in derogation of it, might bring a second effort w ithin
the bar of a statute of l imitations. Moreover, such clauses owe their
exi stence to the knowledge that the location of litigati on can m ateri al l y
affect i t s character, a s in expense, and i t s result, a s through t h e opera
tion of a choice of law clause (which it is often the primary p urpose of
a choice of forum clause to fructify).
Similarly, there can be no doubt that differences between federal and
state law on this matter could lead to forum-shopping. The perception
of difference evidently did so :n this case. There are strong indications
in Walker that that is the end of the matter, that if either of the "twin
aims of Erie," Hanna, 3 80 U . S . at 468, would be frustrated by the
application of federal j udge-made law instead of state law, the l atter
must govern . See Walker, 446 U . S . at 7 5 3 . We believe that it is u seful,
however, also to consider whether application of federal common l aw
on the issue of the validity of the forum selection clau se-assuming
always that it is consequentially different from state law-would lead to
"inequitable administration of the laws," Hanna, 3 80 U . S . at 468, and
thus frustrate the other of Erie 's "twin aims."
In concluding on this aspect of the analysis that there was "simply
no reason why" federal common law should displace state law in Walk
er, 446 U . S . at 753, the Court might be thought to have suggested that
good reasons could j ustify such displacement, perhaps even if differenc
es would lead to forum-shopping. If so, there would be some room for
the consideration of federal policies other than the policies imputed by
the Court to Erie, although not for the free-form balancing of federal
and state policies that some lower federal courts and scholars, as well
as some of my colleagues, have imputed to Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural
Elec. Coop. , 356 U . S . 525 ( 1 95 8 ) . See Stephen B. B urbank,
lnterju risdictional Preclusion, Full Faith and Credit and Federal Com
mon Law: A General Approach , 7 1 Cornell L. Rev . 733, 7 87-9 1 ( 1 986)
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[hereinafter lnte rjurisdictional Preclusion] .
We should consider, therefore, whether some federal policy would
be served by the application of uniform federal j udge-made rules with
respect to the validity of forum selection clauses in diversity cases. For
this purpose, our search for relevant policies must be confined to exist
ing federal law that might be affected by the content of the law on the
issue in question. Although we have concluded that no existing federal
statute or Federal Rule is pertinent on the forum selection clause i s
sue-in the sense that, as interpreted, i t provides the legal standards for
resolution of the issue-federal law speaks in more than one voice, and
sometimes it may simply call for other federal lawmakers to fashion the
rules. The Rules of Decision Act says as much. See 28 U . S .C. § 1 65 2
( 1 98 8 ) ; B urbank, lnterjurisdictional Preclusion, supra, a t 7 5 9 , 762, 79091.
The effect of the enforcement of the forum selection clause in this
case would be to deprive Plaintiff of state and federal forums otherwise
proper as a matter of subject matter j urisdiction and, we assume, as a
matter of personal j urisdiction. Although the protections, benefits, or
rights afforded by the rules governing both matters may be waived, it
would be entirely rational to require that uniform federal Jaw prescribe
the circumstances of an effective waiver of a federal forum . That is not,
however, a policy fairly derived from the diversity statute, the removal
statute, or any other federal statute or Federal Rule of which we are
aware. We thus need not consider how, if it existed, such a policy
should be weighed against the policies imputed to the diversity statute
in Erie and its progeny.
Perhaps the best gauge of Congress ' s level of concern w ith access to
the federal courts by diverse parties who satisfy the amount in contro
versy requirement (itself an index of Congress ' s level of concern) is the
extent to which it has chosen to regulate personal j urisdiction .
Rules of personal j urisdiction and venue may be redundant, see
Allan R. Stein, Forum Non Conven iens and the Redundancy of Cou rt
Access Doctrine, 1 3 3 U. Pa. L. Rev. 7 8 1 ( 1 985), but in recent years at
least, the relevant federal rules are not very much alike when viewed
from the perspective of expressed federal interest. Legislation regu lates
the venue options of prospective federal court plaintiffs (and protections
of prospective defendants) in considerable, and often puzzling, detai l,
and legislation also regulates the reallocation of business among the
federal courts. See, e.g. , 28 U . S . C . § § 1 39 1 , 1 404 ( 1 98 8 ) . There is very
little federal legislation that speaks, directly or indirectly, to the question
of personal j urisdiction, and whatever the ambitions of those responsible
for the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, they have been kept pretty
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well under control by the Rules Enabling Acts. See S tephen B .
B urbank, The Reluctant Partner: Making Procedural La w for Interna
tional Civil Litigation, 57 Law & Contemp. Probs . 1 03, 1 46 & n .347
( 1 994 ) . As a result, in most cases brought i n or removed to federal
court, particul ar! y cases founded i n diversity, the question of personal
j urisdiction depends on the fortuity of state law.
Congres s ' s refusal generally to enact federal standards of amenabili
ty, leaving regulation to delegated lawmakers whose powers in the area
are-and are recognized to be-severely l imited, see Omni Capital Int 'l
v. Rudolf Wolff & Co. , 484 U . S . 97 ( 1 987), renders it impossible for us
to impute to the d iversi ty statute or the removal statute a policy i n
favor o f uniform federal law on a cognate matter of access . To b e sure,
we would displace any element of state l aw found to be hosti l e to or
inconsistent with those statutes, other federal statutes, or the Federal
Rules. B ut until and unless that need arises, state law governs the i ssue
of the validity of the forum selection clause.
We are told that Georgi a law is in flux, but we do not deem i t
appropri ate t o have the first word o n the subject in this case. T h e Su
preme Court has decided that appellate review of district court decision s
concerni ng the content of state l a w should b e plenary. Salve Regina
College v. Russell, 499 U . S . 225 ( 1 99 1 ) . That standard of review does
not require us to dispense with the considered views of the learned
district j udge. Our inclination to have the benefit of those views i s
strengthened by the possibility that Georgia law may call for factual
determi nations on matters as to which, some of my colleagues' sympa
thetic assertions notwithstanding, the present record is only suggestive,
as for instance the impact of enforcement of the clause on Plaintiff s
abi lity to maintain a lawsuit. We only mention here a few consider
ations that may be relevant to the difficult task that confronts the dis
trict j udge on remand:
The choices confronting Georgia lawmakers are not confi ned to the
polar extremes represented by the traditional Georgia rule on the one
hand and the federal rule as implemented in Carnival Cruise Lines on
the other. In predicting how the Supreme Court of Georgi a w i l l deal
w ith thi s issue in the future, the district com1 may wish to consider not
only recent decisions of the lower Georgi a courts regarding forum se
lection clauses, but Georgia law on the enforceabi li ty of arbi tration
clauses and, i ndeed, that state ' s j uri sprudence as a whole relating to
consumer contracts.2
1.

2. Waiting for t h e Supreme Court of Georgia t o reevaluate it s position on thi s
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2. To the extent that practical access to the forum designated i n the
contract i s relevant under Georgi a law, as i t i s under federal law, the
district court may wish to consider how Plaintiff fin anced this lawsuit
and whether the same or similar arrangements are, or are l ikely to be,
available i n Vermont.
3. It is not clear whether Plaintiff also challenges the choice of law
clause. The district court need formally consider such a challenge only
i f it finds the choice of forum clause i nvalid. In any event, we have no
occasion to address it.
Reversed and Remanded.
* * *
MULLENIX, J. * :

(reversing and remanding)
I.

I concur with my colleagues that this federal diversity action re
quires that the Erie doctrine supply the rule of decision governi ng en
forceabi l ity of the forum selection clau se. Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304
U . S . 64 ( 1 93 8 ) . Unlike my colleagues, however, I do not believe this
case presents as i ncredibly complicated an Erie question as they seem
determined to make it. Hence, I do not bel ieve the facts present a "rela
tively unguided Erie choice" derived from dicta i n Hanna v. Plumer,
380 U . S . 460, 47 1 ( 1 965) . Nor do I believe that this case authorizes u s
t o conduct a n a d hoc free-wheeling balanci ng test under Byrd v . Blue
Ridge Rural Elec. Coop. , 356 U . S . 525 ( 1 95 8 ) , i nvoking such j argon
laden concepts as a "liti gant-oriented approach" determined by "system
mien ted standards ."
Thi s case simply asks whether the Georgia federal court, i n its di
versity j urisdiction, should appl y underlying Georgi a state substantive
contract principles. If ever there was a "pure" Erie question, thi s is it.
The facts do not involve a direct conflict between a Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure and a contrasting state procedural rule exactly on point,

issue. as one of my colleagues suggests, could lead to problems of the sort that the
Supreme Court ' s Erie jurisprudence has sought to min imize. See Mark R. Kramer,
The Role of Federal Cou rts in ChanRing Stare Law: The Emplovment at Wi/1 Doc
trine in Pennsylvania, 1 33 U. Pa. L. Rev. 227, 233-38 ( 1 984 ) .
*
Linda S . Mullenix: Bernard J . Ward Centennial Professor of L a w, U n iversity
of Texas Law School; Visiting Professor, Harvard Law School 1 994-95 ; B . A . , 1 97 1 ,
The City College of New York; M . Phi l . . 1 974, Ph.D., 1 97 7 , Columbia University ;
J . D . 1 980, Georgetown University Law Center.
.
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as in Hanna. Moreover, the fact that thi s case ari ses in the court ' s
removal j urisdiction does not convert this case i nto a Hanna problem.
Cf Stewart Org., Inc. v . Ricoh Corp. , 487 U . S . 22 ( 1 98 8 ) . Nor do the
facts implicate a tension between a federal constitutional provision and
a competing weak state policy, as in Byrd. Nor do these facts entail a
state rule (statute of limitations) that exists in the absence of a p arallel
federal rule, as in Guaranty Trust Co. v . York, 3 26 U.S. 99 ( 1 945 ) .
Apparently, m y colleagues feel free t o roam over fifty years of Erie
j urisprudence, selectively plucking standards, rules, pri nciples, and aca
demic exegesis, with little regard to the actual Erie problem in this
case.
II.
Similarly, I believe that my colleagues have turned the problem of
ascertai ning applicable state law into a more complicated exercise than
is necessary . The Supreme Court of Georgia has held that forum selec
tion clauses are unenforceable. However archaic this ruling may be, it is
control ling authority until the Georgia legislature or the S upreme Court
of Georgia decides otherwise. For this Court to now hold differently
would be to announce a rule of law that the federal court thinks Geor
gia should adopt. See McKenna v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 622
F.2d 657, 669 (3d Cir. 1 980) (Higgi nbotham, J . , dissenting) .
Moreover, w e are not deal ing with a case where the state ' s highest
cou11 has not spoken on the legal issue, which would permit the federal
court to look more broadly to state i ntermediate appellate decisions or
other sources to determine appl icable law. See Salve Regina College v.
Russell, 499 U . S . 225 ( 1 99 1 ) ; Comm issioner v. Estate of Bosch, 387
U . S . 456 ( 1 967) . Whi le it is interesti ng that some Georgia intermediate
decisions have adopted the federal approach to forum selection c l auses,
these lower court decisions c2.nnot provide the basis for this federal
court independently to conclude that Georgia has changed its law.
Even where there is evidence that developing state doctrine casts
doubt over estab lished precedent, we should be wary of permitting
federal j udges broad-ranging authority to second-guess what a state
legisl ature or state high court might do if the substantive law i ssue were
newly raised in either forum. Such license inevitably will subvert the
twin aims of Erie and reintroduce the very problems that Erie was
i ntended to eliminate (inequ itable administration of the laws and the evil
of forum-shopping ) . If federal j udges in divers ity cases may disregard
existing state supreme court precedent and consider all avail able data to
determine appl icable l aw, then l awyers seeking to evade unfavorable
state law (such as the unenforceability of forum selection clauses) have
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a great inducement to maneuver their cases into federal court, hoping
that federal j udges will apply some other perceived "better" law. Such a
result embodies the j urisprudential doctrine of Swift v. Tyson, 4 1 U . S .
( 1 6 Pet. ) 1 ( 1 842), a s well a s the forum shopping opportunity o f Black
& White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Trans
fer Co. , 276 U . S . 5 1 8 ( 1 928), both soundly repudiated in Erie.
Final ly, my colleagues' proposals to remand this c ase to ascertain
Georgia law or alternatively to certify the question to the S upreme
Court of Georgia are intuitively attractive, although i t seems better to
ask the state court to speak on this question rather than a federal j udge.
See Ga. Sup. Ct. R . 3 7 . While the state certification process exists i n
Georgia and many other j urisdictions, thi s approach i s less than idea l .
The certification process will cause the Supreme Court o f Georgia to
i ssue essentially an advi sory opinion on the enforceability of forum
selection c lauses, i n the absence of an actual case or controversy . The
federal cour1 might achieve a better result if it simply applied existing
Georgia law and refused to enforce the forum selection clause, allowing
this litigation to proceed as a federal diversity suit. Not only would this
determi nation be faithful to the Erie doctrine, but it also would encour
age future litigants to directly challenge Georgi a ' s exi sting law in state
court . I f Georgia truly desires to change its approach to the enforceabi l 
ity o f forum selection clauses, such change either should come from
legislative action or the Supreme Court of Georgi a' s considered re-eval
uation of its prior rul ings in the context of actual l itigation .
III.
Finally, I write to express concern with the consequences of this
Court i nvalidating the foru m selection clause under state l aw pursuant to
the Erie doctrine.
The S upreme Court has now spoken at least three times on the issue
of the enforceabi lity of forum selection clauses and, taken together,
these cases manifest a strongly stated federal pol icy favori ng enforce
ability, subject to usual contract principles . See Carnival Cruise Lines v.
Shute, 499 U . S . 5 85 ( 1 99 1 ) ; Stewart Org. , Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487
U.S . 22 ( 1 98 8 ) ; and The Bremen v . Zapata Off-Shore Co. , 407 U.S. 1
( 1 972). As a federal diversity action, then, thi s case arises i n a proce
dural posture not present in the three leadi ng Supreme Court precedents .
The easy Erie solution i s to apply existing Georgia law, reverse the
federal dismissal based on Carn ival Cruise Lines, and remand for fur
ther federal court proceedings.
Thi s Erie solution, however, leaves federal court litigants with an
array of logically consistent rules but globally incoherent doctri ne. Thus,
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we will now have one set of enforceabi lity rules for cases i n the federal
court ' s admiralty j urisdiction, Bremen, 407 U.S at 8- 1 9 ; another set of
enforceability rules for diversity-based cases (following di sparate state
laws under the Erie doctrine) ; a third set of governing principles for
state cases removed and transferred within the federal system, Stewart,
487 at 28-32; and possibly yet another undetermined set of standards
for federal question cases . Further, it is not inconceivable that federal
courts could develop different enforceabi lity principles for federal cases
grounded in some other j urisdictional basis, such as a Congressional
charter provision. See, e.g. , A merican Nat '! Red Cross v. S. C. , 1 1 2 S .
Ct. 2465 ( 1 992).
My colleagues are undisturbed by this phenomenon , characterizing
these disparate rules, principles, standards, and results as the "normal
dislocations" of federalism. B ut it seems to me that thi s dismissive
attitude tri vializes some very real problems.
The enforceability of forum selection clauses ought not to turn on
fortuitous fact circumstances or contrived procedural choices. Hence, it
makes very l ittle sense to me that Mrs. S hute ' s case should come out
differentl y depending on where she had the bad luck to s l ip and
fal l-whether at sea off the coast of Mexico or on the gangplank i n
Los Angeles. If Mrs. Shute had been a Georgia resident a n d h ad she
fallen on the gangplank i n Los Angeles, then a diversity removal i n
Georgia might have compel led the S upreme Court to dec ide Carn ival
Cruise Lines entirely differently. And, if Mrs. S hute from Washington
state knocked over a Georgia resident in the same gangplank accident
and both sued Carni val Cruise Lines i n their home states, then on di
versity removal Mrs . Shute probably would be bound by the forum
selection clause, while the Georgia res ident would not. To make matters
even worse, these results would be different if the forum selection
clause permitted transfer to another federal court, in which i nstance
Stewart would appl y to permit the federal court to apply federal Bremen
standards.
Other anomalies abound among the developing federal rules relating
to the enforceab i li ty of forum selection clauses. If i n Stewart the con
tract had spec ified only a state court as a permissible forum (precluding
a federal transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1 404 ( 1 988)), then presum
ably Stewart would have been decided differently because Alabama does
not recognize the enforceabil ity of forum selection clauses. This i s
precisely the question the S upreme Court deflected in Stewart, i nstead
relying on the Hanna-branch of the Erie doctri ne to apply federal stan
dards. At least one lesson derived from the Court' s Stewart holding i s
that a contractual l imitation t o a state forum may enhance t h e abili ty t o
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defeat a forum selection clause, while inclusion of a federal forum
should enhance the ability to have the provision enforced under B remen
principles.
Preci sely these distinctions i nevitably will cause transactional and
litigating attorneys to conform their conduct to the most adventitious
liti gation opportunity available. Hence, all prospective defendants are
well-advised to draft documents with contractual forum selection clauses
that include a federal forum . This simple provision w i l l always assure
application of Stewart and Bremen. On the contrary, all prospective
plaintiffs , i f possible, should sue in those states that do not recognize
the enforceability of forum selection clauses.
Finally, these various rules encourage forum shopping for a more
favorable court as well as more favorable law. My colleagues, apparent
ly agreeing with Justice S calia (see Ferens v. John Deere, 494 U . S . 5 1 6
( 1 990)) , are not offended by such strategies. But i t seems to me that
such a cavalier approach to blatant manipulative behavior reintroduces
precisely the kinds of systemic abuse that the Erie decision was i ntend
ed to eliminate . We should be offended by the result in Ferens, not
applauding clever lawyering. Unless the federal courts have repudiated
the rationales underlyi ng the Erie doctrine, these concerns ought to be
as compelling today as they were i n 1 93 8 . If not, then the Erie doctrine
and its progeny amount to nothing more or less than a highly manipu
lable set of rules.
IV.
Although the . Erie doctrine compel s the result in this case, the con
clusion is an unhappy one. Because of the burgeoning doctrinal disarray
in this area, if there is a national consensus favoring enforcement of
forum selection clauses, then perhaps Congress could better resolve this
problem.
Reversed and remanded.
* * *

REDISH,

J.*:

(remanding)

In reviewing the decision of the court below, we are required to
resolve two distinct issues: ( 1 ) in this diversity case, should the federal
court apply its own l aw on the validity of the forum selection clause or

*
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i nstead apply the relevant l aw of the state of Georgia, and (2) assuming
that thi s Court concludes that federal law controls the issue of forum
selection clause validity, the content of that federal standard. I t i s my
opi nion that the first question cannot be answered without i ni ti ally
ascertaining the content of Georgi a law on the issue of forum selection
c lause validity-apparently a difficult task that requires either c areful
examination and analysi s of the appl icable state court precedents b y the
district court or perhaps resort to certification to the state' s highest c ourt
for clarification of the issue, if such a procedure is available u nder
Georgia law. For this reason, the case must be remanded for consider
ation of these issues by the district court. Even if this Court w ere to
conclude that federal law controls the question before us, according to
control l ing Supreme Court precedent, the case must in any event be re
manded to the district court in order to enable that court to make factu
al findi ngs concerning the level of inconvenience and unfairness that
would result to Plaintiff as a result of enforcement of the clause.
I.

DETERMINING WHOSE L AW CONTROLS

At the outset, i t should be made c lear that the case of Carnival
Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S . 5 85 ( 1 99 1 ), in no way controls
determi nation of the relevance of state law under the present c ircum
stances. That case i nvoked the federal courts ' admiralty j urisdiction, a
j urisdiction in which-rightly or wrongly-federal common law controls
even the most substantive question. Hence, i t i s not surpri sing that the
Court in Carnival Cruise Lines proceeded on the assumption that feder
al law controlled. However, when a case fall s within our diversity j uris
diction, the dictates of Erie R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 ( 1 93 8 ) , and
i ts progeny-a doctrine with no appl ic ability to our admiralty j urisdic
tion-control our deci sion.
Resolution of the issue as to which system' s law controls in this
case, then, necessarily impl icates the Erie doctrine, a doctrine as con
fused as it is venerable. It i s c lear, under both Erie itself and subse
quent deci sions, that it i s unconstitutional-as beyond Congress ' s power
under Article I of the Constitution-to employ the diversity j uri sdiction
i n order to vest i n the federal j udiciary the power to fashion common
l aw principles that supplant applicable state law that is purely substan
tive-i. e. , law that in no way regulates the fairness or accuracy of the
truthfinding process. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U . S . 460 ( 1 965 ) . That i s
clearly not the case for a forum selection clause, which a t least to a
certain extent affects matters of process or procedure. For questions that
are in some sense procedural , the i ssue i s ulti mately a matter of con
gressional choice. When no more speci fic federal statute is applicable,
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i. e. , 28 U . S .C. § 1 404(a) ( 1 98 8 ) , the longstanding Rules of Decision
Act, 28 U . S . C. § 1 65 2 ( 1 982), controls. A lthough the Act' s text may not
easily lend itself to many of the possible i nterpretive modes that have
been suggested over the years, each of these potential standards finds
some level of support in S upreme Court doctrine. Indeed, one can find
reasonable support i n one or more S upreme Court decisions-deci sions
that have never been formal ly overruled-for the foll owing, seemingly
mutuall y excl usive standards : ( l ) a systemic balancing process, that
weighs the federal forum ' s interest in appl ying its own common l aw
pri nciples against the state ' s interest i n having its law applied; (2) an
"outcome determination" test, that app lies state law when use of a dif
ferent federal standard would result i n a possible alteration i n the c ase ' s
outcome ; and ( 3 ) a "modified outcome determination" test, which dic
tates the use of state law when use of a distinct federal standard would
likely i nfluence a reasonable p laintiff' s strategic choice between state
and federal fora.
If a court were to employ either of the latter two standards, the Erie
i ssue would be a relatively easy one: any meaningfu l difference between
state and federal law on the question of enforcement of the forum se
lection c lause would necessari l y di ctate directly oppos ite results concern
i ng the validity of the plaintiff' s selection of forum ; unde:- one standard
the clause would be valid and under the other standard it would be
invalid. Whatever state law turns out to be, then, any departure from
that rule by the federal court wou ld undoubtedl y influence a plaintiff' s
choice of forum . Under one v iew of the Erie doctri ne, this difference i s
o f pri mary concern because it gives rise t o the assumed evil o f forum
shopping on the part of the p laintiff.
According to another version of the values underlying the Erie doc
trine ( what can be properly described as the ''systemic balancing" mod
el, derived l argel y from the Supreme Cour t' s decision in Byrd v. Blue
Ridge Rural Elec. Coop. , 356 U . S . 525 ( 1 95 8)) the dangers of forum
shopping have been grossly overstated, and (at l east i n the procedural
context) are actuall y relatively trivial. Much more i mportant, under this
theory of the values underlying Erie, are the systemic concerns of fed
eral ism that are necessarily impl icated by any Erie choice.
I must candidly acknowledge that the weight of S upreme Court
precedent appears to be on the side of the more l itigant-oriented ap
proach to the Erie question. Both the Court' s dictum in Hanna and its
subsequent dec ision in Walker v. A rmco Steel Corp. , 446 U . S . 740
( 1 980), reflect this fact. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the
Court ' s deci sion in Byrd has never actually been overruled, and lower
courts have for many years continued to invoke its system-oriented
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standards . Hence, I conclude that the Erie issue i n this case should be
resolved by resort to a systemic balancing analysis, because such an
approach properly grounds the Erie doctrine i n concerns of federalism.
Such an analysis cannot be conducted, however, absent a ful l under
standing of both the current status of Georgia law on the issue at h and
and the policies which that law is intended to foster.
As we understand it, the current state of Georgia law i s i n flux.
While state supreme court precedent, which has yet to be overruled,
refuses to enforce forum selection clau ses, apparently more recent mid
level state decisions have indicated a willingness to enforce such c l aus
es. I n ascertaining app licable state law, it i s appropriate for a federal
court to assume the role of the state supreme court, rather than that of
a state trial court. If the federal court were to assume the rol e of a state
trial court it would be bound to enforce existing state supreme court
precedent, even though the state supreme court itself might well choose
to overrule that precedent were it given the opportunity. A state trial
court decision, of course, may be appealed ultimately to the state su
preme cou rt, while a decision of a federal di strict court may not. Thus,
if a federal court were to act as a state trial court w ithout the possibili
ty of review i n the state ' s highest court, a new type of forum shopping
for substantive law on the part of plaintiffs could be created.
I do not believe we are competent at this point to ascertain state law
on the forum selection clause issue. Instead, we need the benefi t of a
careful review of that question by an experienced district j udge. In
addition to ascertai ning the current state of Georgia law, I would direct
the district court to ascertain the policies underlying that l a w . If the
state would, in fact, enforce forum selection clauses, uncertainty exists
as to the state ' s underlying policy goal . On the one hand, the state may
do so i n order to fulfi l l the values of individual self-determination that
provide the basis for the freedom of contract in the first place. Under
these c ircumstances, I believe that the state ' s interest would extend
beyond the four walls of the courtroom, constituting an i mportant state
substantive policy choice which could be seriously undermin ed by a
contrary federal common law rule. I would therefore enforce state l aw .
On the other hand, the state might choose t o enforce forum selection
clauses simply out of a "housekeeping" concern for docket control :
enforcement of such clauses has the beneficial procedural effect of
reducing the state' s already crowded j udicial dockets. If thi s is, i n fact,
the state' s pol icy choice, it would in no way be undermined by a con
trary rule in federal court. The state ' s asserted interest, in other words,
would not extend beyond the four wal l s of its courtroom, and the feder
al court should be deemed free to determine for itself the v al idity of
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forum selection clauses.
If i t were to be determined that under state law the clause would
not be enforced, the state' s policy goal appears clear. The state would
be attempting both to protect its citizens from what amount to contracts
of adhesion and to assure a fair and convenient forum i n which its
citizens may effectively v i ndicate their rights. If so, I believe that a
federal c ourt would be required to enforce that i mportant substantive
policy choice. The interests of federalism dictate such a result.
II. D ETERMINING FEDERAL LAW
If it i s ultimately decided that federal law controls the validity of
forum selection clauses, I believe a hearing must be held i n the district
court in order to determine whether enforcement would effectively de
prive the plaintiff of a forum . Thi s is the lesson of the S upreme Court' s
decision i n Carnival Cruise Lines. There, the Court rejected the court of
appeals ' s finding that plaintiffs l acked a forum, because no such finding
had been made i n the trial court. Thus, the Supreme Court i n that case
effectively held that such factual determinations must be made at the
trial court level. While there appears to be a strong chance that such a
finding could be made i n this case given plaintiff' s obviously precarious
position, we must leave that question, in the first i nstance, to the dis
trict court.
Case remanded, for proceedings consistent with this opm10n.
* * *

S ILBERMAN,

J.* :

(reversi ng)

The j udgment below i s reversed.
The present case presents a welcome opportunity to both clarify and
revi si t the j urisprudence of party autonomy with respect to j urisdiction
and choice of law.
I.
On the i ssue of whether state or federal law control s the validity of
the forum selection clause in this diversity action , we are presented with
a classic Erie problem. An inquiry i nto the nature and purpose of forum
selection clauses was avoided by the S upreme Court in Stewart Org. ,
Inc. v. Ricoh Corp. , 487 U . S . 22 ( 1 988), because the Court found that

*
L inda J . Silberman: Professor of Law, New York Uni versity School of Law ;
B . A . University of M ichigan, 1 965 ; J.D. University of Michigan. 1 968.
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2 8 U . S . C . § 1 404 ( 1 98 8 ) , a federal statute with an avowedly procedural
purpose, controlled in the face of a direct collision with state law . Stew
art, 487 U . S . at 32. However, Justice Scalia, dissenting in Stewart, criti
cized the majority for its assumption that § 1 404 i n any way spoke to
the weight to be given to a forum selection clause. /d. at 3 3 -4 1 ( Sc al ia,
J . , dissenting).
No transfer motion has been made in this action, 1 and thus Stewart
does not control. I ndeed, if § 1 404 had been invoked and I were i n a
position to do so, I would urge the S upreme Court to reconsider the
path i t chose in Stewart.
W hether state standards control the validity of forum-selection c laus
es depend in part on the state ' s reasons for upholding or i nv alidating
such clauses. As Justice H arlan so astutely observed in his concurring
opinion in Hanna v . Plumer, 3 80 U.S. 460 ( 1 965 ) : "if the choice of
rule would substantially affect those primary decisions respecting human
conduct which our constitutional system leaves to state regulation . .
Erie and the Constitution require that the state rule · prevail , even i n the
face of a cont1icting federal rule." !d. at 475 ( Harlan, J . , concurring).
An i nitial inquiry i s to determine what lies behind Georgia' s policy
of disregarding forum selection clauses . If the Georgia rule is merely an
attempt to control its own courts' jurisdiction , then it would appear to
fal l i nto the category of housekeepi ng or procedural rules that should
have no application in a federal court . If, on the other hand, the invali
dation of forum selection clau ses retlects Georgia' s protection of resi
dent consumers i n order to allow them to bring suit at home and to
ease the costs of l itigation, t!lose seem to be the kind of protective rules
that should be honored by a federal court. 2 Indeed, it is precisely those
kinds of policies that led J udge Friendly in the Arrowsmith v. United
Press Jnt 'l, 320 F.2d 2 1 9 (2d Cir. 1 963), to conclude that state and not
federal standards should control amenability to suit in diversity litiga
tion. /d. at 23 1 .
Further support for the choice of state rather than federal l aw can be
.

I . Plaintiff sued i n state court i n her home state of Georgia; Defendant removed
to federal court and then moved to dismiss on the basis of the forum selection
clause. Presumably, no transfer motion was made in connection with the foru m
selection clause because the chosen forum is the Vermont state court.
2 . I t should be noted that some states might make precisely the opposite policy
choice in order to further quite different state policies. See, e.g. , N . Y . Gen. Oblig.
Law § 5 - 1 402 (McKinney 1 989) ( permitting choice of New York forum when non
resident defendant agrees i n contract to submit to j urisdiction i n New York, c hooses
New York law to govern, and the obligation arises out of a transaction cove ri ng at
least one mi llion dol lars).
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found in other values reflected in the Erie line of cases. In order to
avoid the forum selection clause, Plaintiff sues i n Georgia state court to
take advantage of Georgia policy, which ostensibly inval idates the fo
rum selection clause and allows Plaintiff to sue in Georgi a. If the feder
al court i s free to apply a different federal standard, the result will be
the type of state-federal forum-shoppi ng that Erie was designed to
avoid. Of course, merely having suit i n Georgi a as opposed to suit i n
Vermont may not b e the type o f outcome difference w ith which Erie
was concerned. But choice of forum differences are exacerbated by
differing choice of l aw approaches followed in different fora. That is
evident in the present c ase, w here a choice of l aw clau se in the contract
selecting Vermont law may be criti cal to the decisive substantive i ssues
in the case. Certainly, Klaxon Co. v . Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co. , 3 1 3 U . S .
4 8 7 ( 1 94 1 ) , would require the federal court t o follow the state ' s choice
of law approach on that question. The choice of law and choice of
forum c lauses must be viewed together to reflect Georgia' s regu latory
policies against l imiting liability in tort cases of this type. When viewed
in this context, there can be l ittle question that Erie requ ires the federal
court sitting i n diversity to honor the state policies. Needless to say, i f
Congress should decide, a s a matter o f its i nterstate commerce power,
to regulate nationwide ski resorts or to establish federal standards to
govern choice of forum and choice of law clauses in ski-vacation con
tracts, federal law would trump. 3 But the federal standard would then
be the applicable standard in both the state and federal courts. 4 Howev-

3. In prior writing I have suggested that courts treat the l aw governing forum
selection c lauses in international cases as a matter of federal common law. In this
context, parochial values of individual states should give way to the need for a uni
form federal standard in transnational l itigation. That standard would then apply in
both state a n d federal courts. See Linda Silberman, Development in Ju risdiction and
Forum Non Conveniens in International Litigation: Thoughts on Reform and a Pro
posal for a Uniform Standard, 28 Tex. I nt ' l L.J. 50 1 , 528-29 ( 1 994) ; see also,
Andreas F. Lowenfeld, International Litigation and the Quest for Reasonableness
(Hague A cademy General Course on Private International Law), 245 Recueil des

Cours 255-9 1 ( 1 994-I) ( urging a uniform federal standard for enforcement of iorum
selection c lauses in i nternational commercial cases ) . Note that such an approach goes
further than either The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. , 407 U . S . I ( 1 972), or
Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U . S . 585 ( 1 99 1 ), both of which are admi
ralty cases, and do not necessarily speak to situations where the claims in federal
court are based on state law or when international commercial contract cases are
brought i n state court.
4. See, e.g, the S upreme Court ' s recent decision in A llied-Bruce Terminix v.
Dobson, I 1 5 S. Ct. 834 ( 1 995), applying the Federal Arbitration Act to enforc� an
arbitration clause i n a termite bond-enforceable u nder the Federal Act-but unc: n-
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er, in the absence of congressional action to that effect (or a rej uvena
tion of federal common law in this area), the Georgia standard w ith
respect to forum selection c l auses must control .
II.
On the issue of the validity of this particular forum-selection clause,
enforcement is unlikely under either a state or federal standard. Recent
decisions, such as The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. , 407 U . S . I
( 1 972) and Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. ,
473 U . S . 6 1 4 ( 1 985), which have furthered the cause of party autonomy
and upheld various types of forum-selection clauses, are distinguishable
as involving international commercial matters. Of course, Carn ival
Cruise Lines v. Shute, 499 U . S . 585 ( 1 99 1 ), does offer the possibility
that forum-selection clauses will be enforced even as against an unwit
ting consumer. However, i n Carnival Cruise Lines , the Court noted the
cruise line ' s special interest in limiting the fora where a single mi shap could subject the cruise line to l itigation i n several different fora. !d. at
593 . The forum-selection clause as a consolidation device may have
been given particular force in that context. But multi-party litigation
raising common claims is less likely with respect to l itigation against
Ski Vacations. Individual plaintiffs with claims against S ki Vac ations
are more l ikely to present different grievances against the potential
defendant.
The Restatement (Second) of Confl icts provides that the parties'
agreement as to the place of the action will be given effect unless it is
unfair or unreasonable. Restatement (Second) of the Contlicts of Laws §
80 ( 1 97 1 ) . There seems little j ustification for the selection o f Vermont
as the forum. The choice of Vermont seems to be a blatant c:ttempt to
have Vermont law applied (although it is not c lear on j ust what particu
lar i ssue). Because V ermont has almost no connection to the parties and
the transaction, the choice of Vermont law does not seem to meet the
standards for upholding a choice of law clause. See Restatement (Sec
ond) of the Confl icts of Laws § 1 87 ( 1 97 1 ). Again, looked at together,
the choice of forum and choice of law clauses appear to viol ate the
fundamental policy of Georgia and should not be enforced. 5

forceab l e under an Alabama state statute i nval idating predispute arbi tration agreements.
The Court i n Terminix reaffirmed its decision i n Southland Corp. v . Kearing. 465
U . S . I ( 1 984), holding that the Federal Arbitration Act applies in both fe deral di ver
sity cases and state courts, and construing the reach uf the Federal Arbi trat ion Act to
the l imits of the federal commerce c lause power.
5. Note the thoughtful attempt by one district j udge to i mplement t h e policies of
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* * *

WEINTRAUB, J. * : (reversing)
Reversed. The forum selection clause and the choice-of-law clause
are unenforceable. State law governs these issues, but there i s no reason
to think that, on these facts, Georgi a and federal law would produce
different results. The law of Colorado applies in accordance with
Georgia' s choice-of-law rules. The motion to dismiss for lack of person
al j uri sdiction is denied.
I.

ERIE

A split of authority has ari sen between the circuits as to w hether the
enforceability of a forum selection clause is determined in diversity
cases by state or federal law . See, e.g., Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Cucci
America, Inc. , 8 5 8 F.2d 509 (9th Cir. 1 98 8 ) (federal); Gene ral Eng 'g
Corp. v. Martin Marietta A lumina, 783 F.2d 352 (3d Cir. 1 986) (state).
I n Stewart Org. , Inc. v. Ricoh Corp. , 487 U.S. 22 ( 1 9 8 8 ) , the S upreme
Court did not resol ve this issue because the defendant had moved to

Erie and Van Dusen v. Barrack, 376 U . S . 6 1 2 ( 1 964 ) , after transfer on the basis of
a forum selection clause. In Caribbean Wholesales & Serv. Corp. v. US J VC Corp. ,

855 F. Supp. 627 ( S . D . N . Y . 1 994) , the plaintiff brought an action to recover for
violation of the Puerto Rico Dealers' Act in state court i n Puerto Rico, notwi thstand
ing the distributorship agreement containing choice of law and choice of forum
clau ses speci fying New York. Defendant removed the case to federal court and the
case was transferred to New York on the authority of Stewart Org. , Inc. v. Ricoh
Corp. , 487 U . S . 22 ( 1 98 8 ) . However, on the issue of which c hoice of law and
ultimately which substanti v e law should govern the case, the district court had more
difficulty. The transferee j udge indicated that it should be the state policies of the
transferor forum that shou l d be respected; therefore, if the state cou rrs in the
transferor forum would not h ave dismissed the case on the basis of the forum selec
tion c lause, then the choice of law rules of the transferor state should apply. But i f
the state courts would have enforced the forum selection clause and dismissed on
forum non conveniens, then the choice of law rules of the transferee state should
govern, since choice of law rules would have pl ayed no role. The dec ision in Carib
bean tries to give real meaning to the claim that transfers under Stewart should
remain ''housekeeping measures" and not continued jockeying between the state and
federal courts for choice of law advantages. Finding that Puerto Rico would not have
enforced the forum selection clau se on public policy grounds and would have re
tained the case, the court determined the choice of l aw rules of Puerto Rico, the
transferor fomm, should apply.
*
Russell J . Weintraub: Professor of Law and holder of the John B. Connally
Chair i n Civil Jurisprudence, University of Texas at Austin School of Law. Author of
Commentary on the Conflict of L�ws (3d ed. 1 986 with I 99 1 supp.); lnternationul
Litigation and A rbitration ( 1 994 ) .
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transfer under 2 8 U . S .C . § 1 404(a) ( 1 98 8 ) . This, the Court held, caused
the issue to be governed by federal § 1 404(a) standards under which
the forum selection clause was but one factor to be considered. Here,
because the chosen forum is a Vermont state court, the defendant, in
stead of moving for a § 1 404(a) transfer to another federal court, moves
for dismissal for improper venue. Thus, the Erie fat i s back i n the fire .
Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U . S . 64 ( 1 93 8 ) .
I n resolving the Erie problem, the purpose o f the state rul e i s often
the key. If the state rule has a purpose that re lates only to the state as
forum-such as a rul e that favors dismissal in order to c lear c rowded
dockets-the rule might well be regarded as inapplicable in another
forum, even in a federal court sitting in the state. The Georgia rule,
now perhaps being displaced, refusing to dismiss a suit brought in
violation of a forum-selection clause, can have no such forum -related
purpose. We fi nd i t i nconceivable that on a matter so significantly relat
ed to state views of freedom of contract, state law should not c ontrol.
We distinguish those cases i n which circuit courts have applied a
federal view of forum non con ven iens to dismiss actions, even though
the federal courts were sitting in states that abj ure or restrict that doc
trine. See, e.g. , Sibaja v. Dow Chem. Co. , 757 F.2d 1 2 1 5 ( 1 1 th Cir.),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 948 ( 1 98 5 ) . The "public" interest aspect of forum
non conveniens can plausibly be argued to trigger the i nherent power of
a federal court to control its docket and refuse to expend i t s scarce
resources on a matter that could more conveniently be tried elsewhere.
There i s no such factor present here. Thi s case can as conveniently,
nay, more conveniently, be tried here as in Vermont. Thi s i s true not
only with regard to the private convenience considerations of the par
ties, but also with regard to the public factors affecting efficient u s e of
j udicial resources .
B ecause Georgia law control s, it might well be prudent, as Judges
B URBANK and REDISH suggest, to remand this case to the di strict
j udge to receive the benefit of her expertise on that state's law. A lterna
tively, we might certify the question to the Supreme Court of G eorgia.
See Ga. Code Ann . § 1 5 -2-9 (Michie 1 994) ; Ga. S. Ct. R. 37. Plaintiff,
however, is gravely injured and every effort should be made to acceler
ate the determi nation of Plaintiff' s cause. Remand or certification for
determination of Georgia l aw would i n all l ikelihood be a w aste of
time. There is no reason to think that federal and state standards for
enforcing forum-selection clauses would produce different results i n this
case. First, Georgi a seems headed toward joining the mainstream on this
i ssue. Second, even i f the S upreme Court of Georgia would reject the
direction assayed by its lower courts, this is a case in which the strong
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federal presumption i n favor of forum selection is rebutted. Whatever
the Georgi a rule, there is no l ikeli hood that it would enforce a forum
selection clause that the federal rule would reject. Thus, certification to
the S upreme Court of Georgia may not be poss;ble because we could
not represent that state l aw i s "determinative" of the cause, as i s re
quired by the Georgia statute and rule.
The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. , 407 U . S . 1 ( 1 972), stated that
a forum-selection clause should be enforced unless enforcement would
"be so manifestly and gravely i nconvenient . . . that it will . . . effec
tively [deprive the plaintiff] of a meaningfu l day in court," id. at 1 9 ; or
the c lause was affected "by fraud, undue i nfluence, or overweening
bargaining power," id. at 1 2 ; or "enforcement would contravene a
strong public policy of the forum," id. at I 5 . Each of these reasons for
non-enforcement i s present here. Plai ntiff' s disability erects, i f not phys
ical, then economic , barriers that prevent Plaintiff from going to Ver
mont; the clause is in an unbargained consumer contract ; and enforce
ment would shock the conscience.
Carn ival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute , 499 U.S . 585 ( 1 99 1 ), applying
economic theory apparently gleaned from the back of a bubble gum
wrapper, enforced the clause buried in the bed-side reading for insomni
acs on the cruise ticket. An outraged Congress promptly abrogated
Carnival Cruise Lines by amending the Vessel Owner ' s Liabil ity Act,
46 U . S .C. App. § 1 83(c), to insert the boldface word in the subsection
outlawing any ticket provi sion "purporting to lessen . . . the right of
any claimant to a trial by any court of competent j uri sdiction ." Act of
Nov. 4, 1 992, Pub. L. No. 1 02-587, § 3006, 1 992 U . S .C.C.A.N. ( 1 06
Stat . ) 5039, 5068 . The cruise i ndu stry thereupon mobilized its lobbyists
and "any" i s not there any more . Act of Dec . 20, 1 99 3 , Pub . L . No.
1 03-206, § 309, 1 993 U.S .C.C.A.N. ( 1 07 Stat . ) 24 1 9, 2425 .
Be that as i t may, Carn ival Cruise Lines i s distingu ishable, even
aside from the c ircumstance that it was an admiralty matter and this i s
not. A forum-selection c lause on a cruise ticket might b e designed to
protect the shipping company from the draconian prospect of hundreds
of lawsuits in many forums ari s ing out of the same mass disaster. There
is much less l ikelihood that a skier' s c laim will be one of many based
on the same event. Furthermore, Justice Blackmun notes that "the Dis
trict Court made no finding regarding the physi cal and fi nancial impedi
ments to the Shutes' pursuing their case in Florida." Ca rnival Cruise
Lines, 499 U . S . at 594. Here, the finding of p laintiff' s heart-wrenching
disabi lity i s mani fest. Justice B lackmun also states: ''Any suggestions of
such a bad-faith motive [to discourage consu mers from pursuing legi ti
mate clai ms] i s belied by two facts: petitioner has its principal place of
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business in Florida, and many of its cruises depart from and return to
Florida ports." !d. at 595 . Here, defendant ' s principal place of busi ness
i s in New York. The selection of a Vermont forum a:1d Vermont law i s
patently designed not only to discourage a suit such as the one before
us, but also to make the suit i nfeasible. If Vermont wishes to be the
Delaware of ski resorts by winning the race to the bottom, i t i s with
s ingular pleasure that we frustrate that ambition.
Eighteen members of the European Union and the European Free
Trade Association value forum selection clauses. Article 1 7 of their
Convention on Juri sdiction and Enforcement of Judgments (Official
J.E.C. 1 89, v. 33, July 28, 1 990, pp. 1 -34, reprinted 29 I.L.M. 1 4 1 3
[E.U. "Brussels" Convention] ; 28 I .L.M. 620 [E.F.T.A. "Lugano" Con
venti on ] [hereinafter E . U.-E.F.T . A . ] ) provides w ide scope for the p arties
to an agreement to select an exclusive foru m for l itigation of d isputes
that may arise between them . Our brethren abroad have more sense,
however, than to extend this freedom to consumer contracts. Section 4
of that same Convention (arts. 1 3 - 1 5 ) protects the consumer of goods or
services from bargaining away her right to sue at home when " i n the
S tate of the consumer' s domicile the conclusion of the contract was
preceded by a speci fi c invi tation addressed to [her] or by advertising."
E.U.-E.F.T.A., supra, art. 1 3 (3)(a). The resu lt i n Carnival Cruise Lines
might survive the Convention for the Convention' s consumer provi sions
do "not apply to contracts of transport." E.U.-E.F.T. A . , supra, art . 1 3 <][
3 . Of course, the contract i n Carn ival Cruise Lines could be found not
to be one of transport, but of a different service. I am not sure what.
Perhaps the priv ilege of stuffing yoursel f with all the mediocre food
you can eat. In any event, the wise provisions of our European cousins
strengthen our conclusion that this forum-selection clause should not be
enforced.
II.

CHOICE OF

LAW

For the same reasons, neither we nor the Georgia courts w i l l enforce
the choice-of-law c lause i n the "Conditions of Contract." Restatement
(Second) of the Confl icts of Laws § 1 87 cmt. b ( 1 97 1 ) , provides that
"the forum will scrutinize such contracts (as are contained on t ickets)
with care and will refuse to apply any choice-of-law provi si ons they
may contain i f to do so would result in substantial inj ustice to the
adherent." !d. That comment appl ies here .
III.

J U R I S D ICTION

We also dismiss defendant' s 1 2 (b)(2) motion to dismiss for lack of
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personal j u ri sdiction. The same E.U. and E.F.T.A. Convention provi
sions protecting the consumer from adhesion forum-selection c lauses,
confer juri sdiction over the other party at the consumer' s domicile. The
Atlanta travel agency was the defendant' s agent for the purpose of
establishing at the consu mer' s home the contacts (concluding the con
tract and advertising) that, u nder the Convention, permi t the consumer
to sue the other party there . E. U.-E.F.T. A . , supra, arts. 1 3 (3 ) (a), 1 4 CJ[ 1 .
S urely juri sdiction that our European cousins regard as proper and civi
l ized c an not v iolate due process, or our Constitution is on its head.
* * *

STEIN, J . * :

(concurring)

I would deny defendant ' s motion to dismiss for lack of personal
j urisdiction because the foru m selection clause, even if enforceable, does
not divest thi s Court of jurisdiction. Accordingly, a motion to dismiss
pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 1 2(b)(2) and 1 2(b)(3) i s
not a n appropriate mechanism to enforce the c lause. Use o f this proce
dure i s analytically i ncoherent and unnecessarily confuses the source of
l aw governing the enforceabi lity of forum selection clauses in federal
court.
Plaintiff' s contention that state, rather than federal, l aw governs the
present motion is predicated on the distinction between the procedural
posture of this case and that of Stewart Org. , inc. v. Ricoh Corp . , 487
U . S . 22 ( 1 9 8 8 ) . Stewart resolved definitively that the enforceabl ilty of a
forum selection clause asserted as grounds to transfer pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1 404(a) ( 1 98 8) i s governed by federal law. To fi nd a live Erie
issue i n the wake of Stewart, plaintiff rel ies on the fact that defendant
has attempted to enforce the forum selection c lause through a motion to
dismiss for l ack of personal j urisdiction. In this posture, § 1 404(a)
seems to exert no i nfluence, and the court must grapple with the
"relatively unguided" choice between state and federal com mon law. '
The other members of this Court apparently accept Plaintiff' s j urisdic
tional characterization and therefore assume that defendant ' s motion to

*
Allan R. Stein : Professor of Law, Rutgers School of Law-Camden . I would
l ike to thank Steve B urbank, Perry Dane, Roger Dennis, M ichael Dorf, Richard
Hyland, Larry Kramer, Earl M altz, Dennis Patterson and Linda S i l berman for their
helpful suggestions.
l. Hanna v . Plumer, 380 U . S . 460, 47 1 ( 1 965 ) . The "relatively unguided Erie
choice" refers to the choice between federal and state procedural l aw whtn the
application of federal law is not speci fically authorized by federal legislation. /d.
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dismiss for Jack of j uri sdiction i s the appropriate procedural mechanism
to enforce the forum selection clause. That assumption confuses, I con
tend, rather than clarifies, the choice of law.
I n this case, the parties have entered into an agreement that all
disputes between them will be resolved i n the state courts of Vermont.
Plaintiff was allegedly i njured at defendant' s ski faci lity i n Colorado
and, i n v iolation of the agreement, has filed suit in the state courts of
Georgia. Defendant removed to federal court, and then moved to dis
miss for lack of personal j urisdiction and venue. The law of Georgia
traditionally held that forum selection clauses were unenforceable (al
though there i s some i ndication that the l aw may be changing). Thus,
the key i ssue for the rest of the court i s w hether the federal courts may
extend the federal common law position developed in the admiralty
contex e and dismiss in favor of the Vermont state forum notwithstand
ing Georgia Jaw to the contrary.
I have previously argued that state J aw has a central role to p l ay i n
court-access questions not governed by federal statute. See Allan R.
Stein, Erie and Court A ccess, 1 00 Yale L.J. 1 93 6 ( 1 99 1 ) . I do not want
to replay those arguments here. Instead, I conclude that this is not, i n
fact, a n "ungu ided" Erie choice. I would hold that the federal transfer
statute (28 U . S .C. § 1 404(a)) provides the exclusive mechanism for
i nterstate venue adj ustments . I f such a motion were granted, and that
defendant still wanted to get i nto the Vermont state court, it should take
that up with the Vermont federal court.
My reasons for this conclusion are complicated and require an un
derstanding of the various ways that the parties might seek to enforce
the forum selection clause, and the i nterrelationship between those en
forc�ment mechanisms.
One way or another, i t i s l ikely that the motion under consideration
will not be dispositive of the parties' rights under the forum selection
clause. If the Court disregards state law and enforces the forum selec
tion clause through dismissal per defendant' s Rule 1 2 motion, Plaintiff
i s free to refile i n Georgia state court. As a j urisdictional dismissal, that
disposition is without prej udice to refiling in a different j urisdiction,
namely the Georgi a state courts . 3 At that point, having been educated

2. See Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U . S . 5 85 ( 1 99 1 ) ; The Bremen
v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. , 407 U . S . I ( 1 972); .
3. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4 l (b) provides that dismissals for l ack of
jurisdiction are not adjudications upon the merits. Such dispositions are, accordingly,
without prejudice to refi ling. Costello v. United States, 365 U.S. 265 ( 1 96 1 ) (case
dismissed on j urisdictional basis does not create res judicata bar to subsequent suit).
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by the first go-around, plaintiff would undoubtedly attempt to JOin a
non-diverse defendant to defeat removal .
Alternatively, i f the maj ority of this Com1 are correct i n asserting
that state law may govern outside of 28 U . S . C . § 1 404 (as I believe
they are). the Court will probably deny the motion to dismiss. At that
point, defendant would undoubtedly move to transfer to federal court i n
Vermont pursuant t o § 1 404 rather than litigate i n federal court i n
Georgia. 4 Given the holding o f Stewart, the Court would b e hard
pressed not to give the forum selection clause at least some consider
ation i n decidi ng the transfer motion notwithstanding Georgia law . 5
Thus, permi tting a l itigant to enforce a forum selection clause
through a j urisdictional di s m issal will not, as a practical matter, resolve
the rights of the parties under that clause and will only encourage fur
ther preliminary maneuvering. But even i f enforcement of the forum
selecti on clause through a j urisdictional dismissal did settle the question,
I do not believe that i t would be appropriate.
In my view, the forum selection clause in question in fact creates
two separate covenants raising distinct choice-of-law questions: a "hori
zontal covenant"-the agreement to litigate in Verrnont; and a "vertical
covenant"-the waiver of the right to file in or remove to federal court
there . Neither, I suggest, generates a j urisdictional defect. Accordingly, a

Cf, Chick Kam Choo v. Exxon Corp. , 486 U . S . 1 40 ( 1 988) (vacating, on anti-injunc
tion act grounds, i njunction against Texas state action filed after forum non conveni
ens dismissal from federal court); Parsons v. Chesapeake & 0. R. R. , 375 U . S . 7 1
( 1 963) (state forum non conveniens dismissal does not require transfer from district
court sitting in state).
4. B esides moving the case to a federal rather than state forum, the pri ncipal
tactical difference between a § 1 404(a) transfer and a 1 2(b )(2) dismissal is that 2..
transfer will not affect the substantive law appl ied to the case. Under Van Dusen v.
Barrack, 376 U . S . 6 1 2 ( 1 964 ) , the transferee court must apply the same law that
would have been applied by the transferror court. Obviously if the case were dis
missed and refiled in Vermont, plaintiff would have no assurance that Vermont would
apply the same law as Georgia.
5. There is, of course, no guarantee that the court will c hoose to transfer pursu
ant to § 1 404(a). First, the court may be concerned that since the contract did not
call for l itigation in federal court at all, transfer to a federal court would not be
giving effect to the contract. As discussed below, I do not bel ieve that concern is
wel l fou nded. Moreover, if there were no other significant connections with Vermont,
transfer may be denied notwithstanding the forum selection c lause, as occu rred i n
Stewart following remand. See Stewart Org., Inc. v . Ricoh Corp. , 696 F . Supp. 583,
588-89 (N.D. Ala. 1 98 8 ) . Given the fact that plaintiff' s claim arose in Colorado, and
bore l i ttle re lation to Vermont, the transfer motion could well be denied on this
basis.
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motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 1 2 i s an inappropriate mechanism to
enforce the agreement.
Once it is recognized that the forum selection clause does not create
a j urisdictional problem, the range of appropriate enforcement mecha
nisms u nder federal practice n arrows considerably. The procedural
mechanism selected will have a direct i mpact on the law applicable to
the motion.
The horizontal covenant, I argue, should be enforced domesticalll
through the procedural mechanism best suited for that purpose, namely
§ 1 404(a) . Pursuant to Stewart, federal law will control the enforceabili
ty of that part of the forum selection clause.
While there is some division of authority on the question , had the
contract simply said that the parties agree to litigate i n Vermont, with
out specify ing a state forum, many courts would now treat enforcement
of that provision as within the exclusive domain of § 1 404(a). 7
Prior to Stewart, a myriad of mechanisms were commonly em
ployed, i ncluding motions under Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
l 2(b )( I ) (subject-matter j urisdiction dismissal), 1 2(b )(2) (personal juri s-

6. I nternational choice of forum c lauses raise different problems since the alter
native foru m is outside the reach of § 1 404, which authorizes transfer to U n i ted
States di strict courts only. Thus, § 1 404 could not be used to even partia lly enforce
i nternational forum selection c lauses.
7. See, e.g. , Haske! v. The FRP Registry, Inc. , 862 F. Supp. 909 (E. D . N . Y .
1 994) (refusing to enforce forum selection clause through 1 2(b)(3 ) , b u t granting sua
sponte transfer pursuant to § 1 404(a) ) ; Wieczenski v. The Brake Shop, 1 994 W L
1 1 1 08 2 ( D . N .J . M ar. 2 8 , 1 994) (forum selection c lause properly enforced through §
1 404, not § 1 406) ; National Micrographics Systems, Inc. v. Canon U. S.A . , Inc. , 825
F. Supp. 6 7 1 (D.N.J. 1 99 3 ) ( forum selection clause not properly raised by motion to
dismiss for i mproper venue); Creditors Collection Bureau, Inc. v. Access Data, Inc. ,
820 F. Supp. 3 1 1 (W.D. Ky. 1 993) (same). Accord, David H . Taylor, The Forum
Selection Clause: A Tale of Two Concepts, 66 Temple L. Rev. 785 ( 1 993). There are
numerous cases to the contrary, as well . See, e.g., Pant v. Princess Cruises, I nc.,
1 994 W L 5 3 9277 (S. D . Ohio Au g. 1 1 , 1 994) ( 1 2(b)(3 ) dismissal of action fi led i n
violation of forum selection clause ) ; Riley v. Kingsley Underwriting Agencies. Ltd. ,
969 F.2d 953 ( l Oth Cir. 1 992) (forum selection clause properly considered as venue
defect in non-stipulated forum); Medoil Corp. v . Citicorp. , 729 F. Supp. 1 456, 1 457
n . 1 ( S . D . N . Y . 1 990) (same) ;
1 5 Charles A. Wright, et al., Federal Practice &
Procedure § 3 827 n . 8 ( 1 986) ("[a]l though the courts have differed on how to treat a
motion to transfer on the basis of a forum selection c lause, ' such a transfer is more
appropriately treated u nder section 1 406 . . . the nature of a motion to enforce a
forum selection cl ause is that venue is wrong i n the first instance . ' " (quoting
Hoffman v. Burroughs Corp. , 57 1 F. Supp. 545, 55 1 (N .D.Tx . 1 982))): Richard D.
Freer, Erie 's Mid-Life Crisis, 63 Tul . L . Rev. 1 087, 1 1 1 8 ( 1 989) (arguing that �
1 406 i s appropriate enforcement mechanism for forum selection clauses).
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diction dism issal), l 2(b)(3) ( i mproper venue dismissal), and 2 8 U . S . C . §
1 406 (transfer for improper venue). H The use of these devices i s depen
dent on the defendant' s abi lity to characterize the problem generated by
the breach of the forum selection clause as "j urisdictional ." That i s to
say, unless the forum selection clause actually divests a court of its
statutory authority to adj udicate the dispute, the use of these devices is
questionable.
Stewart strongly i mplies that such a j urisdictional characterization is,
i n fact, inappropriate. In Stewart, defendant moved to transfer the case
out of Alabama to New York, the venue stipulated i n the forum selec
tion clause, pursuant to § 1 404(a), or in the alternative, to dismiss or
transfer pursuant to § 1 406. The domains of the two provisions appear
to be m utually exclusive. 9 Section 1 404 is available to transfer cases
from courts that have proper jurisdiction and venue, 10 while § 1 406
provides for tran sfer or dismissal from "a district i n which is filed a
case laying venue i n the wrong division or district." /d. While the Su
preme Court did not address the matter directly, the Court did note that
" [t]he part ies do not dispute that the District Court properly denied the
motion to dismiss for improper venue . . . because respondent apparent
ly does b usiness in the Northern Di strict of Alabama." Stewart, 487
U . S . at 2 8 n . 8 . In other words, the forum selection clause did not ren
der defective an otherwise appropriate venue. That statement should
logically preclude all motions predicated on the theory that the original
court lacks j urisdiction or venue by virtue of the forum selection clause.
Accord, David H. Taylor, The Forum Selection Clause: A. Tale of Two
Concepts, 66 Temple L . Rev. 7 8 5 , 830 ( 1 993).
Moreover, the S upreme Court ' s attitude toward the forum selection
c lause in Stewart was completely at odds with the view that the parties
had contractually stripped the Alabama court of authority . The central
holding of the opinion is that the forum selection clause is but one of
nu merous factors that a court must consider in deciding whether a
transfer i s "in the i nterest of j ustice:"

8.

See

Note,

Viva Zapata ' Toward a Rational System of Forum-Selection Clause

66 N . Y . U . L. Rev. 422, 445-447 ( 1 99 1 ) and cases
c ited t herein. The Note persuasively argues that none of the current enforcement
mechanisms is appropriate and suggests legislation to provide a motion specifically to
e flt.orce forum selection c l auses.
9. A ccord, Federal Practice & Procedure, supra, at 264, ( c i ting Liaw Su Teng
v. Skaa rup Sh ipp ing Corp. , 743 F.2d 1 1 40, 1 1 47 (5th Cir.
1 984)).
I 0 . /d. S e e generally, David E . Steinberg, The Motion to Transfer and t h e Inter
ests of Justice, 66 Notre D ame L. Rev. 443 ( 1 990).

Enforcement in Diversity Cases,
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Section 1 404( a ) directs a district court to take account o f factors other
than those that bear solely on the parties' private ordering of their
affairs. The distric t court also must weigh i n the balance the conve
nience of the w itnesses and those public-interest factors of syste m i c
i ntegrity and fairness that, in addition to private concerns, c o m e under
the heading of "i n the interest of justice." It i s conce i vable in a p articu
l ar case, for example, that because of these factors a district court
acti ng under § 1 404(a) would refuse to transfer a case notwi th standi n g
the counterweight of a foru m-selection clause, w hereas the coordinate
state rule might d ictate the opposite result. . . . The forum-selection
clause, which represents the parties' agreement as to the most proper
forum, should receive neither dispositive consideration (as respondent
might have it) nor no consideration (as Alabama law might have it),
but rather the con sideration for which Congress provided i n § 1 404(a).

Stewart, 487 U . S . at 30-3 1 (citations omitted) .
Steft'art thus makes clear that while the statutory venue and j urisdic
tion provi sions may be supplemented by private ordering, 1 1 such pri
vate ordering does not strip the court of the statutory authority that it
otherwise possesses. The forum selection clause si mply renders the
stipulated forum a potentially preferable venue. While a court may
choose to honor a forum selection clau se, i t i s not because the c ou rt i s
without j urisdiction t o adj udicate . 12 I ndeed, i f the stipulated forum
lacks other affiliation with the l itigation, the courts will deny enforce
ment of the clause and retain j urisdiction. Thus, the whole structure of
§ 1 404 and practice thereunder makes c lear that the parties do not con
tractually divest the transferror court of j urisdiction . 1 3 Logically then, a

I I . Jurisdiction by consent i s one of the most time-honored bases for personal ju
risdiction. It is recogn ized in Pennover as an exception to its holding that a state
only may exert j t;risdiction over persons or property present within it s borders.
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U . S . 7 14, 735 ( 1 878). Volitional affil iation with a forum n ow
forms the core of modem "purposeful avail me nt" doctrine i n the law o f personal
j urisdiction. See generally, Allan R. Stein, Styles of A rgument and Interstate Feder
alism in the Law of Personal Jurisdiction, 65 Tex . L. Rev . 689 ( 1 987).
1 2. Cf . Foster v . Chesapeake Ins. Co. , 933 F.2d 1 207, 1 2 1 2 n.7 (3d Cir. 1 99 1 )
(enforceabi l i ty of forum selection c lauses under Bremen i s "predicated o n the notion
that while the federal court has subject j urisdiction, it should decline to exercise it");
Wm. A . Mueller & Co. v . Swedish Am. Line, Ltd, 224 F.2d 806, 808 (2d Cir. 1 955)
(whi le reasonable forum selection clauses may be enforceable, ''the parties by agree
ment cannot oust a court of jurisdiction otherwise obtaining: notwithstanding the
agreement, the court has ju ri sdiction").
1 3 . This is also why any motion to remand from Georgia federal to Georgia state
court should be denied; the Georgia federal court does have jurisdiction. It may
choose to use that j urisdiction to e nforce the forum selection clause, and remanding
to the Georgia state court would not be an appropriate enforcement. The c lause does
not render the Georgia state coun a preferabl e forum.
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case transferable pursuant to § 1 404(a) ought not be amenable to a
j urisdictional or venue dismissal.
However, as perceptively noted by Professor David Taylor, the Su
preme Court ' s deci sion i n Carnival Cruise Lines did m uddy the proce
dural waters . See Taylor, supra, at 842-49 . In that case, the defendant
was apparently permitted to enforce a forum selection clau se pursuant to
28 U . S .C . § 1 406 even though the forum selection clause in question
could have been satisfied by transfer to a Florida federal court p ursuant
to § 1 404(a) . Section 1 406 is only available where the transferor court
l acks venue or j urisdiction, see generally, 1 5 Charles A. Wri ght, et al .,
Federal Practice & Procedure 263-64 ( 1 986), thus suggesting that the
forum selection clause generated such a defect. The procedural posture
of the case, however, suggests that the case, in this regard, may be an
anomaly, and should not be read as a repudiation of Stewart 's charac
terization of forum selection clau ses as non-j urisdictional.
Defendant i n Carnival Cruise Lines moved to dismiss for l ack of
personal j urisdiction because it l acked contacts with Washington, or in
the alternative to transfer to Florida pursuant to § 1 406. The district
court dismissed for lack of personal j urisdiction over the defendant i n
Washington. The court o f appeals reversed the j urisdictional ruling, and
further rejected enforcement of the forum selection c lause, an issue not
addressed by the district court. The court of appeals found the c lause
unenforceable under the under the Bremen standard of reasonableness
controll i ng in Admiralty. Without discussing the procedural mechanism
employed by defendant, the S upreme Court concluded that the clause
was enforceable under the Bremen standards and reversed. However, its
reversal simply undid the court of appeals ' s own reversal, thus leaving
i ntact the district courts original j urisdi ctional dismissal . See, Taylor,
supra, at 848.
As the Supreme Court never considered the personal j urisdict ion
issue, its i ntent could not have been to resolve the case on that basis.
However, no court i n Carnival Cruise Lines, i n fact, ordered that the
case be transferred. See Patrick J. Borchers, Forum Selection Agree
ments In the Federal Courts After Carnival Cruise: A Proposal for
Congressional Reform, 67 Wash. L. Rev . 55, 74-7 5 . ( 1 992) ; Taylor,
supra, at 847-49 . The most reasonable reading of Carnival Cruise Lines
then, is that the Court never addressed whether forum selection clauses
generate j urisdictional defects sufficient to j ustify enforcement outside of
§ 1 404. 14

14 .

Accord Haske/,

8 6 2 F. S u p p . at 9 1 4

( ' ' Ca rn ival Cruise

left open the question
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Accordingly, it i s relatively clear that § 1 404 should provide the
exclusive mechanism to move a case from one federal court to a nother
where the first court has appropriate statutory j urisdiction and venue.
Can it be then , that the specification of a state forum in the forum
selection clause changes all of thi s? If a contract specifying l itigation in
Federal Court B does not divest Federal Court A of j urisdiction, a state
forum selection clause can be no more debilitating. While one may
question whether § 1 404 may be employed to transfer a case to a feder
al court when the forum selection clause cal l s for a state forum, the
intra-federal cases ought to foreclose any j urisdictional dismissal based
on a forum selection clause.
Some courts have held that if the clause does not technically divest
the court of j urisdiction, then at least it is enforceable via a motion to
dismiss on the merits pursuant to Rule 1 2(b)(6) . 1 5 Such a characteriza
tion, I believe, is even less persuasive than the j urisdictional one. While
the filing of a complaint i n Georgia may well have been in b reach of
contract, it did not render the u nderlying complaint unredressable. In
deed, a 1 2(b ) (6) dismissal that did not otherwise stipulate would be
treated as a j udgment on the merits pursuant to Rule 4 1 (b), an i ndefen
sible consequence. Of course, the court could choose to stipulate that
the dismissal was without prej udice. But that would represent an ac
knowledgment that the court was searching for the appropriate way to
enforce the clause, and that 1 2(b)(6) does not quite fit. Taylor, s upra , at
798; accord, Note, Viva Zapata! Toward a Rational System of Forum
Selection Clause Enforcement in Diversity Cases, 66 N . Y . U . L. Rev.
422, 445-447 ( 1 99 1 ) .
There is one p lausible enforcement mechanism other than § 1 404(a)
that might be employed: the common l aw doctrine of forum non conve
niens. That device is used by federal courts to dismiss claims more
appropriately brought in a foreign country. S ince § 1 404(a) i s generally
thought to preempt forum non conven iens practice where the alternative
forum is in the United States,1 6 there are virtually no federal cases that

of whether a forum selection c lause should be enforced through dismissal or transfer.
I t did not appear that the Court intended to overrule Stewart."); Taylor, supra, at
847 .
I 5 . See. e.g., Lamhert v. Kysar, 983 F.2d I l l 0, 1 1 1 3 n.2 ( I st Cir. J 993) ( motion
dismiss
on basis of forum selection c lause must be brought under 1 2(b)(6) rather
to
than 1 2( b )(3 ) ) ; Crescent Int '/., In c. v. A vata r Communities, Inc. , 857 F.2d 943 (3d.
Cir. 1 98 8 ) ;
1 6. See Federal Practice & Procedure, supra, § 3 828, at 278 ("The doctrine o f
forum n on conveniens h a s on ly a limited continuing vitality in federal courts ."). Cf ,
Doran v. City of Clearwater, 8 1 4 F. Supp. ! 077 (D. Fla. 1 993 ) (refusing to re mand
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use forum non conveniens domestically. ConceptuaEy, however, forum
non conveniens fits better than the other devices . Forum non conveniens
is predicated on the existence of j urisdiction and venue i n the original
forum ; l ike § 1 404, it is specifically designed to mediate between com
peting j urisdictional c laims. Moreover, since the alternative forum in the
case of a state forum selection clause is not in the federal system, the
preemptive impact of § 1 404 is not necessary.
Nevertheless, I would argue that forum non conveniens ought not be
employed in this context. First of all, invocation of a doctri ne that i s
generall y considered preempted b y federal statute c a n only i ntroduce
confusion into an already devilishly complex area. The uniformity
achieved by consolidating enforcement into a single procedural mecha
nism would seem to be well worth whatever marginal infringement it
imposes on state regulatory prerogatives . Remember that any state rule
against enforcement of forum selection clauses will be defeated if the
case is subsequently transferred pursuant to § 1 404 in any event.
The primary impact of procedural consolidation will be to subject all
forum selection clauses to a single federal standard independent of
where the claim is filed and of how defendant frames the motion. This
is a particularly compelling benefit. Not only does enforcement outside
of § 1 404(a) encourage the kind of forum shopping for state law evi
dent here, but it facilitates the development of inconsistent federal law.
Currently, different federal standards are appl ied to forum selection
c lauses depending on whether or not enforcement is sought u nder §
1 404(a). In Stewart, the courts ulti mately decl ined to enforce a bar
gained-for clause between two commercial parties because the stipulated
forum l acked significant connection with the l itigants . Yet in Carnival
Cruise Lines, the Court enforced a boiler-plate c lause against a consum
er. As noted by several commentators, any inconsistencies in the ap
proach to forum selection clauses evident in Stewart as compared to
Carnival Cruise Lines are exacerbated by the procedural distinctions
between the two cases: because Carnival Cruise Lines arose in the §
1 406 context, the Court did not focus on the full range of factors rele
vant to a § 1 404(a) transfer. See Borchers, supra, at 7 5 ; Taylor, supra,
at 845 -47 . Procedural consolidation will lead to greater substantive
uniformity .
More significantly, if one accepts my characterization of the forum
selection clause as creating two separate covenants, the horizontal com-

to state court on forum non conveniens grounds since "[t]he fiel d of that doctrine i s
now entirely occupied by 28 U.S.C . § 1 404(a)").
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ponent ought to be preempted by § 1 404 since that covenant can be
fully enforced by transfer. Note that in asserting that the contract i s
comprised o f t w o separate covenants I am not making a clai m about the
i ntent of the parties, or the severability of those covenants u nder con
tract law . Rather, I am making an observation about the enforceability
of two different aspects of the contract i n federal court . Moving the
case from one part of the country to another has different implications
for the federal courts than divesting the federal courts of j urisdiction
altogether. Distinguishing those two aspects clarifies the source of gov
erning l aw and simplifies enforcement. The federal courts have a mech
ani sm to move cases horizontally. The fact that further proceedings will
be necessary to give full effect to the contract, i. e. , a remand (of sorts)
from the transferee court, is not sufficient j ustification to abandon that
mechanism.
Why not use § 1 404(a)? One possible objection may be that since
the clause does not stipulate a Vermont federal forum, transfer would
not be an appropriate enforcement of the clause. There are two power
ful responses of concern . First, as demonstrated by Stewart, the i ssue i n
a § 1 404 transfer i s whether i t i s in the "interest o f justice" t o transfer,
not per se w hether to enforce the contract. As between a Georgia and
Vermont federal foru m, it may be preferable to litigate in the state the
parties anticipated l itigating in, even if the case does not end up i n the
preci se court agreed to i n the contract. It would be at least as compel
ling as transferring to a contractually-stipulated federal forum in Ver
mont.
Moreover, the case still may find its way i nto the Vermont state
courts. If the courts follow my approach of bifurcating the enforcement
of the contract, transfer to Vermont federal court i s not inconsistent
with enforcing the preci se terms of the contract; it is simply the first
step.
While enforceability of the vertical covenant i s not currently before
thi s Court, it is appropriate to examine that issue now in order to deter
mine the propriety of bifurcating enforcement of the clause.
Assuming the case would be transferred to the Vermont federal
court, that court w i l l then have to decide whether to enforce the v ertical
covenant and send the case to the Vermont state court . The order at
that point could not technically be a "remand" since there is no docket
in Vermont, and the court would not be remanding or returning the
case to the court from which it was removed. 1 7 However, the court

1 7 . Section 1 447 authorizes a remand "to the State court from which it was re-
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could still enforce the vertical covenant by enteri ng a conditional forum
non conven iens dismissal . 1 8 S ince no federal statute covers this vertical
transfer of authority, there is no preemption problem, as there might
have been had the same motion been granted by the Georgia federal
court. Moreover, by isolating the vertical component, the choice-of-law
governing the vertical covenant is c larified. 19

moved." Thus, a court ma y not, under the statute, remand a case to a court from
which it was not removed. See Bradgate Assocs. v. Fellows, Read & A ssoc.�. 999
F.2d 745, 750 (3d Cir. 1 993) (court may not remand portion of case filed origi nall y
i n federal court).
1 8 . Thi s device is typically employed i n i nternational forum non dismissals. The
case is dismissed on the condition that defendant makes himself amenable to suit in
the alternative forum. See, e.g., In re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster at
Bhopal, India, 809 F.2d 1 95 , 203 (2d Cir. 1 98 7 ) (upholding conditions placed on
forum non conveniens dismissal that defendant submit to personal j u risdiction i n India
and waive any personal j urisdiction objection). I n this case, the problem i s not
defendant ' s amenabi l i ty, but rather Plaintiff' s w i l l i ngness to pursue the claim in
Vermont rather than i n a Georgia state court. Thus, the court c ou ld threaten to
reassert j urisdiction i f Plaintiff rei n i tiated the c l a i m anywhere other tha n i n the Ver
mont courts . A ltern atively, the defendant could i n i tiate a declaratory j udgment pro
ceeding i n Vermont.
A similar device is employed i n certain forms of "abstention" where the feder
al court deems it appropriate for the parties to pursue their claims, at least initially,
in state court . See, e. g.. Colorado River WMcr Consen·ation Dist. v. United States,
424 U . S . 800 ( 1 976). This power was cited in support of the ALI Complex Litiga
tion Projec t provision to transfer certain federal cases to state court. ALI Complex
Litigation Project Proposed Final D raft § 4.0 I ( April 5, 1 993). See Linda S.
Mullenix, Complex Lirigation Reform and A rticle Ill Jurisdiction, 5 9 Fordham L. Rev.
1 69, 2 1 4- 1 8 ( 1 990).
1 9 . My col league, Professor Perry Dane, has suggested that the isolation of the
vertical covenant is, in fact, i l lusory. Once the federal court decides to enforce the
vertical covenant and return the case to state court, the horizontal component comes
i n to play agai n ; the court must choose which state court to "return" the case to. The
decision to conditionally dismiss i n favor of a Vermont state court rather than re
mand back to the Georgia state court thus replicates the dilemma posed by
defendan t ' s original 1 2(b)(3) motion in Georgia federal court . Section 1 404 has not
resolved enforcement of the horizontal covenant, since that only settled where the
case would be tried in the federal system.
While this i s a powerful critique, it is, I bel ieve, predicated on the assumption
that the vertical covenant creates a j urisdictional defect . There is no reason to return
the case to the Georgia state court. The vertical covenant does not divest the federal
courts of jurisdiction; rather, it renders the Vermont state court a preferable venue
over the Vermont federal court. No reasonable construction of the forum selection
c lause renders the Georgia state court preferable to ei ther the Vermont state or
federal courts. Accordingly, it would not be an appropriate enforcement of the verti
cal covenant to remand to the Georgia state court, j ust as it would have been inap.
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There I S , I believe, a strong case to made for treating the vertical
coven ant as a matter of federal law, particularly following transfer to
Vermont federal court. Note that fol lowing the transfer, the choice of
forum is no longer between a federal forum and a Georgia state court.
Rather, it i s between a federal and Vermont state court. Accordingly,
Georgia, the source of any applicable state l aw on the question u nder
Van Dusen would neither be vested nor divested of jurisdiction as a
consequence of the vertical covenant. Any i nterest that i t has i n the
case at this point would have to be derived from an i nterest in the
substantive rights of the parties under the contract, as opposed to the
mere "procedural" interest in regulating access to its own courts. Ac
cordingly, it may not be at all clear that Georgi a would appl y its own
law outlawing forum selection clauses to this transaction, or would be
constitutionall y permitted to do so. 20
G i ven Plaintiff s residence in Georgia, i t may be that G eorgi a does
have a legitimate i nterest in preventing its residents from being subj ect
ed to oppressive terms in contracts of adhesion. But where is the "op
pression" now ? The primary consequence of the vertical covenant at
this point will be to direct on which s ide of the street the liti gation w i l l
occur. 2 1 It may w e l l be that Georgia would not disapprove of forum
selection c lauses that did not have any i nterstate consequences .22 In

propriate for the Georgia federal court to remand there. The vertical covenant only
makes sense i n the context of asking whether the case should be tried in state or
federal court in Vermont. Put in other words, while the horizontal covenant might be
given effect i ndependent of the vertical covenant, the con verse is not true. According
ly, the Vermont federal court does not have to choose where to "remand" the case.
If the vertical covenant is to be enforced, there is only one reasonable choice.
20. But see Ferens v . John Deere Co. , 494 U.S. 5 1 6 ( 1 990) (applying M issi ssippi
statute of limitations to tort action ari s i ng in Pennsylvania but transferred from Mis
sissippi federal court).
2 1 . There may be some impact of the applicable law since the federal court
under Van Dusen w i l l be bound to apply the l aw of the transferror court , namely
Georgia law. The Vermont state court, i n contrast, will be free to apply its own
choice of l aw. The hypothetical record stipulates that Georgia norm a lly enforces
choice of law provisions. Thus, it appears that u nder the contract, Vennont l aw w i l l
appl y t o the substantive issues regardless of whether the case is heard i n state or
federal court. A significant change in the applicable law resulting from dismissal
would create a more complex problem and might conceivably justify retention of
j uri sdiction in the federal court.
22. A simil ar distinction might be gleaned from the Alabama ''ouster doctrine" at
issue in Stewart. The state law against forum selection c lauses only applied to con
tracts specifying a forum outside of Alabama. See Redwing Carriers. Inc. v. Foster,
382 So. 2d 554, 556 (Ala. 1 980). Thus, the state' s concern over forum selection
clauses only extended to those provisions that had i nterstate consequence.
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other words, its outlaw of horizontal covenants I S not dispositi ve of its
attitude toward vertical covenants.
Moreover, it would be hard to say there is, in fact, any state law on
the enforceability of the vertical covenant. A covenant requiring litiga
tion i n federal court would either be self-executi ng b y the parties'
choice to file or remove to federal court, or unenforceable i n the event
federal j urisdiction did not otherwise exist.23 A covenant requiring liti
gation in state court would only be breached by liti gation in the federal
courts. Thus, any law on the enforceability of vertical covenants would
necessarily be made by federal courts. While i n theory, the question
may still be a matter of "state law," there will not be any state law to
consult. It thus seems a bit silly to direct the federal court to this non
existent state law.24
Conversely, there would appear to be a particular federal i nterest in
deciding whether parties may waive their right to a federal forum. The
federal courts will absorb the costs of a no-waiver rule, and the federal
interest i n providing a diversity forum could be sacrificed by a pro
waiver rule.
In fact, federal law seems to be quite comfortable with waivers of
federal j urisdiction. A party who fai ls to file a removal petition within
the statutory twenty day period, as provided by 28 U . S .C . § 1 447
( 1 988), unilaterally waives their right to a federal tribunal . Contractual
waivers of j urisdiction are routinely enforced through the Federal Arbi
tration Act, 25 as well as through the Bremen doctrine i n admiralty . 2 6 It
is hard to see why the contractual waiver here would be any more
problematic .27 Indeed, the federal courts routinely remand cases re-

23. Insu rance Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie Des Bauxites De Guinee, 456 U . S .
694, 7 0 2 ( 1 982) ("'no action o f t h e parties c a n confer subj ect-matter j urisdiction upon
a federal court").
24. But see Ma1nse v . American A cademy of Orthopaedic Surgeons, 470 U . S .
373 ( 1 98 5 ) (federal court must determine whether state court would b a r on res
judicma grounds federal anti trust cbim asserted after unsuccessful state litigation even
though state court lacks subject-matter j urisdiction over federal antitrust claims).
25. 9 U .S.C. § § l -208. Enforcement of an arbitration agreement necessari ly pre
cludes the exercise of federal j urisdiction over the case.
26. When an action i s dismissed i n favor of a foreign forum , the court , in effect,
recognizes that there is no inalienable "right" to a federal adj udication.
27. But see Linda S . Mullenix, A nother Choice of Forum, A nother Choice of
Law: Consensual Adjudicatory Procedure in Federal Court, 5 7 Fordham L . Rev. 29 1 ,
332 ( 1 988) (arguing against remand of cases filed in violation of forum selection
clauses) [hereinafter Another Choice of Forum] ; see also Taylor, supra, at 85 1 -52
(arguing that procedural waivers and arbitration agreements are distingui shable from
agreements i n advance of litigation to transfer authority from the federal to state
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moved from state court i n v iolation of a forum-selection clau se w ithout
consulting the forum-state law, at least where the parties have manifest
an unequivocal i ntent to waive their rights to a federal forum . 28
S o where does that leave us? Notwi thstanding the Georgia l aw
agai nst forum selection clauses, defendants are accorded an opportunity
through this bifurcated procedure to enforce the provision and litigate m
the Vermont state courts .
This is perhaps a n odd conclusion for someone who h a s argued m
the face of black-letter l aw that state law should exert a greater i nflu
ence on federal court access than is generally acknowledged.29 It seems
to me, however, that the S upreme Court already crossed that bridge in
Stewart. If Congress indeed wanted to preempt state forum-selection l aw
i n the § 1 404 context, and if § 1 404 generally preempts forum non
con veniens, could it possibly be appropriate to c ircumvent that combina
tion by the expediency of characterizing defendant' s initial motion as
"j urisdictional" or by some other procedural sleight of hand?
The jurisdictional characterization prolongs the inevitable. I f defen
dant loses its motion to dismiss, it w i l l make a § 1 404(a) motion any-

courts) .
2 8 . See, e . g . , Milk 'N' More, Inc. v . Beavert, 963 F .2d 1 342 ( l Oth Cir. 1 992);
Foster v . Chesapeake Ins. Co. , 933 F.2d 1 207 (3d Cir. 1 99 1 ) ; Karl Koch Erecting
Co. v. New York Convention Ctr. Dev. Corp. , 838 F.2d 656, 659 (2d C i r. 1 988);
Pe/leport In vestors, Inc. v. Budco Quality Theaters, Inc., 741 F.2d 27 3 , 280-8 1 (9th
Cir. 1 984). Bw see Mu llenix, supra, A nother Choice of Forum, at 339 (arguing that
there i s "high probability that the federal court w i l l not enforce the forum c lause so
as to order a remand of the litigation to state court") . I do not read the cases c ited
by Professor M u llenix as supportive of her claim that there is federal host i l i ty to
vertical covenants. Most of the cases she c ites are refusals to enforce forum selection
c l auses call ing for l it igation i n other states, and are thus inapposite. See, e.g., Cutter
v.
Scott & Fet::.er Co. , 5 1 0 F. S upp. 905 (E.D. Wis. 1 98 1 ) ; Lulling v. Barbaby 's
Family Inns, Inc. , 482 F. Supp. 3 1 8 (E.D. Wis. 1 980) . In other cases, the contract
did not clearly speci fy exclusive j urisdiction in the state forum . See, e.g., Proyecfi.n
de Venezuela, S.A. v. Banco Indus. de Ven ezuela, S.A . , 760 F.2d 390 (2d Cir. 1 985);
First Nat '/ City Bank v. Nanz, Inc. , 437 F. Supp. 1 84 (S.D.N.Y. 1 97 5 ) . I n another
case, the court decl ined to remand because the plaintiff was not a party to the forum
selection clause rel ied upon. See Transure, Inc. v. Marsh & McLennan, Inc. , 766
F.2d 1 297, 1 299 n . l (9th Cir. 1 985). Professor Mu llenix does not, in fact, ci te any
cases where the federal court decl ined to enforce an u nequivocal waive r of federal
j urisdiction.
29. As I acknowledged i n an earlier a rticle urging federal conformity to state
forum non conveniens doctrine in some c ircu mstances: "[v)irtuall y no federal court
has considered itself bound by doctrines providing greater court access than would be
granted by federal law." Allan R. Stein, Erie and Court Access, I 00 Yale L.J. 1 936,
1 93 8 n . S ( 1 99 1 ) .
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way . As a matter of sound j udicial administration, i f nothing else, it
seems to me prudent to cut to the chase.
There is also a substantial fri nge benefit to m y approach that i s ,
ironically, relatively protective o f state law. Given the federal courts'
propens ity to federalize all questions regarding federal court-access,30
the real risk of permitting enforcement of forum selection clauses out
side of § 1 404(a) is not that state law will play too great a role, but
that federal common law will run amok. While I am critical of this
trend, there is no denying that most federal courts, given the procedural
opportunity, would extend federal common law developed in the admi
ralty context to diversity cases, rather than consult state law.31
Consolidating federal enforcement of forum selection clauses under §
1 404(a) substantially buffers the excesses of free-standing federal com
mon law evident in Carnival Cruise Lines. That decision has been
widely condemned as an unreflective enforcement of an u nconscionable,
unbargained-for, boiler-plate forum selection c lauses . 3 c As several com
mentators have noted, that approach was facilitated by the procedural
posture of the question. Because the issue was not raised in the context
of § 1 404(a), the Carn ival Cruise Lines Court did not have to consider
whether transfer was "in the interest of j ustice," the standard for trans
fer under § l 404(a) . Borchers, supra, at 86 n.9; Taylor, supra, at 845 46. Rather, the question was simply whether the contract should be
enforced. Whether or not Carn ival Cruise Lines represented an appropri
ate appli cation of the Bremen reasonableness standard, it is c lear that

30. See, e.g., Manetti-Farrow, Inc. v. Cucci Am., Inc. , 858 F.2d 5 09, 5 1 4- 1 5 (9th
Cir. 1 988) ( federal law controls enforceability of forum selection c lause raised in
motion to dismiss under rule 1 2(b)(3)); In re A ir Crash Disaster Near New Orleans,
La. , 82 1 F.2d 1 1 47 (5th Cir. 1 987) (federal court not bound by state law against
forum non conveniens dismissals); cf , Federal Practice & Procedure, supra, § 3 828,
at n.42, & 1 994 S upp. (control of federal docket i s matter of federal law; "Any
other result would be i nconsistent with the independent status of the federal courts.").
3 1 . As Professor B ORCHERS has noted, this trend is already apparent in the
case l aw addressing the enforceab il ity of forum selection clauses outside of § 1 404 .
Whi le there i s a division in the circuits, a maj ority of courts addressing the issue
have extended Bremen rather than consult state l aw. See Patrick J. B orchers, Forum
Selection Agreements In the Federal Courts After Carnival Cruise: A Proposal for
Congressional Reform, 67 Wash. L. Rev. 55, 79 ( 1 992). ("In diversity cases that

have expl icitly considered and resolved the i ssue, the preponderant, but by no means
unanimous, v iew is that federal law applies."). Cf Stein, supra, at 1 98 1 n.2 1 8.
32. See B orchers, supra, at 74-78 ; L inda S. Mullenix, A nother Easy Case, Some
More Bad Law: Carnival Cruise Lines and Contractual Personal Jurisdiction , 27 Tex.
lnt' l L .J . 323 ( 1 992); William Richman, Carnival Cruise Lines: Forum Selection
Clauses in Adhesion Contracts, 40 A m. J. Comp. L. 977 ( 1 992).
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unhinging the i nquiry from the § 1 404(a) matrix set the stage for
overenforcement of the provision.
S ection 1 404 i s more than a procedural vessel ; it imposes substan
tive limitations on the enforcement of forum selection clauses. U nder §
1 404(a), the forum selection clause is but one of several factors the
court must look to in deciding whether to transfer. To the extent that a
federal law of forum selection clauses clashes with state policies
disfavoring these provisions, that conflict will be abated by the flexibili
ty built into § 1 404.

* * *
SOLIMINE, J . * : (concurring i n part and dissenting i n part)
I agree with the majority of my colleagues hearing this case en bane
that state law governs the validity of the forum selection clause in this
diversity action. However, I conclude that on the facts of this case,
Georgia law would not prohibit the enforcement of the c l ause. There
fore, I would affi rm the decision of the district court.
Plaintiff, pursuant to a contractual agreement with the defendant Ski
Vacations, went on a ski trip to Colorado, was i nj ured on the slopes,
and rendered a quadriplegic. Plaintiff brought a tort suit against S ki
Vacations i n a state court in Plaintiff' s state of res idence, Georgia. The
contractual papers included clauses directing that any tort claims be
brought in a Vermont state court and would be governed by Vermont
law. S ki Vacations removed the action to federal court on the basis of
diversity j urisdiction, and moved to dismiss for lack of personal j uris
diction and/or i mproper venue, primarily on the basis of the choice of
forum clause. The court below granted the motion, holding that federal
law governed the issue, and that cases such as Stewart Org., Inc. v.
Ricoh Corp. , 487 U . S . 22 ( 1 988) and Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v.
Shute, 499 U . S . 5 85 ( 1 99 1 ), favored enforcement of forum selection
c lauses l ike that i nvolved in this case.
I.

ERIE I SSUES

I agree with Judges B URBANK, REDISH and S ILBERMAN that, i n
this action, state law governs the validity o f the clauses a t i ssue. Unlike
Carnival Cruise Lines, this i s a diversity action, and no federal statute

*
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or rule supplies a rule of deci sion on point. Despite the expansive inter
pretation given the transfer of venue statute, 28 U . S . C . § 1 404 ( 1 988),
i n Stewart, no such transfer i s sought here and nothing i n the text or
purpose of the removal statutes, 28 U . S .C. §§ 1 44 1 -47 ( 1 988), speaks
to the i ssue of forum selection clauses. Unli ke the discretion l odged i n
the former statute, the removal statute i s more straightforward and re
moval is automatic once the requirements of the statute are met, as
here.
The choice between federal and state law turns, then, on the "rel a
tively unguided Erie c hoice" found, among other places, i n the dicta i n
Hanna v. Plumer, 3 8 0 U . S . 460 ( 1 965). Like m y colleagues (save for
Judge B ORCHERS) I agree that application of federal law (which, for
the moment, we can assume i s more solicitous toward the clause at
issue) would lead to intrastate forum shopping and the i nequitable ad
ministration of law. A federal court should thus apply state law.
I also agree with Judges REDISH and SILBERMAN that a more
systemic approach, considering both federal and state i nterests, i s possi
ble given that Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rura l Elec. Coop. , 356 U . S . 525
( 1 95 8 ) h as not been overruled. (However, such an approach w as
deemphasized in Hanna and l ater Rules of Deci sion Act cases like
Chambers v. NASCO, Inc. , 50 1 U . S . 32 ( 1 99 1 ) ) . But the result would
be the same. It i s difficult to discern a federal i nterest in a diversity
action paramount to a state regulatory interest limiting forum selection
clauses. This state interest is of course derived from the power to police
contractual dealings, at least of those that have a connection w ith the
state. I f the state i nterest is based on other, perhaps more parochial,
.
concerns, then the state pol icy might be due less deference. Cf A ll an
R . Stein, Erie and Court A ccess, 1 00 Yale L.J. 1 93 5 , 1 982 ( 1 99 1 ) .
However, a n examination o f state case l a w o n this point is apt t o be
disappointing. The oft -cited case from Georgi a concluding that forum
selection clauses will not be enforced contains but two unhelpful ex
planatory paragraphs. Cartridge Ren tal Network v. Video Entertainment,
Inc. , 209 S . E.2d 1 32, 1 33 (Ga. App. 1 974) . In these circumstances, i t
would b e inappropriate t o assume that regulatory i nterests are not driv
ing the Georgia policy, at least in part .
Finally, the relevance of the choice-of-Vermont-law c lause i s worth
mentioning. Like Judge BORCHERS , I would not argue that we should
automatically credit that clause, and refer to state (Vermont) law to
resolve the Erie issue. The Erie choice is a structural issue not amena
ble (unlike other choice of law i ssues) to advance determ ination by the
parties. Thus, the Erie i ssue should not be delegated to the parties and
should remain to be decided by the court. Moreover, there is no indica-
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tion that the parties wished the clause to reach this issue. (If they had,
i t is interesting to note that Vermont presumptively enforces choice of
forum c lauses. Chase Commercial Corp. v. Barton, 57 1 A.2d 682 (Vt.
1 990)) .
For these reasons, Georgia law, not federal common l aw , supplies
the rule of decision governi ng the validity of the forum selection clause
i n this case.
II.

A PPLICATION OF G EORGIA L AW

As noted above, Georgia has been regarded as a state which w i l l not
enforce forum selection clauses. However, more recent i n termediate
decision s from Georgia have distingui shed the earlier cases and will
presumptively enforce such clauses. E. g. , American Fin. Serv. Group,
Inc. v. Boswell Mem. Hasp. , 447 S .E.2d 3 3 3 (Ga. App. 1 994) ; Harry S.
Peterson Co. v. Nat!. Union Fire Ins. Co. , 434 S .E.2d 778 (Ga. App.
1 993). Unti l and if the Supreme Court of Georgia addresses this i ssue,
we can safely assume that Georgia courts have, or will, fol low the trend
in federal case law to generally enforce such clauses. (At this j uncture,
as suggested by Judges REDISH and SILBERMAN, it is tempting to
utilize the Georgia certification procedure, Ga. Sup. Ct. R. 37, to permit
the state supreme court to supply the definitive word.).
Thus, we return to Carn ival Cruise Lines as point of reference.
Most of my colleagues find this prospect dismaying, and argue either
that Carnival Cruise Lines was wrongly decided, or is distinguishable
from the facts of this case, or both. Even if we were so empowered, I
would not overrule Carn ival Cruise Lines. The decision in that case,
enforcing a forum selection clause found in the fine print of a form
cruise ticket contract, has been subj ect to scathing scholarly criticism.
E.g., Patrick J . Borchers, Forum Selection Agreements in the Federal
Courts After Carnival Cruise: A Proposal for Congressiona l Reform, 67
Wash. L. Rev . 55 ( 1 992); Linda S. Mullenix, Another Easy Case, Some
More Bad Law: Carnival Cruise Lines and Contractual Personal Juris
diction, 27 Tex . Int' l L.J. 323 ( 1 992) . My own view is that Carnival
Cruise Lines is not an outrage and that forum selection clauses, even
those contained in form contracts, should be presumptively enforceable,
absent persuasive reasons pressed by the party seeking to vitiate the
clause in a particular case. The principles of court review of such claus
es should be drawn mainly, though not exclusively, from ordinary rules
of contract law which would otherwise regulate contractual dealings
among parties like the ones before us. Michael E . Solimine, Forum
Selection Clauses and the Privatization of Procedure, 25 Cornell Int ' l
L.J. 5 1 ( 1 992) .

Spri ng, 1 99 5 ]

CASE ONE

575

Contra Judge BORCHERS, Congress recently overturned, P.L. 1 03206, § 309 ( 1 993), an earlier amendment to the Limited Liability Act,
P.L. 1 02-5 87, § 3006 ( 1 992), which would have overruled Carn ival
Cruise Lines as it pertains to cruise tickets . Compare 1 3 9 Cong. Rec.
H 1 094 1 ( 1 993) (remarks of Congressman Studds) (most recent amend
ment does not reinstate Carnival Cruise Lines) with 1 40 Cong. Rec .
S 1 847-48 ( 1 994) (remarks of Senators S tevens and B reaux) (expressly
disagreeing with Congressman Studds) . Congress i s free to revisit this
issue, as are the states. E. g. , N . C . Gen. Stat. 22 § B -3 ( 1 994) (declares
forum selection clauses unenforceable in all contracts entered i nto i n
North Carolina). Until and if the legislatures act, i n my v iew, Carnival
Cruise Lines represents sound precedent.
Likewise, I do not find Carn ival Cruise Lines to be distinguishable,
though I admit the facts of this case present a close question. The over
all "reasonableness" standard of scrutiny advanced i n Carnival Cruise
Lines i s not toothless and can lead to invalidating a clause i n a particu
lar case. Cf Lemoine v. Carn ival Cruise Lines, Inc. , 854 F. Supp. 447
(E.D. La. 1 994) (forum selection clause like that in Carnival Cruise
Lines case not enforced, since plaintiff presented evidence that she had
no notice of the clause) ; Prows v. Pinpoint Retail Sys. , Inc. , 868 P.2d
809 (Utah 1 993) (forum selection clause not enforced due to unreason
ableness, based on, inter alia, parties being from Utah and C anada but
clause designated New York as forum) .
I s t h e present case o n e of those? The contractual aspects of t h i s case
are very similar to those in Carn ival Cruise Lines. In both cases the
clauses are found in form contracts prepared by the defendant, though
the papers were sent to and signed by the plaintiffs in advance of the
trips . The more difficult inquiry is whether the choice of the Vermont
forum was unfair and, relatedly, whether Plaintiff here has an adequate
alternative forum in that state. At first blush, Vermont in this case does
not seem as reasonable a forum as does Florida in Carnival Cruise
Lines. In the latter, Florida was a pri ncipal place of business for the
defendant. Here, New York is the home base for the defendant, and it
only does business in Vermont ( Vermont. of course, is near New York).
The record does not tell us if Vermont law or courts have some special
expertise with regard to ski litigati on. Perhaps defendant chose Vermont,
in part, because of favorable Vermont law; the choice of law clause
might confirm thi s suspicion. Certainly, Vermont is not devoid of inter
est in thi s case.
Similarly, the record tells us l ittle about whether Plaintiff can litigate
thi s matter in Vermont. A similar issue was addressed in Carnival
Cruise Lines. As I read the opinions and record in that case, though it
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was (and is) widely assumed that Ms. Shute (from the state of Wash
i ngton) would have enormous difficulty in l itigating her personal i nj ury
action i n Florida, specific persuasive facts to that effect were not tru l y
advanced b y Ms. S hute nor made by t h e trial court. Here, we might
assume that Plaintiff, now a quadriplegic , would have u nderstandable
problems in litigating thi s matter other than in the home state of G eor
gia. The record is quite bare on these points, however, and given mod
ern modes of transportation and communication, and the l i kelihood that
Plainti ff would only need to travel to Vermont once (for the trial, i f
there i s one), we should not automatically assume that it i s s imply
impossible for Plaintiff, and Plaintiff' s attorneys, to l itigate this action
in Vermont.
S ince, in my view, Plaintiff has not met the burden of demon strating
that enforcing the forum selection c lause would be unreasonable, the
district j udge correctly enforced the clause.
Ill.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, I respectfully dissent from the maj ority of
my colleagues on this en bane Court. Given my conclusions, I find it
unnecessary to reach defendant' s apparent alternative argument that
there is no personal j urisdiction over it in Georgia.

C ase Two : Extraterritorial Application of
United States Law Against United States
and Alien Defendants (Sherman Act)
INTRODUCTION *

One does not have to go back very far i n United States S upreme
Court j urisprudence, to arrive at a time when it was fel t that each sov
ereign had control of its own territory, but l acked the prerogative (or
power) to exercise authority in the territory of another. 1 This same
principle of territorial exclusivity is recognized, and generall y fol lowed,
in international rel ations.2 If such principles were not observed, often

*
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1 960, University o f Cincinnat i ; J . D . 1 965, Georgetown U niversity L a w Center.
l . See, e.g., Penno_ver v. Neff, 95 U.S. 7 1 4 ( 1 87 8 ) .
2. Restatement (Third) of t h e Foreign Relations L a w of t h e United States § 40 1
( 1 986) (discussing "li mitations," under general i n ternational law, on a state' s "(a)
jurisdiction to prescribe" ( make its laws applicable); "(b) j urisdiction to adj udicate"
(exercise j udicial authority); and ·'(c) j urisdiction to enforce" (compel compliance or
punish non-compl iance)). Obviously, if the concept of "state sovereignty" is to have
any force in i n ternational law, the abil i ty of one state to interfere in the legal regime
of another is very l i m ited. See id. at § 402 which states that
[s]ubj ect to § 403, a state has j urisdiction to prescribe law with respect to:
( 1 ) ( a) conduct that, wholly or i n substantial part, takes place within its terri
tory ; (b) the status of persons, or i nterests in things, present within i ts terri
tory ; (c) conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have sub
stantial effect within its territory;
(2 ) the activities, i n terests, status, or relations of its nationals outside as well
as within its territory; and
( 3 ) certain conduct outside its terri tory by persons not its nationals that is
directed against the security of the state or against a l imited c lass of other
state interests.
ld. See id. at § 403 ( stating that even when a basis for the exercise of j urisdiction
exists, a state should not do so where, considering all relevant factors, it would be
unreasonable); see also EEOC v. A rabian Am. Oil Co. , 499 U . S . 244 ( 1 99 1 ) (holding
that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1 964 does not apply extraterritorially, u nless
Congress c learly states such an i ntent i n the statute. The Court held that there was
a presumption against the extraterritorial application of United States law which
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there would be great tension, and uncertainty about cross-border con
duct.
Thus it was that the first time the extraterritorial application of
Uni ted States antitrust law was considered by the S upreme Court, it was
held to be confined to United States territory , 3 notwi thstanding the lan
guage of the statute:' As the quantity of cross-border business transac
tions i ncreased, however, it became c lear that entities could take actions
beyond our borders that had serious economic and legal consequences
here.
American j udicial precedents evolved with this trend. I n due course,
they allowed United States courts to exercise j urisdiction over absent
parties (that had some "minimum contacts" with the state in question 5 )
and to apply local substantive law to non-local behavior that c au sed
serious legal or economic "effects" in the state. 6 At least, that was the
case whenever the contacts with this country were not so attenuated that
it would be inappropriate for United States courts to exercise j udicial
power7, or when the application of our law would "surprise" the for
eign defendant. 8
United States courts were not alone in reaching this conclusion. The
European Court of Justice, cons idering the scope of application of Euro
pean Community competition l aw9 in the " Wood Pulp" case, 1 0 also
found that acts taken beyond its borders could be actionable there . 1 1

"serves to protect agai nst unintended c lashes between our laws and those of other
nations which could result in international discord.").
3 . American Banana Co. v . United Fruit Co. , 2 1 3 U.S. 347 ( 1 909).
4 . The Sherman Act, 15 U.S .C. � l ( 1 988), proscribes "[e]very contract, combi
nation i n the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or com
merce among the several states, or ll'ith foreign nations . . . . " !d. (emphasis added).
5. International Shoe v . Washington , 326 U.S. 3 1 0 ( 1 945 ) .
6. United States v . A luminum Co. of Am. , 1 48 F .2d 4 1 6 (2d Cir. 1 945) ( Hand,
J., sitting by designation for the United S tates Supreme Court) [hereinafter A lcoa ] .
7 . See e.g. , A sa h i Metal Indus. Co. v . Superior Court, 480 U . S . 1 02 ( 1 9 8 7 ) ; In
re Union Carbide Corp. Gas Plant Disaster a t Bhopal, India, 809 F.2d 1 95 (2d Cir.
1 987).
8 . See Home Ins. Co. v. Dick 28 1 U.S. 397 ( 1 930). Compare Phillips Petroleum
Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797 ( 1 985) ll'ith A llstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U . S . 302
( 1 98 1 ) .
9 . Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community [EEC Treaty] arts. 8590, especially arts. 85-86.
10. Cases 89/8 5 , 1 04/85, 1 1 4/85, 1 1 6- 1 1 7/85, 1 25- 1 29/85, Ahlstrom v . Commis
sion, ( Wood Pulp) 1 988 E.C.R. 5 1 93 , 4 C . M . L . R . 90 1 ( 1 988).
I I . The European Court of Justice held that article 85 of the EEC Treaty applied
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However, the Court consciously chose a more limited basis (one based
on territorialism), than that adopted by United States courts in A lcoa
and subsequent cases. 1 2
In both situations, the court i n question exerc ised j urisdiction and
applied domestic law, but not without considering the competing i nter
ests of other sovereigns. Rather, each court, after balanc i ng those inter
ests, convinced itself that it would be impossible to effectuate the legis
lative policy of the state it served without exercising j udicial authority
and applying its law to the foreign acts.
Consequently, this exercise of legislative and j udicial authority may
be thought l imited to a narrow range of cases, in which the state' s legal
i nterest is equal to or greater than that of competing sovereigns, and
where it could easily be frustrated if the extra-state behavior were not
punished. 1 3 Hence this extra-territorial policy does not have a wide
application. If it did, the political, economic, and legal chaos of which I

to agreements abroad between non-EEC producers, if they were meant to be executed
m the European Community.
Ahlstrom, 1 988 E.C.R. at 5242-43.
1 2 . In the Wood Pulp case, the European Court of Justice rej ected a test similar
to the A merican "effects" test proposed by Advocate General Darmon . Ahlstrom,
1 98 8 E.C.R. at 5 243 . See Opinion of' Advocate General Darmon , 1 988 E.C.R. 52 1 4
( 1 98 8 ) (proposing that an "effects" test be used) . B y contrast, i n A lcoa, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held that the Sherman Act covered
extraterritorial agreements that both were intended to affect American i mports/exports
and, in fact , did affect them . A lcoa , 1 48 F.2d at 444 ( Hand, J . , sitting by designation
for the Supreme Court) .
1 3 . The Sherman Act probably is the best example o f a United States statute that
was meant to apply extraterritorially to foreign acts. See generally 1 5 U.S .C. § l -3 6
( 1 98 8 ); Timberland Lumber Co. v. Bank of A m. , 549 F.2d 597 (9th Cir. 1 97 6 ) (hold
ing that, i n determining whether the Sherman Act applies extraterritorially, courts
should ascertain whether the alleged restraint affected or was i n tended to affect the
United States' s foreign commerce, and whether the extraterritorial assertion of United
States j urisdiction would comport with pri nciples of international comity and fairness).
See Russe l l J. Wei ntraub, The Ettruterritoriu/ Application of Antitrust and Securities
Laws: An !nquil}' into rhe Ut i l i tv tif u
" Choice of Law " Approach , 70 Tex . L .
Rev. 1 799 ( 1 992), for a brief, readable examination of t he extraterritorial appl ication
of United States law . See also Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A . , 87 1
F.2d 252, 263 (2d Cir.), modtjied, 890 F 2 d 569 (2d Cir.) , cert. de n i ed, 492 U.S.
939 ( 1 989) ( holding that the anti-fraud prov isions of the Security and Exchange Act
of 1 934, I 5 U.S.C. § 78 ( 1 98 8 ) , apply whenever a predominantly foreign, fraudulent
transaction has substantial effects within the United States. The court noted, howev
er, that "[i ]t is a settled pri nciple of i nternational and our domestic law that a court
may abstain from exercising enforcement j uri sdiction when the extratenitorial effect of
a particular remedy is so disproportionate to harm within the United S tates as to
offend principles of comity.''); Sreele v. Buiu i 'U Wmch Co. , 344 U . S . 280 ( 1 952) . But
see supra note 2.
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spoke above would surely result.
Thus, the U ni ted States S upreme Court recogn ized as early as the
Sabbatino case ( 1 964), that it l ac ked the authority (and probab l y the
power) to interfere with certain foreign acts, legal where taken, although
those acts v iolated United S tates law . 1 4 Except i n the rare circ u mstanc
es cited above, this makes good sense.
We w ant foreign governments to respect our territory, policies and
prerogatives after all . They are not likely to do so if we do not respect
theirs. That is, if our nation and its businessmen are to get along in a
world increasingly dominated by cross-border transactions, then we
must, in appropriate situations, accommodate competing foreign inter
ests, policy and law. Reciprocally, we expect them to accommodate
ours.
S ince the Sabbatino decision, the United States S upreme Court and
other federal courts have exhibited, in my opinion, an increased sensi
tivity to the conflicts that arise in cross-border activity . That sensitivity
i s reflected in case dicta that states that United States courts w i l l not al
ways have enough i nterest i n foreign matters to take j urisdiction of
them, or to apply United States l aw . 1 5
I have always felt that the American j udiciary ' s acceptance of this
i nternational reality was long overdue. The interdependence of world
governments and businesses is a fact of life today. It is insufferably
arrogant to think that there i s an American tribunal or legal rule to deal

1 4. See Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbatino, 376 U . S . 398 ( 1 964). But see the
"Hickenlooper Amendment," 22 U . S . C. § 2370(e)(2) ( 1 988). The Hicken l ooper
Amendment provides that a United States court cannot refuse to decide a case on the
ground of the federal act of state doctrine, when a party asserts a claim of title or
right to property confiscated or taken by the act of a foreign state. "Hicke nlooper
Amendment," 22 U.S.C. § 2370(e)(2) ( ! 988). But the Hickenlooper Amendment does
not apply "i n any case in which an act of a foreign state is not contrary to interna
tional law;" or "i n any case with respect to which the President determines that
application of the act of state doctrine is required . . . by the foreign policy interests
of the United Stales . . . ." ''Hickenlooper Amendment," 22 U.S.C. § 2 370(e)(2)
( 1 988); see also A lfred Dunhill of London, Inc. v . Republic of Cuba, 425 U.S. 682
( 1 976).
1 5 . An exhaustive list of such cases will not be attempted. Some i l lu strative ones,
beyond those previously mentioned, are : Helicopteros Nacionales de Cuba. S.A. v.
Hall 466 U . S . 408 ( 1 984); The Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co. , 407 U . S . 1 ( 1 972 ) ;
Lauritzen v . Larsen , 3 45 U.S . 57 1 ( 1 95 3 ) ; Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum
Corp. , 595 F.2d 1 28 7 (3d Cir. 1 979) ; Ciprari v. Servicos Aereos Cruzeiro, S.A . , 359
F.2d 855 (2d Cir. 1 966) ; Tramontana v . S.A. Empresa de Viacao A e rea Rio
Grandense, 350 F.2d 468 (D.C. Cir. 1 965 ) .
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with every situation, regardless of its i nternational contacts . In today ' s
legal and economic environment, the reality is quite otherwi se. We
Americans simply have been slow to recognize it. 1 6
A more-sensitive international posture was taken by our executive
branch in the 1 980s, as well . Its "guidelines" concerning foreign be
havior actionable under the Sherman Act, said that : "the . . . Act [did]
not reach the activities of United S tates or foreign firms in foreign
markets i f those activities [had] no direct, substantial and reasonably
foreseeable effect on U. S. interstate commerce . . . . " 1 7
Moreover,
even if the Justice Department found that foreign acts produced such an
"effect" on United States commerce, it stil l was to inquire whether the
conduct abroad was "encouraged or promoted by the law and policy of
[the] foreign sovereign". Hence, the Department was to weigh a series
of six comity "factors," i n order to balance the interests of the United
States and the foreign government18• A similar sensitivity to competing

1 6. A good, recent example is the Consolidated Gold Fields, 87 1 F.2d 252, 263
(2d Cir.), modified, 890 F.2d 569 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 939 ( 1 989) . I n it,
a U nited S tates court exercised j urisdiction, and enjoined a securities offering, simply
because i t did n ot meet t h e standards of ou r Securities a nd Exchange Ac t. The goal
was to protect a mere 2.5 percent of the i nvestor group who were A mericans. Upon
recon sideration (at the urging of the Securities and Exchange Commission), the court
modified its decree; for its action went far beyond any i nterest our government had,
relative to other sovereigns, in exercising U ni ted S tates authority or applying United
S tates l aw to this situation.
1 7 . Department of Justice, Antitrust Enforcement Guide lines for I nternational
Operations § 4 ( 1 988), reprinted in 4 Trade Regulation Reporter 9[ 1 3 1 09 . 1 0 ( 1 988).
Cf Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v . Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc. , 473 U.S. 6 1 4 ( 1 985).
1 8 . D epartment of Justice, Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for I n ternational
Operations § 5, n . l 70 ( 1 988), reprinted in 4 Trade Regulation Reporter <j[ 1 3 1 09. 1 0
( 1 988). There six comity factors are:
( I ) the relative signi ficance, to the viol ation alleged, of conduct within the
U ni ted States as compared to conduct abroad;
(2) the nationality of the persons invol ved in or affected by the conduct;
(3) the presence or absence of a purpose to affect U nited States consumers
or competitors;
(4) the relative significance and foreseeabil i ty of the effects of the conduct
on the United States as compared to the effects abroad;
(5) the existence of reasonable expectations that would be furthered or de
feated by the action; and
(6) the degree of confl ict with foreign law or articulated foreign economic
policies.
ld. See generally Robert C. Reuland, Hartford Fire Insurance Co., Comitv. and rhe
Extraterritorial Reach of United States A ntitrust Laws, 29 Tex. I nt ' I L.J. 1 59 ( 1 994 ) .
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sovereign prerogatives is reflected i n an anti-trust agreement negotiated
between the United States and the European Community i n 1 99 1 . In it,
both part ies pledge to cooperate i n i nternational antitrust matters, and to
defer to one another in appropriate circumstances. 1 9
The Department of Justice "Guidelines" fol low prior Congressional
legislation (the Foreign Trade Antitrust I mprovements Act (FfAlA) of
1 982), that effectively codifies the "effects" test regarding U nited S tates
antitrust j uri sdiction, then generally applied by United States courts.20
Its purpose was "to exempt from the S herman Act export transactions
that did not i nj ure the U . S . economy" . 2 1
One final example of our awareness of the interdependency of world
nations is our zeal to complete the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT), including a World Trade Organi zation (WTO) that
should help to resol ve i nternational trade disputes.22 The l atter may
involve some modest ioss of United States sovereignty . In return for it,
however, we will enj oy more stable i nternational business relations.2 3
Thus, the pre-Hartfo rd Fire state of the law was founded pri ncipally on
a balancing of United States versus foreign i nterests. 24

1 9. Agreement Between the Govern ment of the United States of America and the
Commission of the European Communities Regarding the Application of their Compe
tition Laws, Sept. 23, 1 99 1 [ hereinafter US/EC Commission Agreement]. In this
Agreement there is a list of interests to be balanced before deciding w hether the
United S tates or the European Community should proceed i n a matter of i n terest to
one or both, or w hether they should collaborate. !d. at l l - 1 2 . Although the agree
ment was struck down by the European Court of Justice in C-327/9 1 , French Repub
lic v. Commission of rhe European Communities, Aug., 9, 1 994, it worked quite
satisfactorily while in force, and is l i kely to be renegotiated. Monthly B u lletin of
European Union Economic and Financial News, EJC Annuls EU-US Antitrust Accord,
Eurecom vol . 6, no. 8 (Sept. 1 994 ) .
The European Court of Justice voided the
agreement for reasons of lack of negOliating competence, but it is expected that the
competent Community institution will negotiate an agreement to replace it.
20. Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1 982, l S U.S.C. § 6(a) ( 1 988) .
2 1 . Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v . California, 1 1 3 S. Ct. 289 1 , 2909 n . 2 3 ( 1 99 3 ) (cit
ing H.R. Rep . No. 97-686, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. at 2-3, 9- 1 0 ( 1 982)).
22. See Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of M u ltilateral
Trade Negotiations (GAIT), Agreement Establish i ng the Multilateral Trade Organ iza
tion ( now the World Trade Organization), Office of the Trade Representative, part I I ,
1 - 1 4 ( Version o f I S , Dec. 1 993 ) . I S B N 0- 1 6-043037-2.
23. See id. (particularly Art icles IX and X); Ambassador and Deputy Un ited
S tates Trade Representative Rufus Yerxa, Testimony to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, 1 994 W L 266468 (F . D.C.H.) (Jun. 1 4, ! 994 ).
24. See Laker A invays Ltd. v. Sabena, Belgian World A irlines, 7 3 1 F.2d 909
( D.C. Cir. 1 984). Cf Manningron Mills, 595 F.2d at 1 2 87; Timber!ane, 549 F.2d at
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You will appreciate from the foregoing that the issues confronting
United States courts, when they are asked to adj udicate c ases with
substantial foreign elements, are: first, whether or not to exercise j uris
diction over a foreign entity (not generally subject to j urisdiction in this
country) ;25 and, second, whether domestic law ought to be applied to
the act(s) i n question.26
In S herman Act litigation, however, one can safely assume that a
United S tates court would not exerci se j urisdiction (that is, would dis
miss the case), if it did not propose to apply United States law. We are
told that this question turns on a "reasonableness" standard;27 but
whether this is an absolute limit (the exercise of j urisdiction is u nrea
sonable), or a discretionary one (it would be unreasonable to appl y our
substantive law to the acts i n question) i s unclear. What is c lear is that
more than one sovereign could meet this test, exercise j urisdiction, and
apply its l aw to regulate cross-border transactions.
That being so, I should think i t more important than ever to be
conscious of the competing interests of various states and their regulato
ry regimes. Hence, the United States Supreme Court majority decision
i n Hartford Fire 28 is difficult for me to fathom. Whi le the j udgement
may be entirely correct on the merits, the majority ' s reasoning seems
insensitive and backward-looking.
In the Hartfo rd case, it appears that Uni ted States and B ri tish busi
ness collaborators i ntended to evade United States law and pol icy . Their
actions abroad (and in the United States as well) either were intended
to, or foreseeably would. have a substantial anti-competitive "effect" on
the American insurance market. Consequently, United States courts were
fully competent to exercise j urisdiction over the foreign actors, and to
apply the Sherman Act to their behavior. 29 That outcome should have
surprised no one, the defendants included.

597.
25. See Asahi, 480 U.S. at 1 02 ; Helicopteros, 466 U.S. at 408 .
26. While it i s commonplace for courts to apply domestic law to the cases before
them, that is not invariably true. See Lauritzen. 345 U.S. at 57 1 ; Shultz. v. Boy
Scouts of Am., Inc. , 480 N.E.2d 679 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1 985). But see Babcock v.
Jackson, 1 9 1 N .E.2d 279 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1 963); Kilherg v. Northeast A irlines, Inc. ,
1 7 2 N . E.2d 526 (N.Y. Ct. App. 1 96 1 ) .
27. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United S tates §
4 1 5 ( 3) ( 1 986); see also Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United S tates §§ 40 1 , 402(3), 403 ( 1 986); Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1 287;
Timber/ane, 549 F.2d at 5 97 .
28. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 1 1 3 S . Ct. 289 1 ( 1 993).
29. See id. at 2895-99.
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What is surpnsmg, however, i s that the Court appears to forego any
i nterest-balancing, when deciding whether or not to exerci se j urisdiction.
Rather, Mr. Justice Souter, writing for a bare majority , said that 1j a
United States court could exercise personal j urisdiction over the defen
dants (one assumes this is a test of constitutional permissibility), then it
shoul d do so, and apply American l aw, if "their conduct . . . produced
[a] substantial effect" in the Uni ted States.30 Thi s despite the fact that
the legislation i nvolved would allow the court to "employ notions of
[ international] comity. . . . "3 1 You will search Justice Souter' s opinion
i n vain for any material degree of i nterest-weighing, although the sub
j ect is c learly raised by the defendants .32 It might be inferred from
Justice Souter' s dicta, therefore, that "balancing" the interests of the
United States against those of foreign states is a political matter; one
for the executi ve and not the cou rts. 3 3 Thi s is an oft-repeated j udicial
maxim, but I am not certain i t fits the situation.
It has always seemed to me that it is the quintessential function of
courts to balance competing i nterests. This is especial l y so w hen the
legislative scheme is not a model of clarity (e . g . , the S herman Act) and,
if appl ied aggressively and literall y , c learly would do more harm than
good to i nternational commerce. 3� Indeed, it is often the legislature ' s

30. /d. at 2909- 1 0.
3 1 . Justice Souter stated that "[ w ]hen it enacted the Foreign Trade Antitrust
Improvements Act of 1 982 . . . Congress expressed no view on the question whether
a court with S herman Act j urisdiction should ever dec l i ne to exercise such j urisdic
tion on grounds of international comity." !d. at 29 1 0 .
32. /d. a t 2909.
3 3 . See Hartford Fire, 1 1 3 S. Ct. at 2909- 1 0 & nn.23, 24 (citing Mannington
Mills, 595 F.2d at 1 294 with approva l) : Mannington Mills, 595 F.2d at 1 294- l 2<J8.
34. A well-established United States antitmst litigator writes:
Many foreign governments have rejected the U.S. assertion of 'extra
territorial' j urisdiction as unauthorized by international law. As America's
economic power has decl ined, its allies have become increasing critical of the
application of U. S . concepts of market organization and competition to activi
ties outside the United States . . . . To complicate matters further, the Euro
pean Community and several countries have begu n actively to e n force their
own competition laws, which, in some circu mstances, may impose penalties
on conduct by U.S. companies that is permitted by U.S. law.
Joseph P. Griffi n , " Un ited States A ntirrusr Laws and Transna rionul Business
Transacrions: An lnrroduction, " 2 1 The International Lawyer 307 , 308-309 ( 1 987)
This article is an excellent, short primer on the problems of reconciling U nited St�ttcs
and foreign competition laws, albeit from a business perspective. See ulso. C o m ll l i s 
sion of the European Communities, General Overview of EC/US Relorions ( 8 ru-.;sc l s .
26 M a y 1 995). particularly Part E .
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and/or executive ' s inability to agree to a single view of a regulatory
scheme, that precipitates the court ' s i nvolvement in the first place.
Moreover, courts sometimes rej ect the balance that the executive branch
urges upon them .15 One might argue that the executive made this "bal
ancing" j udgement when it initi ated an enforcement action . B ut most
Sherman Act suits are brought by private parties . Moreover, the execu
tive branch has indicated in its own guidelines that balancing be
done.3 6
But i f Justice Souter would allocate respon sibility between govern
mental branches, he allows virtually no opening for it. If U nited States
courts exercise j urisdiction whenever the Constitution permits it; and,
whenever they do, they apply United States law, then the international
sensitivity developed in prior cases is lost. Hartford Fire seems like an
i nflexible, opportunistic ruling; not one well-suited to our times.
Given the enhanced internati onal i nterdependency of our economy in
recent years, one would expect a more sensitive approach to have been
taken; even i f, in the end, the court chose United States law. To allow
no weighing whatever, unless foreign l aw required the offending be
havior, seems to invite foreign nations to structure their l aws to con
front ours. (The Hartford Fire dicta did suggest that a balancing of
i nterests would be attempted if the foreign conduct was required-not
j ust permitted-by the foreign sovereign.)17

3 5 . See, e. g. , Consolidated Gold Fields, 87 1 F.2d at 252, which involved a
relatively small United States interest. The executive branch, in the person of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, urged the j udiciary not to be too heavy-handed
in applying Uni ted States law. !d. at 263 . In the end, they were successfuL be
cause the i nj u nction imposed by the court, coveri ng a large body of non-United
S tates acti vity, was overzealous i n its attempted protection of the United States
in terest at stake. Consolidared Gold Fields, 890 F.2d at 569. But even Consolidared
Gold Fields i nvolved some weighing and balancing.
36. Department of Justice, Anti trust Enforcement Guidelines for International
Operations § 5 ( 1 98 8 ) , reprinted in 4 Trade Regulation Reporter 9! 1 3 1 09 . I 0 ( 1 988).
A ccord U.S ./E.C. Commission Agreement art. V I .
3 7 . Justice Souter's majority al lows a n exception t o the Hartford Fire pri nciple
when "there i s . . . a true conflict between domestic and fore ign law [so that the
business enti ty might not be able to obey both]." Hartford Fire, 1 1 3 S. Ct. at 29 1 0
(citing Societe Narionale lndusrrie/le A erospatiale v. United Stares Dist. Court, 482
U.S. 522, 555 ( 1 987) ( B l ackman, J., concurring in part and dissenting i n part ) ) ; see
also, Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States �
4 1 5(2)-(3) ( 1 986). Of course, to suggest that a basis for United States court j urisdic
tion exists, does not mean that i t must be exercised, and United States law imposed.
Perhaps J ustice Souter considered this policy-weighing j udgement subsumed in the
Department of J ustice ' s decision to prosecute. However, the British government went
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The passage of "clawback" legislation by a number of nations i ndicates
that at l east some foreign states w i l l accept this invitation and adopt
statutes that put their law on a coll ision course with ours. 38
Not to be outdone, the executive branch has proposed that the 1 988
anti-trust guidelines be discarded, and a new, rather more heavy-handed,
set be adopted. 39

to considerable lengths and expense in Hortford Fire to defend the acts of its i nsur
ers. Hartford Fire, 1 1 3 S. Ct. at 29 1 0: see Reul and, supra, at 1 70-73 .
3 8 . One commen tator suggests that ''[m]ore than fifteen 'blocking statutes' de
signed to impede or thwart the extraterritorial application of the U . S . antitrust laws
have been enacted by some of America· s closest allies, inc luding Austra lia, Canada,
E ngland, France, Switzerl and, and West Germany." Gri ffin, supra, a t 308-09 . A
c lassic example of a foreign "cl awback" statute i s the Foreign Proceedings ( Prohibi
tion of Cer1ain Evidence) Act, 1 976, Austl. Acts No. 1 2 1 , amended by Foreign Pro
ceedings ( Prohibition of Cer1ain Evidence) Amendment Act. 1 976, Aust l . , Acts No.
202, replaced by Foreign Proceedings (Excess of Jurisdiction) Act, 1 9 84, Austl. Acts
No. 3. B arry E. Hawk, United States, Common Market and International A ntitrust:
A Comparative Guide, vol. I at 7 1 8. 1 (2d ed. 1 993 ): see also Pen ny Zagalis, Hart
ford Fire Insurance Co. v. Califomia: Reassessing the Application of the McCarran
Ferguson Act to Foreign Reinsurers, 27 Cornell Int' I L.J. 24 1 , 267-68 ( 1 994 ) See
generally Terry Calvani, Long A rm 4 U.S. Regulations, Financial Times, Oct. 25,
1 994 at 16 (Mr. Calvani is a former commissioner of the United S tates Federal
.

Trade Commission).
39. Department of Justice, Request for Comments on Draft Anti trust E n forcement
Guidelines for I nternational Operations, 59 FR 528 1 0 (Oct. 1 9, 1 994).
The draft
guidelines extend U nited States j urisdiction to '·anti -competitive conduct. wherever
occumng, that restrains U.S. e.\ports .
. [or where] the U.S. Gove rn ment is a
purchaser, or substantially jimds the purchase, of goods or services for con sumption
or use abroad." /d. at 528 1 7 (emphasis added) . The 1 994 Draft Guidel i nes were
not warmly received by the Un ited Kingdom, which is not l ikely to be alone in its
hostile response.
Robert Rice, Guidelines Meet a Cold Front, Financial Times,
March 7, 1 995 at 1 2 . But see I nternational Antitrust Enforcement Assistance Act of
1 994, 1 5 U.S.C. §§ 620 1 - 1 2 ( 1 994) (aiming to promote international cooperation in
extraterritorial antitrust enforcement); s e e a l s o Assistant Attorney General Anne K.
B i ngaman, Testi mony to the Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial Law,
United States House of Representatives Commirtee on the J udiciary, 1 994 WL 4 1 3408
(F.D.C.H.) (Aug. 8 , 1 994) [hereinafter Bingaman testimony ] . Ms. B ingaman, noted
for her aggressive stance on i nternational antitrust enforcement, welcomed the statute
stati ng that i t "will allow us to get the evidence we need to enforce our anti trust
laws in today ' s global economy . . . through expanded international anti trust coop
eration." Bingaman testimony, supra, at 7. Bingaman further stated that "the bill
speci fically directs the Attorney General and the Federal Trade Commission to in
clude i n their consideration any proprietary interest the foreign government involved
may have that could benefit from or be affected by the assistance the U . S . a ge nc i e s
have been asked to provide. " Bingaman tl:'stimonv. supra, at 7 . Despite t h e Dcp � 1 rt ·
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It hardly needs be said that what America considers to be anti-com
petitive behavior is probably the most capitalistic view taken anywhere
i n the world. Almost any other country (for example, the European
Union) would tolerate a greater degree of collaboration between compa
nies, and between business and government. To enforce our v iew con
cerning such relationships whenever we have the power do so, threatens
to do enormous damage to our professed desire to i mprove i nternational
business relations.
We must bear in mind, of course, that the facts in our hypothetical
are not identical to those in Hartford Fire. In our case, a l l anti-competi
tive acts took place abroad. As observed above, that may not be dispos
itive of the matter, however. It also may be implicit in the Hartford
holding that the application of U nited States regulatory l aw to foreign
conduct is limited to a few sectors where this practice is essential to
enforcement.
It is against this backdrop that our di stingui shed panel of conflict of
l aws and i nternational l aw experts w i l l tel l us what they believe was at
stake in Hartford Fire, and in our hypothetical case.
* * *

FACTS

Primary Insurers are U nited States insurance compames which de
sired to effect changes in comprehensive general l iabil ity (CGL) insur
ance i ssued via standard policies in the United States. London is one of
the maj or markets for rei nsurance or excess coverage that American
insurance companies woul d wish to buy in relation to CGL policies
i ssued in the United States. Count X of the complaint al l eges that Pri
mary Insurers conspired with Key Actors (pri marily B ritish insurance
companies, but also some other brokers involved in the London i nsur
ance market), persuading them to boycott (not reinsure or issue excess
coverage against) any pol icies which did not contain the form l anguage
which Primary Insurers desired. The desired form language woul d de
crease Primary Insurers' s and Key Actors ' s ultimate l iabi l ity by decreas
ing coverage available for environmental disasters and toxic torts . The
l anguage places a cap on the legal defense costs provided by CGL
i nsurance, and shortens the effective coverage period of CGL insurance.

ment o f Justice ' s apparent wi l lingness to take unilateral action in their I <J94 Draft
Guidelines, it still seems to recognize the need for cooperation and solicitude for the
sovereigns' interests.
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Count X refers only to meetings among Key Actors and between Pri
mary Insurers and Key Actors. These meetings took place outside the
United S tates and related to the actions of neither reinsuring nor provid
ing excess insurance through the London market.
Assuming extraterritorial reach of the S herman Act, the allegations
stated would constitute a violation of the Act by both American c ompa
nies, under the boycott exception to the McCarran-Ferguson antitrust
exemption for i nsurance companies, and foreign companies. Neither the
London actions of Primary Insurers nor of Key Actors would v iolate
any Uni ted Kingdom law. It is the B ritish government' s position that
the London i nsurance market is effectively and exclusively regulated by
its own system of laws, and that any application of United S tates law
to these facts, especially against Key Actors, would constitute i mproper
i nterference with United Kingdom government and regul atory processes.
Primary Insurers and Key Actors moved to dismiss the Count X c laims
against them, on the ground that the S herman Act does not reach their
actions. The trial court granted Key Actors ' s motion to dismiss Count
X, denied Primary Insurers ' s motion to dismiss Count X, and certified
i nterlocutory appeal on the Count X i ssue. The lower appellate court
found that the Sherman Act applied to the actions of both sets of de
fendants and denied the motions to dismiss Count X.
As members of the United States Supreme Court, rev1ew these ex
traterritoriality i ssues.
May and should the Sherman Act, with regard to the actions which
took place outside the United States, be applied extraterritorially against
Primary Insurers ? Against Key Actors ?
* * *

BURBANK, J. * : (affi rming)
Our cases construing the applicability of the Sherman Act to extra
territorial conduct are not a model of consistency, and we welcome this
opportunity to put our house in order.
When we last v isited this question, i n a strikingly similar c ase, the
Court was closely divided as to the result and the appropriate analytical
approach. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California , 1 1 3 S . Ct. 289 1

*

Robert G. Ful l er, Jr., Professor of Law, Uni versity of Pennsylvania.
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( 1 993). B ecause we believe that analytical clarity i s essential not only
to a wise resolution of the i ssues before us but to a resolution that re
spects the proper role of federal courts, we take some pains in charting
our decisional path.
The compl aint in this case seeks recovery directly u nder the
S herman Act, and the claims it states are neither i mmaterial nor frivo
lous in the sense of those words intended by this Court in Bell v.
Hood, 327 U . S . 678 ( 1 946) . 1 There is, therefore, subject matter j urisdic
tion under 28 U . S . C . §§ 1 3 3 1 and 1 33 7 ( 1 988). Congress is, of course,
free to enact more specific j urisdictional statutes and in doing so to
make relevant to the question of subject matter j urisdiction matters that,
under our long-standing interpretation of § 1 33 1 , are properly consid
ered as part of the merits. If 1 5 U . S . C . § 1 5 ( 1 988), is properly regard
ed as a j urisdictional provision, it nonetheless furnishes no basis for
treating the question of territorial scope as an aspect of subj ect matter
j uri sdiction. There is, however, evidence in the Jegislati ve history of the
Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act of 1 98 2 (FT AlA) of an
i ntent to do something similar. See H . R. Rep. No. 686, 97th Cong., 2d
Sess. 1 3 ( 1 982). We do not decide that question, however, because the
FT AlA is not involved in this case and those who drafted the legis
l ative h istory of the FT AlA may have been misled by decisions of this
and other federal courts that lost sight of both the rule announced in
Bell and the reasons for it. See Comment, Sherman A ct "Jurisdiction "
in Hospital Staff Exclusion Cases, 1 32 U . Pa. L. Rev . 1 2 1 ( 1 983).
Part of the appeal of a dismissal for lack of subject matter j urisdic
tion may repose in the capacity of the concept to induce belief that the
decision was inevitable, or at least c learly attributable to congressional
choices. Moreover, if a court considers matters that implicate the territo
rial scope of federal Jaw as part of the j urisdictional inquiry, it is hard
to see how that court cou ld properly decline to exerci se the j u risdiction

l.

Jurisdiction, therefore, i s not defeated . . . by the possibility that the
averments might fai l to state a cause of action on which petitioners could
actuall y recover. For it is well settled that the fai lure to state a proper cause
of action calls for a judgment on the merits and not for a dismissal for want
of jurisdiction . . . . The previously carved out exceptions are that a suit may
sometimes be dismissed for want of j urisdiction where the alleged claim
under the Constitution or federal statutes c learly appears to be immaterial and
made solely for the purpose of obtaining j urisdiction or where such a claim
is whol l y insubstantial and frivolous.
Bell v . Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682-83 ( 1 946).
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Congress has conferred. That was the dilemma confronting the maj ority
in the Hartford Fire case, under the i nfluence of the FTAIA, if not of
its legis lative hi story.
Having determi ned that the FfAlA does not control this case and
that there is subj ect matter jurisdiction under the standards set forth i n
Bell, we are required t o explore what Justice Scalia identified a s a
problem of legislative or prescriptive j urisdiction. See Hartfo rd Fire,
1 1 3 S . Ct. at 29 1 8 (Scalia, J . , dissenting with respect to Part II). To say
that the S herman Act simultaneously exercises prescriptive juri sd iction
and grants subject matter j urisdiction, even if true, hardly settles the
question whether the two are congruent. But see Hartford Fire, 1 1 3 S .
Ct. at 2909 n.22.
The problem of legislative jurisdiction can arise in domestic state
law cases when the choice of law normall y avai l able to a cou rt i s con
strained by federal constitutional limits. It can ari se in federal l aw c ases
because, although the Supremacy Clause dictates a choice of pertinent
federal law, the Constitution also limits the l awmaking power of the
federal government.
When either federal constitutional or self-imposed limits foreclose
the application of a state' s l aw, the case can often be decided on the
merits u nder the law of another state. A deci sion that federal law does
not apply also i mports, as we have discussed, a deci sion on the merits,
but it often does not usher i n the appl ication of the law of another
j urisdiction. That is because, although (supplemental ) subj ect matter
j urisdiction may exist to apply state or foreign l aw , see 28 U . S .C . §
1 3 67 (Supp. II 1 990), often federal law i s the only law u nder which a
plainti ff seeks or can seek relief.
Although different in important respects, i nterstate choice of law and
determi nations about the extraterritorial application of federal law share
one salient characteristic. They are usually unconstrained by textually
explicit signs of legislative self-restraint. See Stephen B. B urbank, The
World in Our Courts, 89 Mich. L. Rev . 1 456, 1 460 ( 1 99 1 ) (book re
view) . Honestly v iewed, state choice of law decisions are typically not
j udicial attempts to carry out actual legislative intent so much as they
are attempts to confect rational solutions of problems to which legis
l atures rarely give attention . See Lea B rilmayer. lnrcrcsr A nalysis ond
the Myth of Legislative Intent, 78 Mich. L. Rev . 392 ( 1 980). The same
is true of the decisions of this Court with respect to e x trat e rr i t o r i a l i t y .
with the "rational solution" in each case being inll ucnccd h y t h e fe l t
necessities, including the jurisprudential climate, of t h e t i m e s .
To say that our decisions on extraterritori ality h a v e heni � t pn ) d u c t
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of the times in which they were decided is, more or less, to admit that
they are hard to defend as consistent. That is true of our decisions
interpreting the Sherman Act. The i nfluence of domestic choice of l aw
thinking on those decisions i s hard to miss, see B urbank, supra, at
1 460-6 1 , and, as Justice Scalia has observed, it i s equally hard to ex
plain what happened to the presumption against extraterritorial app lica
tion. See Hartford Fire, 1 1 3 S . Ct. at 29 1 8- 1 9 (Scalia, J . , dissenting
with respect to Part II). It i s time to clarify the proper role that both
choice of law analysis and presumptions play in determining the ex
traterritorial application of federal statutes.
Even if we were competent to identify the interests of another sov
ereign nation, it is not consistent with our proper function as a federal
court interpreting an act of Congress to attempt to weigh those interests
against the interests of the United States. A presumption against the
i nterpretation or application of federal l aw so as to bring the United
States in violation of international l aw is entirely appropriate . "Interna
tional comity" is not, however, international law, and few peopl e other
than those who drafted the relevant sections of the Restatement (Third)
of the Foreign Relations Law of the United S tates ( 1 986), bel ieve that
section 403 states rules of customary international law. See B urbank,
supra, at 1 464-65 . Certainl y , the European Court of Justice cannot
bel ieve such a thing, having brought the European Union ' s approach to
antitrust l aw closely in accord with that taken i n Hartford Fire. See
Case 89/9 5 , Ahlstrom v. Commission, 1 988 E.C.R. 5 1 93, 4 C . M .L.R.
90 1 ( 1 988). Although federal common l awmaking and statutory interpre
tation are di fferent in degree rather than in kind-particularly when the
statute i s the Sherman Act-federal courts do not have the freedom i n
implementing congressional choices through statutory interpretation that
they have when making federal choices through federal common l aw .
Congress might grant that freedom, but when foreign relations could be
affected, we require more than an ambiguous sentence in a committee
report on another statute. Cf Andreas F. Lowenfeld, Act of State and
Department of State: First National City Bank v. Banco Nacional de
Cuba, 66 Am. J . Int ' l L. 795 ( 1 972).
On the facts alleged in thi s case, the purposes of the S herman Act
would be served by its application to the domestic and foreign defen
dants a like. In choice of law parlance, the United States is an i nterested
state. The same would be true i f the FTAlA ' s requirement of "a direct,
substantial, and reasonably foreseeable effect" were appl icable (and
deemed a requirement on the merits). The complaint alleges such an
effect. In the absence of some specific i ndication of congressional will
to forebear or of an applicable general interpretative rule, there i s no
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legitimate basis upon which we may decline to enforce the statute.
For much of our hi story, there h ave been two "general interpretative
rules" to which the courts could appeal to avoid the potential antago
nisms o r embarrassments that extraterritorial application of United States
law might entai l . Those rules, of course, are the presumption against the
extraterritorial appl ication of statutes and the presumption against statu
tory viol ation of international law. Together with traditional territorial
choice of law rules-and more than one of these devices might be
involved in the same case-they were long adequate to the task.
Today , traditional territorial choice of l aw rules may not be wholly
obsolete, but they are hardly available to us as a plausible surrogate for
congressional i ntent. Consideri ng the place of the U nited S tates i n the
world economy , one might say the same about the presumption against
extraterritorial application. See Jonathan R. Turley, " When in Rome ":
Multinational Misconduct and the Presumption Against Extraterritoriali
ty, 84 Nw. U . L. Rev . 598 ( 1 990). Perhaps for that reason, this pre
sumption has long ceased to operate in connection with the S he rman
Act. Thus, even if we were persuaded to adopt in its stead a presump
tion in favor of extraterritorial appl ication , this would not be the occa
sion to do so. Perhaps we should reconsider the presumption in an
appropriate case, but we only recently affirmed its vitality . EEOC v.
A rabian Am. Oil Co. , 499 U . S . 244 ( 1 99 1 ) . Moreover, it i s less i mpor
tant w hat the content of such an interpretative rule is than that it be
clear, c learly understood by Congress, and consistently applied by the
federal courts .
Acknowledging our own inconsistency in applying the presu mption
against extraterritori ality in the past , we believe that it is the better part
of valor to strive to improve in the future. We, therefore, leave it to
Congress to clearly signal when it has determined that the potential
costs of either unil ateral regulation or unreciprocated forbearance are
outweighed by the potential benefits of enforcing otherwise applicable
United States Jaw. This, in any event, seems to us a better approach to
statutory interpretation than one which relies on "international comity ,"
which is neither clear nor clearly understood by Congress, and which,
in the view of many informed observers, is consistent only in permi tting
federal courts to apply United States Jaw. See, e.g. , Harold G. Maier,
In terest Balancing and Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 3 1 Am. J . Comp. L.
579 ( 1 983).
All of this is not to say that statutory interpretation is the best ap
proach to the problem. It would be far better for Congress to provide
more specific guidance in the text of the antitrust laws, and it should
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start by clarifying the scope of the FTAIA and the relationship of the
standards it contains to other provisions of those laws. Moreover, rec
ognizing that even the most thoughtful rewrite of the antitrust l aws
could not antici pate all of the n uances arising from the i nterplay of
domestic co mpet i t i o n policy and foreign rel ations, Congress may wish
to reconsider the re lationship between public and private enforcement
when it is proposed to apply the antitrust laws extraterritorial ly. Recip
rocal forbearance is i mpossible so long as public l aw is in private
hands, and progress w i l l not be made so long as we insist on j urispru
dential notions-whether about the pub l ic/private dichotomy or the
proper role of couns-that are uncongenial to other countries with
whom we desire cooper arion. The Executive Branch has made progress
in this area on which Congress might build. See, e.g. , Agreement be
tween the Govern m e n t of the United States of America and the Com
mission of the European Communities regarding the Appl ication of their
Competition Laws, Sept. 23, 1 99 1 , 3 0 I . L.M. 1 487. Arrayed against the
competence and resources of both the Executive B ranch and Congress
in foreign relations, both a j udicially created presumption against extra
territorial application and j udic i al l y interpreted norms of international
comity are feeble tools indeed.
The presumption against interpreting or applyi ng a federal statute so
as to bring it in violation of international Jaw is, as we have indicated,
by no means obsolete . It remains a vitally important means to bridge
the gap between this country ' s essential ly duali st traditions and monist
aspirations for an international l egal order. Except in the case of treaties
or ius cogens, however, it too is a feeble tool, and we would honor
neither our traditions nor those aspirations by projecting home-made
choice of J aw mov ies onto a world screen. Nothing in i nternational law
prevents the application of the S herman Act to the facts alleged in thi s
case. The decis ion be l ow i s therefore
Affirmed.
* * *
COX, J . * : (affirm ing)
Affi rm e d . The Sherman Act should be applied to the actions of
Primary Insurers and Key Actors, even though these actions took place
wholly outside the United States and were in conformity with l ocal Jaw.
I largely agree with the opinions of Justices SCHARF and
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WEINTRAUB . I write separately to i ndicate minor points of potential
disagreement from their positions, and to further emphasize that the
current Court presumption against extraterritoriality outs ide of the
Shennan Act context is wrongheaded and should be abandoned.
B oth Justices WEINTRAUB and SCHARF properly acknowledge the
unworkableness of any balancing or weighing approach for determining
whether United Sates l aw should be applied extraterritori ally. U nited
States j udges merely pretend to balance United S tates i nterests agai nst
foreign interests; it would be more honest and helpful to hold that we
only have authority to evaluate whether our own interests are strongly
i mpli cated. As a matter of fundamental j urisdictional power and legiti
macy, we have no authority to "neutrally" decide whether United States
i nterests predomi nate over foreign i nterests. We are not an i nternational
court of justice, but rather an appellate court of a single soverei gn . To
the extent that our decisions are constrai ned by "international law," the
content of that international law is not dictated to us from an outward
source, but is something which we fashion or recognize ourselves (i. e. ,
the l aw of our foreign rel ations versus i nternational law i n a more ab
stract or universal sense). Both Justice WEI NTRAUB ' s strong p resump
tion of extraterritorial ity and Justice SCHARF' s unilateral approach,
with the possibility of a sovereign compulsion defense, properly inquire
into the extent of our own i nterest and properly reach the same re
sult-application of United S tates law is proper whenever our regul atory
interests are legitimately i mpli cated.
I further agree with Justice SILBERMAN that Justice MAIER ' s
attempt to carve out a regulatory o r quasi-criminal enclave, w here a
unilateral approach can operate unimpeded, does not adequately address
the problem i n this or related types of cases. Private p laintiffs, in
addition to state department prosecutors, are entitled to remedies under
the S herman Act. Even when private plaintiffs sue foreigners under
other statutes, which have no quasi-criminal cast or state department
i nvol vement, United States regulatory interests are similarl y implicated.
The absence of a sovereign p arty does not eliminate the source of regu
lation . Plaintiffs who seek application of United S tates laws, in Ameri
can courts, are asking that our nation ' s regulatory and enforcement
power be applied to regulate conduct via a court j udgment .
Accordingly, the question we should ask i n any suit, regardl ess of
who brings it, is whether the conduct at i ssue was meant to trigger
application of Ameri can law. Contrary to the implications in Justice
SCHARF' s opinion, I would not automatically foreclose appl ication of
our own Jaw even in situations where actions abroad are "compelled,"
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at least to the extent compul sion is determined according to another
sovereign ' s law. Our law may be meant to apply without defenses;
whatever defenses are meant to apply are governed by U ni ted States
law, rather than dictated by the actions of other sovereigns.
This unilateral approach does not support the application of United
States law without an i nitial determi nation that there is enough effect i n
the United States for u s legitimately t o regulate. Justice WEINTRAUB
addressed this concern of overreaching in condemni ng the application of
securities law to a whole transaction that only slightly affects United
States i nterests. A more unilateral approach allows regulation of conduct
only partially aimed at the U ni ted States, regardless of the effects of
such regulation on defendant' s activities elsewhere . If there is a signifi
cant harmful effect i n the United S tates, there is presumably a need to
regulate that portion of the conduct, regardless of how this might cause
the defendant to change its whole method of operations. Otherw i se, the
net result is the immunization of foreign manufacturers from product
liability suits because the majority of their products are sold overseas,
although they knowingly direct a small portion of h armful products to
particular local plaintiffs. This is a tort result Justice WEINTRAUB
elsewhere disapproves . See WEINTRAUB, infra, at 664.
The i nstant litigation is an easy c ase for extraterritorial application
of United States law . To determine whether United States law is trig
gered by any particular actions abroad is partly a matter of statutory
construction and partly a matter of j udicial application. The statutory
interpretation part of our analysis, in the instant case, i ndicates that
Congress i ntended to prohibit conduct of the type alleged here. Con
gress has expressed no l imit regarding the geographical reach of the law
that was meant to appl y . 1 Judicial application of the S herman Act to
actions abroad, having substantial effect in the United States (apparently
actions directed towards parties in the United States, according to
plaintiffs ' allegations), would be a reasonable exercise of our govern
mental regulatory power. Accordingly, the judgment should be affirmed.
I additionally emphasize that we should, at the first available oppor
tunity , abandon the nearly irrebuttable presumption against extraterritori
ality which we foolishly adopted i n EEOC v. A rabian Am. Oil Co. , 499
U . S . 244 ( 1 99 1 ) [herei nafter A ramco] . Although not directly at issue i n

I . Even i f Congress expressly l imits geographical reach, there are situations
where such a l imitation is arguably unconstitutional. Where similarly situated persons
are treated dissimi larly, or other constitutional rights are infri nged by immunizing
conduct abroad, we should at least consider whether even Congress' s express intent
should be declared invalid.
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this case, since the S herman Act previously has been construed to have
clear extraterritorial reach, the presumption against extraterritoriality will
only cause future additional mischief. Cf Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.
Californ ia , 1 1 3 S . Ct. 289 1 , 29 1 8 ( 1 993) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (indicat
ing that, were the matter not governed by precedent, the territorial reach
of the Sherman Act would be worth reconsidering under A ramco ) A
presumption that United States laws are meant to apply extraterri torially
when defendants i ntend and do have effects clearly within the United
States ' s regulatory sphere of interest is a more sensible construction of
legislative i ntent, and is a prudent exercise of federal common l aw
discretion.
In the instant case, especi ally as applied to the actions of Primary
Insurers, a presu mption of extraterritoriality prevents insurers from mov
ing offshore, aiming their actions back at their horne country, and then
claiming l ack of j urisdictional reach. I did not agree with this Court ' s
immunization o f United States tortfeasors for their wrongfu l actions in
either S audi Arabi a (Aramco) or Antarctica (see Smith v . United States,
1 1 3 S . Ct. 1 1 7 8 ( 1 993)). We should reverse the trend, begun in
A ramco, of providing safe harbors for wrongdoing.
.

* * *
KRAMER, J . * : (affirming)
In this case we consider the applicability of the S herman Act, 1 5
U . S . C . § 1 , to an alleged conspiracy formed i n England between vari
ous American i nsurance companies ("Primary Insurers") and their Brit
ish counterparts ("Key Actors"). The court of appeals ruled that both
sets of defendants could be held l iable under the Act. We affirm.
I.
Comprehensive general liabi lity ("CGL") insurance i s sold in the
United States under a standardized agreement drafted by the Insurance
Services Office (ISO), an association of approximately 1 ,400 domestic
property and casualty insurers. Primary Insurers sought changes in the
terms of this agreement that would decrease their l iability for environ
mental disasters and toxic torts. In particular, they wanted to shorten the
effective term of coverage of any CGL insurance agreement and to

*
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i mpose a cap on their responsibility for l itigation costs. When they
fai led to convince the ISO to make these changes, Primary Insurers
contacted Key Actors and persuaded them to use their market power to
produce the desired results.
Key Actors control a significant portion of the London i nsurance
market, a maj or source of reinsurance and excess insurance coverage.
At meetings held in England, Key Actors agreed with Primary Insurers
to refuse to sell reinsurance or provi de excess coverage to any company
whose insurance form did not include the terms sought by Primary
Insurers . It is conceded by all parties that this agreement consti tutes a
restraint of trade within the meaning of the S herman Act and, further,
that it cal l s for a boycott under the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 1 5 U . S . C .
§ 1 1 0 1 . Primary Insurers and Key Actors nonetheless moved t o dismiss
the plaintiffs ' complaint on the ground that American law does not
apply to an agreement made and executed entirely in England. They are
supported in this position by the B ritish government, which has filed a
brief amicus curiae arguing that the conduct at i ssue does not violate
any law of the United Kingdom and that the application of United
States law would constitute "improper i nterference with U nited Kingdom
government and regulatory processes."
II.
Before turning to the problem of whether the Sherman Act reaches
conduct outside the United States, we briefly discuss the question of
subj ect-matter j urisdiction. For reasons that are unclear, a number of
courts and commentators have confused the question of whether a par
ticular law appl ies to foreign conduct-a question of the merits that
asks whether the party relying on a law states a claim or defense-wi th
the question of whether the court has subject-matter j urisdiction. See,
e.g. , Steele v. Bulova Watch, 344 U . S . 280, 282 ( 1 952) ; Boureslan v.
A ramco, 653 F. S upp. 629 (S.D. Tex . 1 987), aff'd, 499 U . S . 244
( 1 99 1 ) ; Gary Born & David Westin, International Civil Litigation in
United States Courts 6 1 6 (2d ed. 1 992) ; Note, Extraterritorial Applica
tion of United States Laws, 28 Stan . L. Rev . 1 005 ( 1 97 8 ) . Indeed, Jus
tice Souter made this m istake in his opi nion for the Court i n Hartford
Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 1 1 3 S . Ct. 289 1 , 2909 n .22 ( 1 993), though
ultimately it did not affect the disposition of the case. Perhaps the con
fusion arises from the fact that extraterritorial app lication in i nternation
al cases is often described as a question of "prescriptive j u ri sdiction"
and use of the word j u risdiction misleads . Certainly, no one makes the
same mistake in domestic choice of law cases, where the question of
applying forum law rather than deferring to another state' s law is every-
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where understood as a question on the merits that has n othing to do
with the court ' s subject-matter j urisdiction (and hence is waivable).
Be that as i t may, there i s simply no question about subj ect-matter
j urisdiction here. The plaintiffs have filed an action seeking d amages
under the S herman Act. As such, there is j urisdiction under 28 U . S .C.
§ 1 3 3 1 , which gives federal courts "original j urisdiction of all c i vii ac
tions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the U ni ted
States." See Hartford Fire, 1 1 3 S. Ct. at 29 1 7- 1 8 (Scalia, J . , dissenting).
The defendants maintain that the Sherman Act does not reach this
far-that the Act does not render their conduct unlawful because it
applies only to conduct occurring i n the United States . I f so, the
plaintiffs ' complaint would fai l because they could not establish an
essential element of their claim (conduct w ithin the United S tates), and
the proper course would be to dismiss u nder Federal R u l e of Civil
Procedure 1 2(b)(6). See Romero v . International Terminal Ope rating
Co. , 3 5 8 U . S . 354, 359 ( 1 959); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U . S . 5 7 1 , 575
( 1 95 3 ) . 1
III.
We turn, therefore, to the argument that the plaintiffs may not re
cover under the S herman Act because the conduct, alleged to constitute
a consp1racy, took place outside the United States.
A.
That we need to discuss this question at all may seem surpnsmg
given our recent decision i n Hartford Fire, supra, holding the S herman
Act applicable on facts virtually identical to these. But the narrow ma
j ority opi nion i n that case is questionable in several respects, and these
have convinced us to revisit the i ssue in order further to c larify the law.
First, the majority opinion in Hartford Fire failed adequately to deal
with our almost contemporaneous deci sion in EEOC v. Arabian Am. Oil
Co., 499 U.S. 244 ( 1 99 1 ) [hereinafter A ramco ], which held '"that legis-

I . The plaintiffs might still be able to l itigate i n federal court if they could
state a claim under the law of another nation and the parties are diverse or the court
retains supplemental jurisdiction under 28 U . S. C. § 1 367 . I n many cases, however,
such a claim would be based on a foreign penal, tax, or regulatory law, and our
courts do not enforce these types of foreign law. See, e. g. , Huntington v. A tril/, 1 46
U . S . 657 ( 1 892); The Antelope, 23 U . S . ( 1 0 Wheat. ) 66, 1 23 ( 1 825 ) . The continuing
viability of this l i mitation i s dubious, but we need not reach that question i n l ight of
our holdi ng that these plaintiffs state a claim under the Sherman Act.
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l ation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply
only within the territorial j urisdi ction of the United States."' !d. at 248
(quoting Foley Bros. v. Fi!ardo, 3 3 6 U . S . 28 1 , 285 ( 1 949)) . S ince noth
ing in the language (or, for that matter, the legis lative h istory) of the
S herman Act i ndicates an i ntent to regulate conduct abroad, one might
have expected the Court to find the Sherman Act i napplicable to a
conspiracy that, like the conspiracies alleged in Hartford Fire and i n
this case, consists entirely o f conduct outside the United States . This i s
particularly true i f one recalls that the presumption against extraterritori
ality was first articulated in a case brought under the S herman Act. See
American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co. , 2 1 3 U.S . 357 ( 1 909) . Yet
not only did the Hartford Fire Court allow plaintiffs to sue based on
allegations of conduct that took place entirely outside the United States,
but i t did so without even mentioning, much less attempting to distin
guish, A ramco. Hence, we revisit these dec isions to clarify the apparent
contlict between them. 2
Second, the Hartford Fire maj ority ' s explanation of extraterritoriality
is que stionable and confusing. J ustice Souter says the Sherman Act
applies presumptively whenever there are effects within the United

2. Justice Scalia discussed EEOC v . A rabian Am. Oil Co. 499 U.S. 244 ( 1 99 1 )
[hereinafter A ramco ] . i n his dissent, concl uding (with obvious disappointment) that,
while one might have expected A ramco to control the outcome, "it is now well
establ ished that the Sherman Act applies extraterritorially." Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v.
California, 1 1 3 S. Ct. 289 1 , 29 1 8- 1 9 (Scalia, J . , dissenting) (citing Matmshira Elec.
Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp. , 475 U.S. 574, 582 n .6 ( 1 9 8 5 ) ; Continenwl Ore
Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Co. , 370 U.S. 690, 704 ( 1 962); and United Stures
v. A luminum Co.
of Am. . 1 48 F.2d 4 1 6 (2d Cir. 1 945) [hereinafter A lcoa ] ) . In fact,
none of the cases Justice Scalia cites supports so broad a concl usion. The reference
in Marsushita is a dictum that cites only Conrinental Ore, and Continental Ore holds
merely that the Sherman Act applies if some culpable acts were committed in the
United States even i f some were committed abroad. It does not, in other words,
abandon the tenitorial requirement or hold that the Sherman Act reaches conduct that
took place wholly outside the United S tates and only had effects within it. (Other
decisions reaching the same concl usion include United States v . Sisal Sales Corp. ,
274 U . S . 268 ( 1 927): Thomsen v. Cayser. 243 U.S. 66 ( 1 9 1 7) ; and United States v.
Pacijic & A rcric Ry. , 228 U . S . 87 ( 1 9 1 3 ) ) . As for A lcoa, it is only a court of
appeals decision. and while the case was referred to the Second Circuit because the
Supreme Court w as unable to muster a quorum, that does not enhance its
precedential effect. Hence, prior to Hartfo rd Fire, there was no Supreme Court
authority holding the Sherman Act applicable on the basis of effects alone ( though
there was considerable lower court authority as well as an interpretation to this effect
from the Justice Department). The unexplained adoption of such a position in Hart
ford Fire, corning close on the heels of Aramco ' s strong presumption against extrater
ritoriality, thus gives rise to an apparent contlict.
.
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States . He then reserves the question whether thi s presumption can ever
be overcome based on comity. Accordi ng to Justice Souter, such consid
erations "would not counsel" against the application of U ni ted S tates
l aw unless there was a "true confl ict," and a true conflict exists only i f
foreign law requires something U nited States l aw forbids (or vice-versa) .
Hartford Fire, 1 1 3 S . Ct. at 29 1 0.
However one thinks such problems ought to be resolved, this rea
soning is obviously flawed . To begin with, Justice S outer bases his
analysis on the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Rel ations Law of the
United States § 403 ( 1 986), but as Justice Scal i a poi nts out in dissent,
Hartford Fire, 1 1 3 S. Ct. at 2922 (Scalia J . , dissenting), J ustice Souter
misreads the provision. Justice Souter ' s argument is, moreover, i nconsis
tent w ith the conventional u nderstanding of "true confl ict," which re
qui res only that the l aws of different states or nations regu late the same
conduct di fferently. Finally, and most importantl y , Justice Souter' s ap
proach l eads to the application of United States law in s ituations w here
it advances United States interests only marginally while interfering
with the regulatory objectives of other nations. Not only i s this wrong
as a matter of principle, but as we have seen i n recent years, it can be
expected to trigger aggressive responses from other nations that w i l l
subvert United States i nterests in cases o f more immediate o r significant
concern . See, e. g. , G . Born & D. Westin, supra, at 600-03 (discussing
Engl and ' s "blocki ng statute," which prevents recovery of treble damages
and authorizes B ritish officials to forbid comp l iance with United States
discovery orders) . For this reason too, we think recons ideration of the
Hartford Fire problem is appropriate . 3

3 . Justice WEINTRAUB offers an altemative reading of Justice Souter' s Hartford
Fire opinion to make i t more palatable. We should, he tel l s us, ··credit Justice Souter
with being able to read section 403" and interpret his opinion "as sayi ng that under
any form of comity �m alysis, the facts of Hartford Fire justified application of the
Sherman Act, the only possible defense was that the defendants were required by the
United Kingdom to act as they did, and there was no evidence of compulsion."
WEINTRAUB, infra, at 6 1 7- 1 8 . B u t this saves Justice Souter the e mbarrassment o f
misreading section 403 only by having him make an equally embarrassing comity
argument. For even i f one thinks (as I do) that comity analysis favors the appl ication
of U n i ted S tates l aw i n both this case and Hurij(Jrd Fire, Justice S I L B ERMAN' s
opinion makes c lear that there are strong arguments on the other side. I n any event,
Justice WEINTRAU B ' s rewrite of Justice Souter's opinion is not true to the original.
Read i n context, it i s perfectly c lear that Justice Souter was saying that no conflict
exists i f a party can comply with the law of both nations, and that without such a
conflict there is ··no need . . . to address other considerations that might i n form a
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B.
We turn , then, to the problem o f determining the scope o f the
S herman Act in multinational cases (i. e. , cases whose facts include
some contact or connection with a foreign nation). And we beg in with
an elementary proposition: that this is, first and foremost, a problem of
statutory i nterpretation. Congress enacted a l aw that gives i nj ured parties
a right to seek relief; our task is to interpret this law in order to deter
mine the circumstances that must exist for a party to obtain that relief.
The appropriate territorial connection i s simply one aspect of this inqui
ry-an element of the claim to be determined, like any other element,
by reference to the statute. Just as the plaintiff must plead a "contract"
that is "in restraint of trade," so too must the plaintiff plead an appro
priate connection to the United States. U nfortunately, while Congress
was clear about some terms, it was less c lear about others, including
extraterritorial appl ication. Indeed, as with most state and federal legisla
tion, there i s no mention of territorial scope in either the statute ' s lan
guage or its legislative history . We are consequently faced with a famil
iar problem of statutory construction-uncontemplated c ircumstanc
es-that calls upon us to fil l a gap in the statute' s coverage.4

decision to refrai n from the exercise o!' j urisdiction on grounds of i nternational comi
ty." Hartford Fire, 1 1 3 S. Ct. at 29 1 0 .
4 . To say this i s a problem o f statutory construc tion does not make m y ap
proach "unilateral" as opposed to "multilateral." The dist inction between u nilateral and
multilateral approaches turns on whether the forum anal yzes the problem in terms of
forum interests only or views it from a multistate or multi national perspective. Treat
ing the problem as one of statutory i nterpretation, in contrast, ret1ects separation of
powers concerns and has no bearing on this choice of perspectives. The scope of a
law, in terms of i ts territorial reach as muc h as anything else, is determined by
Congress. Our task is to m ake sense of what Congress did, whether it was done
from a u n i lateral or multi lateral perspective. That task would be si mple, for example,
if the Sherman Act stated clearly that it applies whenever a n agreement is made in
the United States or whenever an agreement has e ffects in the United States or
whatever. For unless Congress acted u nconsti tutional ly, the Court is bound to respect
a clear statutory directive. That Congress has not said anything changes the kind of
statutory construction problem we face, but not the fact that it is such a problem.
Having said this much, I should add that I think the debate over "uni l:.lteral"
and '·multilateral" approaches i s a waste of time, because any sensible approach will
incorporate elements of both. To start, the analysis must necessari ly include an initial
inquiry that i s unilateral-whether the forum has any interest in applying its law at
all-because it makes no sense to start worrying about balancing forum and foreign
i nterests w ithout some reason first to think that forum law applies. After that, the
distinction between "unilateral" and '"multilateral" approaches ceases to m atter, be
cause even a state determi ned to advance only its own i nterests w i l l want to take the
interests of other states or nations i nto account. In theory, such a state will defer to
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(1)
Some approaches to fil l ing this gap can be rejected out of hand. The
sort of "plain l anguage" interpretation that has recently become popular
in certain c ircles, for example, i s obviously inappropri ate h ere . After all ,
the text of the S herman Act contains n o territorial l imitations w hatever;
its plain l anguage declares "every contract" in restraint of trade to be
i llegal. 1 5 U . S .C. § 1 . Read l iterally, this would make U nited States
law universally applicable-even to agreements between foreign parties
with no connection to the U nited States-a preposterous result.
Of course, Congress could not make United States l aw universally
appl icable even if it wanted to, because (as in every area) Congress ' s
power i s limited by the Constitution . The most significant c onstraint in
this regard i s probabl y the Due Process Clause of the Fifth A mendment,
though other prov isions might also come into play . In addition, Con
gress is further restrained by the wel l-established principle that "an act
of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if
any other possible construction remai ns." Murray v. The Schooner
Charming Betsy, 6 U . S . (2 Cranch) 64, 1 1 8 ( 1 804). Whi le not a binding
restriction as such, this canon of constructi on tel l s us not to read an Act
of Congress to exceed the l imits of intern ational l aw unless the legisla
ture has indicated explicitly i n the language of the statute that this i s
what i t wants.
Hence, a second possible con structi on would be to assume that the
S herman Act reaches as far as permitted by the Constitution and in
ternational l aw (whichever is more restrictive). B ut thi s is scarcely bet
ter than interpreting the statute ' s reach to be universal, because the
limits imposed by the Constitution and international law are quite mod
est. See Lea B rilmu.yer & Charles Norchi, Federal Extraterritoriality
and Fifth A mendment Due Process, 1 05 Harv . L. Rev . 1 2 1 7 ( 1 992);
Matthias Herdegan, Book Review, 39 Am. 1 . Comp . L . 207 , 209- 1 0
( 1 99 1 ) These limits are desig ned to impose only minima l restraints
whi le leaving government room to act in a wide variety of potential
circumstances. As such, there is no a priori reason to expect such cau
tious restrictions to serve appropriatel y in the context of a particular
.

other states only to the m i rwn u m extent necessary. But inasmuch as a c hoice-of-law
regime based on cooperation and reciprocity will advance the interests of every state
better than one based on shortsighted pursuit of sel f in terest, set: Larry Kramer,
Return of the Rt:nvoi, 66 N . Y . U . L. Rev. 979, 1 0 1 5-28 ( 1 99 1 ), the best unil ateral
regime should c losely resemble the best multilateral one. Hence, there is no real
choice to be made in pragmatic terms.
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statu te .
A third possibil ity is to use a case-by-case balancing test such as
that proposed in section 403 of the Restatement (Third) of the Foreign
Relations Law of the United States ( 1 986) . 5 This is the practice in anti
trust cases in the lower courts, see, e. g., Mannington Mills, Inc. v.
Congu!eum Corp. , 595 F.2d 1 287, 1 297-98 (3d Cir. 1 97 9 ) ; Timberlane
Lumber Co. v . Bank of Am. , 549 F.2d 597 , 608- 1 5 (9th Cir. 1 976),
where it has been endorsed by the Justice Department. See U . S . Dept.
of Justice, A ntitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations
( 1 98 8 ) . I ndeed, this Court itself adopted such a balancing approach for
questions of extraterritorial discovery in Societe Nationale Industrielle
A erospatiale v. Un ited States Dist. Court, 482 U.S. 522 ( 1 987).
Nonetheless, like all my col leagues, I think case-by-case balancing is
a bad idea. It seems attractive enough in concept-what could be better,
after all, than an approach that enables the court to take all relevant
considerations into account and tailor them to the particular situa
tion ?-but balancing of this sort tends not to work very well in prac
tice. The considerations being weighed are always imprecise e nough to
permit several answers and to dictate none. As a result, there is no
greater certainty about the correctness of particular outcomes--o n l y
more uncertainty about what those outcome;; are l ikely t o b e . When i t
comes t o choice-of-law, these problems are exacerbated by t h e incom
mensurable nature of the factors bei ng balanced and by the fact that the
stakes often depend on outcomes in many cases rather than on the
disposition of any particular case. In the final analysis, multi-factored
balancing l eads to the worst sort of intuitive decisionmaking; rather than
being guided by the test, j udges simply manipulate the considerations to
j ustify a result already reached by intuition. This may explain why
j udges l ike this kind of approach, but i t is a good reason to rej ect it.
A fourth approach is the one embraced by this Court in A ramco: a
presumption that federal statutes appl y only to conduct in the United
States. A ramco says that such a presumption protects "against unintend
ed clashes between our laws and those of other nations which could
result in international discord." A ramco, 1 1 1 S. Ct. at 1 230 (citations
omitted). Thi s may, in fact, sometimes be true-though a territorial pre-

5.

The drafters of the Restatement appear to believe thm the "re asonableness"
section 403 ' s balancing test reflects l i mits required by
i nternational law. If so, as Justice B URBANK points out, they are about the only
ones who be lieve this. The l i mits of international law more closely resemble the
b:1ses identified in section 402 of the Restmement. Section 403 then provides a
d i scretionary overlay. a method for exercising restraint within those limits.

req u i rement embodied in
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sumption does nothing about clashes that arise because forei g n nations
would apply their laws to conduct in the United States . More i mportant,
even if restricting American law to conduct in the United States does
avoid some conflicts, it does so in a manner that is often arbitrary,
since the underlying obj ectives of many laws are not related to (or
solely concerned with) w here the conduct took place. The arg uments
here shouid already be familiar, for while much of modern confl icts
theory remains unsettled, if anything is established, it is that across-the
board territoriality is a poor system for resolving confl icts. (Thi s is a
point that I, l ike many others, have explored elsewhere . ) See L arry
Kramer, Vestiges of Beale: Extraterritorial Application of A merican
Law, 1 99 1 S up . Ct. Rev . 1 79, 207 - 1 3 ) . Rather than repeat the argu
ments here, suffice it to say that A ramco was a mistake-a step b ack to
an outmoded j urisprudence that was abandoned long ago, and for good
reason, in every other area where it once was used. 6 A ramco should be
overruled; at the very least, its presumption should not be extended.
(2)
I prefer to determine the extraterritorial scope of the S herman Act i n
the same manner a s I would decide any problem o f statutory construc
tion-by asking what is the most reasonable interpretation i n l ight of
the purposes Congress sought to achieve. Obviously, this calls for an
exercise of practical j udgment. But Congress left us w ith a problem,
and any decision we make will affect parties acting in the world outside
the courtroom . That being so, it would be irresponsible to do less than

6. The presumption against extraterritoriality was part of a 1 9th Century system
for regulating intersovereign rel ations in which territorial ity was thought to define the
permi ssible scope of authority on a broad range of issues. including public and
private i nternational law, personal j urisdiction, choice of law, and recognition of
j udgments. B y m id-20th Century, the notion that sovereignty is defi ned exclusively in
territorial terms had come to be seen as i ncreasingly implausible. I n area after area,
territoriality was replaced by a broader understanding that n:cognizes other grounds
for exercising j urisdiction. These developments were retlected in this Court ' s later
cases on the extraterritorial applicat ion of federal statutes, none of which relied upon,
or even discussed, a presumption against extraterritoriality. See, e. g. , Romero v. Inter
national Terminal Operating Co. , 3 5 8 U . S . 354 ( 1 959) ; Laurit:.:en v. Larsen, 345 U.S.
57 1 ( 1 95 3 ) ; Steele v . Bulova Watch Co. , 344 U . S . 280 ( 1 952); Vermilya-Brown Co.
v. Connell, 3 3 5 U . S . 377 ( 1 948). But none of these decisions contained the sort of
unequivocal declaration needed to Jay the presumption to rest, and A ramco thus
presented the Court with its first opportunity in many years to complete the process
of modernization. Instead, the Court ignored these decisions (except for Steele, which
was distinguished on unpersuasi ve grounds) , and slid back to the 1 9th Centu ry .
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try to make the best sense we can of the statute. If we are wrong,
Congress can always clarify its will by overrul ing our decision. 7
The obj ective of the S herman Act is not in dispute, and the Court is
unanimous i n reading the Act to protect American markets, or, more
accurately perhaps, to ensure a proper level and type of competition
within those markets. It fol lows that the S herman Act applies to con
duct that affects competition in United States markets and that this is
true, as a prima facie matter at least, regardless of where the conduct i s
committed o r takes place. I say a s a prima facie matter, because it does
not fol low that j ust because the S herman Act applies to conduct that
affects competition in United States markets that it applies to all such
conduct. The reasons for this are spelled out in Justice S ILB ERMAN ' s
opinion : conduct that affects competition i n United States markets may
take place or affect markets in other countries and thus i mplicate for
eign regu latory interests as well .
W e could, o f course, simply ignore those i nterests and apply the
Sherman Act to any conduct that affects our markets (or, to put a slight
gloss on the rule, apply the Act to conduct that has more than a de
minimis effect on United States markets) . This, as I u nderstand it, i s the
position of Justices SCHARF and COX (though Justice SCHARF would
allow a defense of sovereign compulsion). According to them, courts
are not i nstitutionally equipped to evaluate the interests of foreign na
tions because they lack the resources and perspective to perform the
task adequately, and because it is an "inherently political " function that
should be left to Congress or the President .
I would not agree with these propositions even were we talking
about the sort of open-ended, case-by-case balancing approach that both
j ustices seem to presuppose. Courts engage in balancing all the time,
and have been doing so without causing undue harm in myriad contexts
for a good many years now (there are other reasons, discussed above,
for rej ecting balancing in this particular context) . Moreover, courts
routinely decide cases in which they apply foreign law, though misap
plication is as or more likely to cause the harms feared by Justices
SCHARF and COX. Finally, notwithstanding the l ip-service paid to the
act-of-state doctrine, courts routinely j udge the validity of acts of for-

7 . Legislative overru li ng is not necessarily easy and certainly i s not costless: the
press of other business must be put aside, inertia must be overcome, and private
interest groups may be able to block legislation (for as we know, it is easier to
block legislation than to enact it). This is precisely why we have a responsibility to
give statutes their most reasonable i nterpretation rather than avoiding the problem and
endorsing a solution we know is undesirable.
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eign governments . See Anne-Marie B urley, La w Among Libera l States:
Liberal Internationalism and the Act of State Doctrine, 92 Colum. L.
Rev . 1 907 ( 1 992) . There may be room for a "political question" doc
trine, and certainly it is important for courts to proceed with caution in
controversial areas. B ut the c laim that such considerations are important
with regard to choice-of-law is an outmoded shibboleth, the product of
an earlier era when courts were still stinging from the effects of
Lochner and j udges and scholars of the "legal process" schoo l adopted
an overly cautious view of their task (best exemplified by the j urispru
dence of Felix Frankfurter or, in choice-of-law, of Brainerd Currie) . Too
much time has passed, and we have too much contrary experience, to
adhere to such quaint notions any longer.
More important, we are not talking about a process of open-ended
balancing of United States and foreign interests anyway. We are talking
about the possibility of reading a specific l imitation into a particular
statute i n order to avoid needless conflicts with the laws of other na
tions . I am confident that had Congress addressed this question, it
would not have written the Act i n a way that totally ignores foreign
interests. Not only would such a step be inconsistent with our recog
nized obligation to respect the interests of co-equal sovereigns, it would
also, ultimately, undermine United States interests by provoking retalia
tory action. See supra, at 600.
That still leaves the problem of deciding what kind of limitation to
impose. Justice S ILBERMAN i nterprets the S herman Act to apply to
conduct abroad only if, in addition to affecting United S tates markets,
the conduct is i llegal in most foreign countries. 8 But this construction i s

8 . Even under this test, the Sherman Act would reach the conduct at i ssue here,
because there i s a consensus in the i ntern ational community that agreements l i ke that
alleged by the plaintiffs' are i l legal. See Eleanor Fox, Competition Law and the
Agenda for the WTO: Forging the Links of Competition and Trade, 4 Pac. Rim. L.
& Pol ' y J . (forthcoming 1 995). I n this connection, it i s worth noting that Justice
S I L B ERMAN' s reliance on the fact that the McCarran-Ferguson Act exempts domes
tic insurers from antitrust l i ab i lity in deference to state regulation is misplaced, since
the conduct alleged here constitutes a "boycott" that states c annot exempt. See 1 5
U.S.C. § 1 1 03(b). But I would not make much of the McCarran-Ferguson Act any
way, because allow i ng states to displace federal antitrust law does not pose the same
risks to federal objectives. This is so for at least two reasons: First, state regulation
is a product of the same basic legal culture and hence less l ikel y to diverge from
federal goals too much. Second, i f a state exempts conduct that significantly threatens
national i n terests, Congress can preempt it. Neither of these conditions is true of
foreign regul ation-which could explain why the M cCarran-Ferguson Act was limited
to states in the first place, but which does, in any event, suggest t hat we proceed
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both too restrictive and beside the point, because it l imits United S tates
law in a way that bears no relation to the l ikely strength of either Unit
ed States or foreign i nterests, and does so based on the practice of na
tions other than those whose interests are actually affected.
I would read the S herman Act to apply to conduct abroad i f: (a) the
conduct has substantial effects on competition in the United States, and
(b) the conduct is either (i) i ntended to affect competition in the United
States or (ii) has its primary effects here. I believe that such a test
would make the Sherman Act applicable in cases where Uni ted States
interests are strongest relative to those of other nations. This is particu
larly true because the S herman Act governs practices that are i ntention
al, and foreign defendants will often be able to segregate their activity
to comply with United States law when acting i n United States markets
without having to forego options available under forei gn law when
acting in non-United States markets. 9
This test obviously does not accommodate United States and foreign
i nterests perfectly. To the extent that foreign companies must act differ
ently when operating i n United States markets, they w i l l u ndoubtedly
lose some advantages that foreign law might provide. But there i s no
perfect accommodation, because these are genuine cont1 icts of i nterest
and someone' s interests must necessaril y be subordinated. Nonetheless, I
believe that the interpretation proposed here offers the most reasonable
accommodation-one that applies United States law in cases where
United States interests are likely to be significant and minimizes the
extent of any interference by requiring foreign companies to modify
only those practices directed toward United States markets . Moreover, it
does so by offeri ng a relatively straightforward rule that i s easy to
understand and apply and that does not create the kind of confusion and
uncertainty associated with ad-hoc balancing.
A final note : the interpretation offered here is applicable only to the
S herman Act. Unlike Justice WEINTRAUB , who says that all United
States l aws s hould be read to apply to "conduct abroad [that] produces
substantial and foreseeable effects here . . . ," WEINTRAUB , infra, at
6 1 6, I have not attempted to articulate a general rule . My reasoning
may have force in the context of analogous statutes, but it i s crucial to
examine each l aw on its own terms. The reason i s simple, but i mpor
tant: because different laws have different purposes, any general pre-

cautiously before extendi n g a simi l ar exemption to foreign n ations.

9 . Even u nder thi s i n terpretation, it remains true that the S herman Act should
not apply in a particular case if this would v i o l ate either the Constitution o r i nterna
tional l a w . See supra, at.

60 1 . Such cases should, however, be extraordinarily rare.
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scription-whether it be a presumption against extraterritoriality or for
effects-will lead to i nappropriate results. Nor is a broad rule needed.
Each statute governs its own domain, and while these occasionally
overlap, we are comfortable interpreting laws independently in every
other context. We do not, for example, require a single rule to deter
mine the required mental state or the kind of inj ury that must be al
leged, and I see no reason to treat extraterritorial scope differently. The
interpretive gloss put on each statute should, of course, be as clear as
possible, but it is not important that every statute have the same gloss.
IV.
Applying thi s test to the facts alleged here, the plaintiffs have stated
a valid claim against both sets of defendants . They allege that Primary
Insurers and Key Actors entered a conspiracy that w as aimed solely and
exclusively at U nited States markets and whose anticompetitive effects
were felt entirely within the U nited States. U nder such circ umstances, it
is hard to understand why U nited States law should not appl y . If the
defendants stood in England and lobbed explosives into the United
States, we would not hesitate to apply our law to make them pay for
the inj ury that resulted-even i f England made such conduct legal or
chose not to prosecute it. That scenario i s indistinguishable from this
one except that the inj uries alleged here are economic, and s urely that
does not make a difference.
The j udgment of the court below should be affirmed.
* * *
MAIER, J. * : (affirming)

I.

I affirm the decision of the court of appeals. Under the c ircumstanc
es of this case, the S herman Act is properly applied to the c onduct of
the London rei nsurers .
I divide this opinion into three parts. The first distinguishes deci
sions about j urisdiction to prescribe in regulatory cases from choice of
law decis ions in non-regulatory cases. The second part describes the
relationship between the international legal system ' s limitations on a

*
Harold G. M aier: Professor of L1w and holder of the David Daniels A llen
Distinguished Chair i n Law, Vanderbilt Uni versity School of Law. Professor M aier' s
research was supported by a summer research grant from Vanderb i l t Uni versity
School of Law.
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nation-state' s exercise of prescriptive j urisdiction and a United S tates
court ' s determination of congress ional i ntent with respect to a statute' s
territorial scope. The third section describes the principle of i nternational
comity and distinguishes those considerations from both the policies that
inform determinations of domestic legislative intent and those reflected
in the j urisdictional limi tations of customary international law.
II.

B I LATERAL AND U NILATERAL C HOICE OF L AW D ISTINGUISHED

Determining whether United States regulatory statutes apply to for
eign-situs conduct requires an analysis different from that employed in
ordinary bilateral choice of law cases. I n bilateral cases, the court must
decide w hether to apply the local law of a foreign country or that of
the United States (or some subdivision thereof) in the case at bar.
In such cases, the forum court identifies legal standards that are
appropriate guides for its decision in the light of the relationships
among the parties, their conduct, and the bodies politic w ith which
these elements have contacts . The forum' s selection i s guided by its
own choice of law rules in the l ight of the policies that those rules
reflect. To the extent that those rules indicate that foreign legal norms
should govern with respect to a particular i ssue, the court, subject to a
limited number of exceptions, will apply those foreign rules, rather than
its own.
Regulatory cases, on the other hand, usually require unilateral choice
of law deci sions. In those cases, a United States court does not c hoose
between the regulatory standards of the United States and those of
foreign countries to find applicable law . 1 In such cases the substantive
content of a foreign nation' s law is irrelevant with respect to the j uris
dictional i ssue, except to the extent that the existence of foreign inter
ests might make the appl ication of the forum' s statute u nreasonable. 2
Even in that event, if it i s c lear that Congress intended the statute to
apply to a case like that at bar, the court has no choice but to apply
the statutory rule. 3
Thus, i n unilateral choice of law cases, once j udicial j urisdiction is

1 . Harold G . Maier, Resolving Extraterritorial Conflicts, or " There a n d Back
Again, " 25 Va. J. Int' l L. 7, 24 ( 1 984) [here i nafter There and Back Again ] ; Henry J.
Steiner & Detlev F. Vagts, Transnational Legal Problems 932-34 (2d e d. 1 976).
2. Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States §
403( I )-(2) ( 1 986).
3 . Laker v. Belgian, Sabena A irlines, A LI, Restatement (Second) of Conflicts of
L.1w § 6( I ) and cmt. b ( 1 969); E l l iot E . Cheatham & Willis L. M. Reese, Choice of
Applicohle Law, 52 Colum . L . Rev . 959, 96 1 ( 1 952).
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established, the court asks only if the l aw of the forum governs the
case before it. 4 The key question is, has the forum decided to exercise
prescriptive j urisdiction to apply its regulations under the facts of the
case at bar? If the answer is "yes," the forum court decides the c ase
under its own regulatory law 5 If the answer is "no," forum law does
not properly govem and the case is dismissed. 6
The policies supporting this approach are sound. Most modern regu
latory statutes are so intimately connected with the economic, social and
political structures, and policies of the nation that promulgates them that
their accurate application by a decision maker foreign to the promulgat
ing state is often extremely difficult, if not outright impossible. 7 This
intimate connection between regulatory norms and society ' s economic,
social and political mores, informed the traditional rule that one nation
.

4. See Harold G . Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads: An Inter
section Berrveen Public and Private International Law, 76 Amer. J. Int' l L. 280, 290
( 1 982) [ hereinafter Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads].
5. This Court has made tentative efforts to develop constitutional l i m i tations on
the e xerci se of prescriptive jurisdiction under the Due Process Clause, Home Ins. Co.
v. Dick, 28 1 U . S . 397 ( 1 930); and the Full Faith and Credit Clause, First Nat '/ Bank
of Chicago v. United A irlines, 342 U . S . 396 ( 1 95 2 ) : Hughes v. Fetter, 3 4 1 U . S . 609
( 1 95 I ): Bradford Elec. Light v. Clapper, 286 U . S . 1 45 ( 1932), by req uiring that a
forum ' s exercise of prescriptive j urisdiction be l i mited to situations i n which the
forum has some mini mum reasonable contacts with the parties o r the c ause of action.
Such j urisdictional l i mitations have never be e n very strict. See Ca rro l v . Lnnz.a, 349
U . S . 408 ( 1 95 5 ) ; Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial A ccident Comm 'n, 306 U .S .
48-93 ( 1 939); A laska Packers Assoc. v . fndustria! A ccident Comm 'n of Culifornia,
294 U.S. 5 3 2 ( 1 93 5 ) . Such restrictions were e:;scmtially wiped out i n Wells v.
Simonds Abrasive Co. , 345 U.S. 5 1 4 ( 1 95 3 ) with respe.:t to the Ful l Faith and Credit
Clause and in A llstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 4.:1-9 U . S . 3 0 2 ( 1 98 1 ) , with respect to the
Due Process Clause. See Sun Oil v. Wortman, 486 U . S . 7 1 7 ( 1 988). But see Phillips
Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U. S. 797 ( 1 985). For fun her commentary on this
Court ' s fail ure to develop limitations on prescriptive j urisdiction. see H arold G. M aier
& Thomas R. McCoy, A Unifving Theon· for Judicial Jurisdiction and Choice of
Law, 3 9 Am. J . Comp. L . 249, 280-88 ( 1 99 1 ).
6. Steiner & Vagts, supra, at 932-34.
7 . See M aier, supra, There and Back Again, at 2 89. Cf David Lord H acking,
The Increasing Extraterritorial Impact of U.S. Lull's: A Cause for Con ce rn A mongst
Friends of America, 1 Nw. J. Int' l L. & Bus. 1 ( l 979). Conflicts over regulatory

policy are especiall y prevalent with respect to statutes dealing with restraints of trade.
For example, the origins of the Sherman Act reflect just as much a desire to protect
Un ited S tates democracy and free enterprise from interference by pri vate concen tra
tions of economic power as a desire to protect consumers from artificial l y high prices
or shoddy merchandise. See generallv Mark S. Masse ! , Competition and Monopoly,
1 6-20 ( 1 962).
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will not enforce the criminal laws of another. Most of the i nternational
limitations on j urisdiction to prescribe were originally derived from
situations involving the extraterritorial application of cri minal statutes. 8
This close connection among regulatory rules, general social atti
tudes, and political mores of the body politic whose law they represent
does not exist with the same intimacy or intensity with respect to most
ordi nary non-regulatory private law rules. 9 See, e.g., Romero v. Interna
tional Terminal Operating Co. , 3 5 8 U . S . 354, 3 84 ( 1 959), rej ecting the
place of inj ury rule in a Jones Act case in favor of an analysis empha
sizing recognition of the legitimate interests of foreign nations. 10 There
fore, any effort by this forum to select between applying our own regu
lations and those of a foreign state would at best be counter-productive.
III .

C USTOMARY I NTERNATIONAL L AW AND C ONGRESSIONAL I NTENT

Because regulatory legislation reflects direct governmental policy
interests, this Court must be specially cognizant of the public interna
tional legal limitations on national authority to assert legislative control
over activities that take place outside the United States ' s borders . Con
sideration of these limitations is not required because this Court must
(or even may) give preference to international legal norms over those
contained in controlling congressional acts . The Paquette Habana, 1 75
U . S . 677, 700 ( 1 9 00) . United States courts must obey a clear command
of Congress, even if that command violates international law. 1 1 B ut,

8 . See Harvard Research i n I n ternational Law (Under the Auspices of the Facul
ty of the Harvard Law School), Jurisdiction With Respect to Crime, 29 Am. J. Int ' l
L . 435, 445 (Supp. 1 93 5 ) .
9 . Ma ier, Extraterritorial Jurisdiction at a Crossroads, supra, at 3 1 7.
1 0. I n Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 57 1 ( 1 953), this Court refused to revtew an
award made under Danish l aw to a Danish seaman inj ured in Havana Harbor on
board a ship of Danish registry when it concluded that the Jones Act did not apply
to grant him an additional remedy. Claims under Danish law were adm i nistratively
determined solely on the fact of i nj ury and the extent of liability, not with respect to
the possible negl igence of the defendant ship owner. !d. at 575-76. Cf Hellenic
Lines. Ltd. v. Rhoditis, 398 U.S. 306 ( 1 970), where this Court applied the Jones Act
to a m aritime i nj ury on board a Greek ship in the port of New Orleans on the
grounds that the compensatory policies of the Jones Act were i ntended to apply to
such a tort.
I I . See. e.g. , Laker Airways v. Sabena, Belgian World A irlines, 7 3 1 F.2d 909,
949 (D.C. Cir. 1 984). The court stated:
The desirability of applying ambiguous legislation to a particular transaction
may imply the presence or absence of legis lative i ntent. However, once a
dec ision is made that the political branches i ntended to rely on a legitimate
base of prescriptive j urisdiction to regulate activities a ffecting foreign com-
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absent clear congressional direction to the contrary, this Court will
presume that the political branches i ntended to act within the confines
of the jurisdictional limits of i nternational law. United States v. A lumi
num Co. of Am. , 1 48 F.2d 4 1 6, 443 (2d Cir. 1 945) [hereinafter
A lcoa] . 1 2 See EEOC v. A rabian Am. Oil Co. , 499 U . S . 244, 248-55
( 1 99 1 ) .
I nternational legal limitations on the authority of a n at ion-state to
appl y its regulatory rules to activities or parties located outside its bor
ders derive from principles of territorial sovereignty and the relationship
between those princi pies and a nation state' s right to protect its territo
ry . 13 Those principles necessarily reflect a state ' s right to p rotect its
population by prohibiting acts that occur i n other states when those acts
have effects within the forum' s territory that the forum s tate reprehends.
Limitations on a nation' s right to protect itself in this manner will not
be presumed.
In the case of the S. S. "Lotus, " the Permanent Court of I nternational
Justice wrote :
Far from laying down a general prohibition to the effect that S tates
may not extend the application of their laws and the j urisdiction of
their courts to persons, property and acts outside their territory, it
leaves them in this respect a w ide measure of discretion w h i c h is only
l i mited i n certain cases by prohibitive rules; as regards other c ases,
every S tate remains free to adopt the principles which it regards as best
14
and most suitable.

Those l imitations are found i n customary international law, evidenced
by state practice from which community consent to the l imitations can
be inferred . See Art. 3 8 (2), Statute of the I.C.J.
Under our tripartite federal governmental structure, it would be
highly inappropriate for the j udicial branch to place the United S tates in
violation of its international legal obl igations when such a result had

merce within the domestic forum , the desirability of the law I S no l on ger an
i ssue for the courts.
!d. at 949.
1 2 . In this case, Judge Learned H and sat by designation for the S upreme Court
of the United S tates because the Court was unable to mount a quorum .
1 3 . See generally Harold G . M aier, The Principles of Sovereignty, Sovereign
Equality, and National Self-Determination, in International Law and International
Security 24 1 (Paul B. Stephan I I I & B ori s M. Klimenko eds. , 1 99 1 ).
1 4. The S.S. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk. ) , 1 927 P.C.I .J. (ser. A) No. 1 0, at 1 9 (Sept. 7 ) ;
see North S e a Continental Shelf, 1 969 I . C . J . 3 , 44-45; Barcelona Traction Light &
Power Co. Ltd. , 1 970 I.C.J. 4, 40, 46-47.
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not been intended by the political branches who hold direct commis
sions to regulate and conduct this country ' s i nternational affairs. A lcoa,
1 48 F.2d at 443 ; McCulloch v. Sociedad Nacional de Marineros de
Honduras, 372 U . S . 1 0, 2 1 ( 1 957).
Furthermore, a j udicial assertion of congressional i ntent to apply a
United States regulation to extraterritorial events might raise an infer
ence that the United S tates courts believed that international l aw con
doned such a result or that the courts had found that Congress h ad
disregarded i nternational law entirely . Such an assertion i n the context
of the demand-response-accommodation process that characterizes cus
tomary international law formation 1 5 would necessaril y have l aw-creat
ing effects in the i nternational community that the political branches
may neither have contemplated, i ntended nor welcomed. See McCulloch,
372 U . S . at 2 1 ( 1 963); Benz v. Campania Naviera Hildago, 3 5 3 U . S .
1 3 8 ( 1 95 7 ) ; A lcoa, 1 48 F.2d a t 443 .
In l ight of the above, cases raising the question of congressional
intent concerning the applicability of U nited States federal regulatory
statutes to foreign events or parties are appropriatel y divided into three
categories :
1 . W here Congress has made it clear that it intends the legislation i n
question t o appl y t o foreign activities like those in the case a t bar, the
courts must fol low the congressional command unless to do so would
be otherwi se unconstitutional under the United States Constitution.
2. Where Congress has made it clear that it does not intend the
regulatory statute to apply to foreign activities like those in the case at
bar, the courts may not appl y the statute and must dismiss the case.
The courts have no commission to substitute their own views for those
of the Congress. 1 6
3 . Where the language of a regulatory statute is so broad that it
might encompass activities outside the forum state but there is no addi 
tional affirmative evidence that Congress actuall y intended t o give it
such broad extraterritorial scope, the courts will presume that the statute
is intended to apply within the limitations established by international
law.
The S herman Antitrust Act fall s into the third category . 1 7 Its broad
l anguage i s clearly sufficient to encompass the activities of the London
based insurance companies in this case. 1 8 Thus, we must now deterMyers McDougal, The Hydrogen Bomb Tests and the International unv
49 Am. J. I n t ' l L. 356, 357 ( 1 955) .
e. g. , United States v . Mitchell, 553 F.2d 996. 1 002 (5th Cir. 1 97 7 ).
A lcoa, 1 48 F. 2 d a t 443 (2 d Cir. 1 94 5 ) (Hand, J . ) .
1 8 . T h e Sherman A c t prohibits "every contract, combination . .
or consp1racy,

1 5 . See
of the Sea,
1 6 . See,
1 7. See
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mine w hether the S herman Act is properly appl ied to the actiVIties of
the B ritish reinsurance companies carried out principally in England.
Sections 40 1 through 403 and section 4 1 5 of the American Law
Institute' s Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States ( 1 986), provide a useful analytical framework under which
the case at bar is properly j udged. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California,
1 1 3 S. Ct. 289 1 ( 1 993). Here, the question is whether the standards of
the Sherman Act properly apply to test the validity of the actions by
British i nsurers who are alleged to have used their combi ned economic
power to wring concessions from American insurance firms doing busi
ness i n the United States.
Under section 402( 1 )(c), a nation may prescribe rules of l aw to
regulate "conduct outside its territory that has or is intended to have
substantial effect within its territory ." !d. Under section 403 ( 1 ), even a
j urisdiction that meets the test of section 402 may not be exerci sed if
such exercise would be otherwi se unreasonable i n light of a series of
factors contained in section 403 (2) .
Taken together, these two provisions make ultimate good sense.
Lacking any true central enforcement mechanism, the i nternational legal
system necessarily depends upon its ability to reflect the long-term self
interests of the nations that are its component parts. International com
munity recognition that a given course of conduct adversel y affects the
welfare of community members necessari ly supports the existence of a
rule of law prohibiting such conduct. Customary international law i s
necessarily evidenced, in part, b y state practice from which community
consent can be i nferred. 1 9
I t can safely be presumed that, despite the apparent validity of a
given state action under one accepted standard of international law, that
action would be prohibited if it were carried out in an u nreasonable
manner. That is the message of sections 403 ( 1 ) and 403 (2) of the Re
statement (Third). Put another way, no action can be legal under con
sensual community standards when that action is determined, in a par
ticular case, to be unreasonable u nder those same community stan
dards. 20

i n restraint of trade . . . among the several states, or with foreign nations. . ." I S
U . S. C . § I ( 1 988). Read l i terally, this language would prohibit any such agreements
anywhere i n the world as long as each had some minimal effect on U nited States
i nternational trade.
1 9. See Art. 38 (2), Statute of the I .C.J.
20. See Maier, Extraterritorial Jurisdicrion ar a Crossroads, supra, at 30 1 . Cf
.
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This reasonableness test i s not comparative ; i t is, i n a sense, abso
lute. In other words, the acts or assertions of more than one nation may
meet the test of reasonableness on the same facts. See Laker A irways v.
Sabena, Belgian World A irlines, 7 3 1 F.2d 909, 952 n . 1 69 (D.C. Cir.
1 984) . � 1 When this is so, concurrent jurisdiction exists. In the event
that two or more states having such concurrent j urisdiction prescribe
confl icti ng courses of conduct, the state having the lesser interests
should, but need not, defer to the other if the l atter' s i nterest is clearly
greater. See Restatement (Thi rd) of Foreign Relations Law of the United
States § 403(3) ( 1 986). 22
Section 403 (3) does not purport to be a legal requirement and Unit
ed States courts have not treated it as such. It is, rather, a policy guide
to decision. The subsection embodies the principle of international comi
ty: that a nation will give that effect to the laws of other nations that it
would have them give to its own in the same or similar circ umstanc
es. 2 3 That comity principle reflects the wise counsel of Mr. Justice Rob
ert Jackson when in Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U . S . 57 1 ( 1 953), he
wrote:
[I]n dealing with international commerce we c annot b e unmindful of
the necessity for mutual forbearance if retal i at i o n s are to be avoided;
nor should we forget that any contact which we hold sufficient to war
rant application of our law to a foreign transaction w i l l logically be as
strong a w arrant for a foreign country to apply its law to an A merican
trans action.

!d. at 5 82.
This "enlightened self-interest" principle of reciprocal expectation i s a
fundamental guide to determin ing the reach of United States antitrust
laws (and other statutes) in tran snational regulatory cases. 24
I n light of the principles above, the results in the case at bar present
l ittle difficulty. The alleged conspiracy between Key Actors and Primary

Myres S . McDougal, et al., Law and Public Order in Space 748 ( 1 963).
2 1 . Accord Letter from Judge Malcolm Wi lkey to Professor Loui s Henkin, Chief
Reporter to the Restatement (Third) of the Fore ign Relations Law of the United
States. explaining the Laker case, in Maier, " There and Back Again, " supra , at 4348.
22. For a re view of this section ' s drafting history a nd a discussion of its conver
sion from one of mandatory i ntent to one of hortatory i ntent, see Harold G. Maier,
83 Am. J. Int' l L. 676, 678 ( 1 989) (reviewing Th e ExrrarerriTOrial Application of Na
tional Lmvs (Dieter Lange & Gary Born eds., 1 987)).
23. H arold G . Mai er, Remarks, lnrernatiuna/ Comiry and U.S. Fede ral Common
Law, 1 990 Proc. Am. Soc. Int' l L. 339, 340.
24. Karl M. Meessen, A n titrusT Ju risdicrion Under Cusromarv !n renwrional Law,
78 Am. J. Int' l L. 783, 800 ( 1 984j .
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Insurers i s clearly intended to have sufficien t effect within the territory
of the U nited States to meet the requirements of section 402 . If such an
effect is intended, the burden of proof shifts to the parties charged to
demonstrate that no such effect has in fact occurred. See A lcoa, 1 48
F.2d at 4 1 6. 25
In l ight of the additional considerations noted i n section 403(2), the
appl ication of the Sherman Act to thi s alleged contract is not u nreason
able. Both the U nited States and the U nited Kingdom have a legitimate
basis for applying their domestic regulations. The nationality principle
of section 402 confers j urisdiction on Great Britain to prescribe rules
governing the conduct of its own nationals. Furthermore, the agreement
in question will have some effects in B ritish territory as well as in the
U nited States. Given these c ircumstances , and contrary to the conclusion
reached by my brother WEINTRAUB, I do not find it u nreasonable
under the standards in section 403 (2) for the B ritish to exercise j urisdic
tion to prescribe.
But the facts in the case at b ar do not reveal that Great B ritain has,
in fact , promulgated any confl icting legi slation that would be applicable
in thi s case. The mere absence of legislation is not an exercise of con
flicting concurrent j urisdiction l ike that described in section 403 (3 ) .
Consequently , the principle of reciprocal regard, generall y called the
principle of comity, embodied in section 403 (3), does not indicate the
need for United States courts even to consider refusing to apply the
S herman Act to the facts of the case at bar. Absent such a conflict, the
literal language of the Sherman Act clearly encompasses thi s case.
I affirm the court of appeals .
* * *
WEINTRAUB , J . * : (affi rming)
Affirmed. The S herman Act should apply to the actions of the Lon
don reinsurers . Before deciding to apply U nited States law to conduct
abroad that causes effects in the U nited States, the Restatement (Third)

2 5 . Judge Learned Hand, sitting by designation for the United States S upreme
Court who could not muster a quoru m .
*
Russell J . Weintraub: Professor o f Law a n d holder of the John B . Connal ly
Chair i n Civil Jurisprudence, University of Texas at Austin School of La'A . Author of
Commentmy on the Conjlict of Lmvs (3d ed. 1 986 with 1 99 1 supp.) ; International
Litigation and A rbitration ( 1 994 ).
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of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States § 403 (2) ( 1 986),
counsels a delicate weighing of at least eight factors , i ncluding a com
parison of the United States ' s i nterest in forbidding the activity and the
interest of the forei gn country in permitting the activ ity. I do not agree.
The concerns stated i n section 403 are the stuff of diplomatic negotia
tions or the wise exercise of di scretion by the Department of Justice i n
deciding whether to prosecute. The section 403 l i st i s too amorphous
and multidi rectional for a court to apply cogently to resolve l itigation.
The problem of extraterritorial application of United States public
l aw is better approached by a presumption that our l aw applies whenev
er conduct abroad produces substantial and foreseeable effects here that
it is the purpose of our law to avoid. The presumption would be rebut
ted when the effects here are slight when compared with the reasonable
interest of the foreign country in permitting the conduct centered there.
An example would be Consolidated Gold Fields PLC v. Minorco, S.A . ,
87 1 F.2d 252 (2d Cir.), modified, 890 F.2d 5 69 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
492 U . S . 939 ( 1 989), in which the Second Circuit, I suggest unwisely,
enjoined worldwide a tender offer even though only 2.5 percent of the
target company ' s shareholders were Americans.
This presumption, i n favor of application of United States public law
when effects are foreseeably caused here by conduct abroad, i s a better
approach than an attempt to "balance" irreconcilable sovereign i nterests.
The presumption produces results that are more predictable and, in the
end, less insulting to friendly foreign countries . Even a nodding ac
quaintance with reality i ndicates that United States law will be applied
under the "weighing" test whenever it would be applied under the pre
sumption. At least, however, the presumption does not say to the for
eign country, "our interests are greater than yours. "
If, a s seems likely, the section 403 (2) factors are i ntended a s a
statement of considerations that would rebut a presumption i n favor of
applying our public law to actions abroad that foreseeably cause sub
stantial effects here, I do not fi nd the section 403 list as he! pful as the
simpler test stated above. Section 403 attempts to span the gap between
choice of the most reasonably applicable law and unilateral determi
nation of the territorial reach of forum law. It fails.
Even i f a court were to indulge i n appl ication of the Restatement ' s
multi-factor test, appl ication of the S herman Act i s justified o n these
facts. Section 4 1 5 applies the reasonableness test of section 403 (2) to
the specifi c topic of antitrust law. U nder section 4 1 5(2), conduct outside
the United States is subject to our law "if a principal purpose of the
conduct or agreement is to interfere with the commerce of the United
States, and the agreement or conduct has some effect on that com-
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merce." !d. "Some effect" would be an understatement on the facts of
this case. Comment (a) to section 4 1 5 states that "[a]ny exercise of
j urisdiction under this section is subj ect to the requirement of reason
ableness." !d. That requirement is also met.
J ustice Souter ' s opinion under the remarkably similar circumstances
of Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 1 1 3 S. Ct. 289 1 ( 1 993), has
been condemned for requiring a "sovereign compulsion" defense as a
condition precedent to applying the comity analysis of section 403 (2) .
This i s a possible meaning of a cryptic passage in his opinion. I think
it more reasonable, however, to credit Justice Souter with being able to
read section 403, which he cites, and as saying that under any form of
comity analysis, the facts of Hartford Fire j u stified applic ation of the
S herman Act, the only possible defense was that the defendants were
required by the United Kingdom to act as they did, and there w as no
evidence of compulsion. Although in our case the acts within the Unit
ed States that were present in Hartford Fire are absent, I would echo
the sentiments that I have attri buted to Justice Souter. Even if I were to
appl y a comity analysis, the effects intentionally caused here are beyond
the pale of what any self-respecting sovereign would permit w ithout
claiming the right to impose the sanctions of its law.
It is unlikely that the test I propose would produce different results
from the purely unilateral approach of Justice S CHARF. The reason that
I prefer a presumption in favor of applying our public law and do not
say that this presumption can never be rebutted, is that "never" is a
long time. Justice SILBERMAN notes that the English authorities regu
l ate the activity of the English insurers and suggests that we should
defer to them, j u st as the McCarron-Ferguson Act defers to state regula
tion of insurance. 1 5 U . S . C . § 1 0 1 2(a) ( 1 988) (subj ect to an exception
for "boycott, coercion, or inti midation," id. at § 1 0 1 3 (b ) ) . The
McCarron-Ferguson Act' s exception of the busi ness of i n surance i s
based on the belief that state regul ation will adequately protect the
public from anticompetitive insurance practices. 1 5 U . S . C . § 1 0 1 2(b)
( 1 98 8 ) . English regulation does not provide thi s protection i f, as the
English insurers contended, their conduct was pri vi leged under English
law. Hartford Fire, 1 1 3 S. Ct. at 29 1 0.
* * *
SCHARF, J . * : (concurring i n the j udgment)
*

M ichael P. Scharf: Assistant Professor of Law, New England School of Law;
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I concur i n the j udgment of the maJonty, but write separately be
cause I do not agree with the comparative i nterest balancing analysis
embraced to varying degrees by some of my colleagues, most notably
Justices M AIER and WEINTRAUB .
For two decades now, the extraterritorial application of United States
law has purportedly been governed by a comparative-interest balancing
test. U nder this test, a United S tates court i s to determine w hether the
application of United States law to persons and conduct abroad is ap
propriate by balancing several factors, inc luding the competing i nterests
of the foreign State i nvolved, the nationality of the parties, and the
degree to which there is an actual conflict with foreign law or policy .
See Mannington Mills, Inc. v. Congoleum Corp. , 595 F.2d 1 2 87 (3rd
Cir. 1 979); Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am. , 549 F.2d 597 (9th
Cir. 1 976) ; Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United States § 40 ( 1 965) ; Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations
Law of the United States § 403 ( 1 986). The Supreme Court specifically
endorsed the comparative i nterest balancing approach of the Restatement
(Third) in Societe Nationale Industrielle Aerospatiale v. United States
Dist. Court, 482 U . S . 522 ( 1 987) .
Application of comparative-interest balancing by the lower courts,
however, has resulted in confu sed, ad hoc decision making. See Michael
P. Scharf, Beyond the Rhetoric of Comparative Interest Balancing, 5 0
Law & Contemp. Probs . 95, 1 0 1 ( 1 98 7 ) . I n opposing the Court' s sup
port of the Restatement ' s comparative-i nterest balancing formula i n
A erospatiale, Justice Blackmun stated, " I dissent . . . because I cannot
endorse the Court ' s case-by-case inquiry . . . and its failure to provide
lower courts with any meaningfu l guidance for carrying out that inqui
ry. " A erospatiale, 482 U . S . at 548. In addition to the problem of vague
ness, there are several other difficulties inherent in the comparative
interest balancing approach, namely : ( 1 ) domestic courts lack the institu
tional resources and expertise to assess and evaluate the substantive
policies or interests of foreign states ; (2) domestic courts are incapable
of sitting as international tribunals and evenhandedly balancing foreign
and domestic interests; (3) the balancing of disparate i nterests of two

J.D., Duke University School of Law. From 1 989 to 1 993, Professor Scharf served as
Attorney-Adviser i n the Office of the Legal Adviser, United S tates Department of
State. I n that capacity, he participated in negotiations for a Mutual Legal Assistance
Treaty between the United States and United Ki ngdom as a means of addressing
U nited K ingdom concerns about the u n i l ateral extraterritori al application o f United
States laws.
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For this reason, it has long been recognized that the S herman Act ap
plies to foreign conduct that was meant to produce and did in fact
produce some substantial effect i n the United States. See Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp . , 475 U.S. 574, 582 n . 6 ( 1 986);
United States v . A luminum Co. of Am. , 1 48 F.2d 4 1 6 (2d Cir. 1 945).
Comparative-interest balancing was added to this "effects test" under
the theory that Congress would not have intended for the S he rman Act
to apply extraterritorially where the United States interest in the Act ' s
extraterritorial application i s outweighed b y a foreign S tate ' s i nterest
against its extraterritorial application. In l ight of the defic iencies inher
ent in comparative-interest balancing, a better approach would be for
courts simply to undertake a unilateral assessment of the strength of the
United S tates interest in the extraterritorial application of its law. In
antitrust cases, United States inLerests of a constitutional magnitude are
i mplicated. S uch cases "are as important to the preservation of our free
enterprise system as the B i l l of Rights is to the protection of our funda
mental personal freedoms." In re Uran ium Antitrust Litig . , 480 F. Supp.
1 1 3 8 , 1 1 54 (N.D. I l l . 1 979). Therefore, the United States i nterest would
be sufficient in any antitrust case such as the case at bar in which the
foreign conduct produces a substantial and foreseeable effect in the
United States. No balancing of foreign i nterests would be required.
This would not, however, foreclose foreign defendants from asserting
the defense of foreign sovereign compulsion when their conduct abroad
which contravenes United States l aw is compelled by a foreign sover
eign. See Restatement (Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the
United S tates § 44 1 ( 1 986). Under the United States Department of
Justice, Antitrust Enforcement Guidelines for International Operations 33
( 1 98 8 ) , the government has announced that it "will not prosecute
anticompetitive conduct that has been compelled by a foreign sover
eign." !d. Courts should correspondingly recognize the defense of for
eign sovereign compulsion in cases brought by private parties. Recog
nizing such a defense does not require comparative-i nterest balancing,
but rather merely a finding that: ( l ) there is an actual conflict between
the law of the State in which the defendant is located and United States
law, (2) the defendant did not in bad faith court the foreign legal im
pediments in order to avoid compl iance with United States law, and (3)
the defendant would be subject to severe penalties if forced to act in
contravention of the local law. This defense woul d not b e avai lable in
the case at bar since the United Kingdom has not promulgated any con
flicting legislation that wou ld impose a penalty on defendants if they
acted in compliance with the Sherman Act. By focusing on whether
there exists a "true conflict," the Court in Hartford Fire in effect con-
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States is an i nherently political , rather than j udicial, function, and
therefore contravenes the principles underlying the pol itical question
doctrine as enumerated in Baker v. Carr, 3 69 U . S . 1 86 ( 1 962); and (4)
the comparative-interest balancing approach has not furthered the i nter
ests of international comity since, in the vast majority of cases, U nited
States courts refuse to defer to foreign interests.
Perhaps i n recognition of these deficiencies, Justice WEINTRAUB in
this case, and the majority in the recent case of Hartford Fire Ins. Co.
v. California, 1 1 3 S . Ct. 289 1 ( 1 993), each depart to some extent from
the traditional formulations of the comparative-interest balancing test.
Justice WEINTRAUB advocates an alternative test w hereby courts
would apply a presumption that United States law applies abroad when
foreign conduct produces a substantial and foreseeable effect i n the
United States which can be rebutted by a finding that the effects are
slight compared w ith the reasonable interest of the foreign country i n
permitting the conduct. Under Justice WEINTRAUB ' s appmach, howev
er, a court would still find itself in the troublesome position of having
to assess the i nterests of a foreign State and weigh those interests
against the interests of the United States.
The Court i n Hartford Fire modifies the traditional comparative
interest balancing formulation by changing the "degree of conflict with
foreign law or policy" from one factor among many to be considered
which must be established before a court may consider the competing
interests of the foreign state. !d. While the holding in Hartford Fire
will effectively reduce the number of cases in which courts have to
balance foreign interests, comparative-interest balancing w i l l still be nec
essary whenever there is a "true contlict."
These approaches amount to no more than tinkering on the margins
when what is needed is the imposition of a new conceptual framework
with guiding rules. It i s time we reject comparative-interest balancing
altogether as a bankrupt method of determining the extraterritorial appli
cation of United States law.
Ultimately , the question is whether Congress intended the particular
statute i n question to have extraterritorial effect. If the statute i s ::.;ilent
as to its extraterritorial reach, congressional i ntent to apply the statute
extraterritorially can nevertheless be inferred by the statute ' s legislative
history or the statutory scheme. In this regard, a narrow construction of
the S herman Act would frustrate the Act' s purpose by allowing persons
engaged in anticompetitive activities directed at the United States to
escape the Act' s bite simply by locati ng their operations abroad. Cf
United States v. Noriega, 746 F. Supp. 1 506, 1 5 1 7 (S.D. Fla. 1 990) .
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fuses this defense with the doctrine of comity .
Under the unilateral interest analysis approach advocated
opi nion, the court of appeals decision i s affirmed.

m

this

* * *
S ILBERMAN, J . * : (dissenting)
Reversed. I write separatel y in dissent because I believe m y col
leagues have fai led to provide the appropriate principles and guidance
for deciding choice of l aw i ssues in "public"/"regul atory" transnational
cases . The majority-with a mix of rationales-has once again advanced
American regulatory policies without due consideration of c ompeting
i nterests of other nations in the context of the i nternational and world
market of insurance. See Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Californ ia, 1 1 3 S .
Ct. 289 1 ( 1 99 3 ) .
Justices WEINTRAUB , MAIER, B URBANK, and SCHARF-to
varying degrees-all adopt a unilateral choice of law approach to the
issue of the extraterritorial application of the American antitrust laws. In
effect, their inquiry goes only so far as to determine whether or not
American interests are furthered by the application of the S herman Act
i n this case; i f the answer to that question i s "yes," no further interest
balancing or weighing of the competing interests of other nations is reqUire
. d. I
Justice MAIER, i n particular, has a lengthy expl anation about why
the comparative-interest and balancing approaches of traditional choice
of law methodology-used to decide both domestic and international
private bilateral cases-is i nappropriate in resolving regulatory transna
tional cases, such as the instant matter.
I disagree with that basic premise. Formal c ategorizations of public
and private l aw have begun to blur, and even i f there i s yet no unified
field, domestic conflict of laws principles have much to offer i n think
ing about legislative j urisdiction in the transnational area. Professor
Andreas Lowenfeld, the archi tect of the general section s on legi s lative
j urisdiction ( § § 40 1 -403) in the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Rela
tions Law of the United States ( 1 986), has made precisely this argu-

*
Linda J . S i lberman: Professor of Law, New York University School of Law;
B . A . U n iversity of Michigan, 1 965 ; J . D . Uni versity of M ichigan, 1 968.
1 . The maj ority does appear to accept_ the l ong-standing principle that Congress
did not i ntend extraterritorial application of a law when such application would
violate i n ternational law.
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ment. In his 1 979 Hague Lectures, Public Law in the International
A rena: Conflict of Laws, International Law, and Some Suggestions for
Their Interaction, 1 63 Recuei l des Cours 3 1 1 ( 1 979-II), Professor
Lowenfeld urged a conflict of laws approach of interest balancing to de
cide transnational cases when more than one state has an i nterest i n
having its law applied. The Restatement (Thi rd) o f t h e Foreign Rela
tions Laws of the United States ( 1 986), building upon prior j udicial
decisions, see Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of A m. , 549 F.2d 597
(9th Cir. 1 976); Mannington Mills, Inc. v . Congoleum Corp. , 595 F.2d
1 287 (3d Cir. 1 979), reflects j ust such a methodology. Section 402
identifies the relevant bases for jurisdiction to prescribe; section 403 ( 1 )
i mposes a standard of reasonableness upon such prescriptive j urisdiction
and section 403(2) sets forth a number of factors for assessing whether
regulation under the circumstances is reasonable, taking into account the
i nterests of other states ; and section 403(3) urges a principle of defer
ence when another state has a greater interest.
Though I endorse the underlying philosophy of the Restatement
(Third) of Foreign Relations-that the United States should exercise its
l egislative j urisdiction in moderation with an eye toward the interests of
other states-the Restatement' s somewhat overl apping provisions and its
failure to offer more precise guidelines has led to some basic misunder
standings. See Hartford Fire, 1 1 3 S . Ct. at 289 1 . Moreover, as Justice
WEINTRAUB writes, the list of factors is "too amorphous and mul
tidirectional" to guide courts m maki ng a particular decision .
WEINTRAUB , supra, at 6 1 6.
To some degree, I share these criticisms of the Restatement (Thirct).
The rule of "reasonableness" to which the Restatement consistently
looks, has been a muddled and confusing principle in other areas where
it has been tried, such as adj udicatory j uri sdiction, see Asahi Metal
Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U . S . 1 02 ( 1 987), and discovery under
the Hague Evidence Convention , see Societe Nationale Industrielle
Aerospatiale v. United States Dist. Court, 482 U . S . 522 ( 1 987). I do
not believe it offers any greater util ity for resolving confl icts of legi sla
tive j urisdiction.
The solution, however, is not to throw out the baby w ith the
bathwater. Rather, courts-as they have done i n resolving other types of
"true conflicts" i n the domestic context-should attempt to formulate
pri nciples of preference for resol ving important clashes of policy. Cf
David Cavers, The Choice of Law Process 1 20-38 ( 1 965). Both the
United States and the United Kingdom have important policies at stake
in the i nstant case. The agreement between Primary Insurers and Key
Actors has a direct impact upon the United States insurance market and
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the purposes underlying the United States antitrust laws is furthered by
their application to these English defendants. However, there is no justi
fication for the United States to pursue its interest "Currie-like" 2 with
out attention to the legitimate concerns of other p layers in the i nterna
tional community . The British regulatory scheme-largely a s ystem of
self regul ation but with superintendence-was designed to assure sol
vency and thus the rel iability and security of the London rein surance
market. 3 Certainly those poli cies, whether or not they shoul d ultimately
trump, are entitled to serious consideration in any deci sion about the
reach of the American antitrust laws. I ndeed, it is i nteresting that the
S herman Act exempts domestic insurers from federal antitrust regulation
to the extent that insurance is regulated by state law, see McCarran
Ferguson Act, 1 5 U.S .C. § 1 0 1 2 ( 1 98 8 ), and yet my colleagues in the
majority pay l ittle attention to the British regulatory scheme in deter
mining the reach of the Act.
The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations, correctly understood,
provides a start for deciding the instant case. As Justice Souter points
out in Hartford Fire, the conduct of the defendants does have a sub
stantial impact on the availability of American purchasers to obtain
certain types of insurance in the United States, thus implicating Ameri
can regulatory i nterests . B ut the conflict w ith the British regul atory
scheme and framework cannot be dismissed. In Hartford Fire, Justice
Scalia took account of the British regulatory interests and concluded
that appl ication of the American antitrust laws would be "unreasonable"
under section 403(2) of the Restatement. Justice Souter acknowledged
the British interests but rej ected the need to weigh the competing inter
ests in the absence of clear "compulsion," i. e. , the situation w here the
l aw of one state directly requires that which is prohibited in another.
Justice Souter, it appears, misconstrued the broad interest balancing
envisioned by the Restatement (Third) and prior cases . See Andreas F.
Lowenfeld, Conflict, Balancing of Interests, and the Exercise of Juris
diction to Prescribe: Reflections on the Insurance Antitrust Case, 89
Am. J. Int' l L. 42 ( 1 995 ) ; see Andreas F. Lowenfeld, International Liti
gation and the Quest for Reasonableness (Hague Academy General

2 . See Brainerd Currie, Notes o n Methods and Objectives i n the Conflict of
La ws, in Selected Essays on the Conflict of Laws 1 77 , 1 84 ( 1 963) ("I f the coun
finds that the forum state has an i nterest in the appl ication of its policy,
apply the Jaw of the foru m . . . . ) .
3 . For a descri ption o f the rise and fall o f Lloyd' s, see Adam Raphae l,
Risk ( 1 994).
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Course on Private International Law), 245 Recueil des Cours 49-58
( 1 994-1). Perhaps Justice Scalia, too, went awry in another direction by
failing to acknowledge two "reasonable" but conflicting clashes of poli
cy in Hartford Fire, and thereby avoided any interpretation of section
403(3).
But it is under section 403 (3) of the Restatement where courts
should identify principles of preference-or principles of deference as
they might be referred to in the international context-for resolving
transnational confl icts of jurisdiction to prescribe. Territorial and rela
tional tie-breakers, such as those advocated by Professor David Cavers,
see Cavers, supra, at 1 20-3 8, may be more difficult to arrive at than i n
domestic cases. However, a similar approach identifying particular crite
ria can also hel p to resolve true transnational legislative conflicts. First,
the strength of the competing policies can be evaluated within the
framework of the international community. In the present case, the need
for uniformity in the international insurance market is critical, and given
the absence of any international consensus about the illegality of the ar
rangements, the regulatory norms at the location of the market-here,
England-should trump. Second, the detail with which the regulatory
policy is crafted may be evidence of how strongly particular state in
terests are being pursued . The history of Parliament' s superintendence of
the regulatory framework applicable to the Lloyd' s insurance market,
and the Department of Trade and Industry ' s authority over the i nsurance
industry appears to be a more detailed scheme of regul ation than
Congress ' s more general antitrust legislation, particularly when Congress
has expressed no intention of an extraterritorial reach and the statute
offers exemptions when alternative regulatory mechanisms are in effect.
Finally, territorial principles may still play a role, and it may be j ustifi
able to view the instant transactions as involving American i nsurers
bringing their product-primary insurance-to the reinsurance market i n
London .
Application of the above criteria point to the application of United
Kingdom and not American law to the English defendants in this ac
tion. Therefore, I would reverse the decision of the court of appeals .

C ase Three: Personal Jurisdiction
I NTRODUCTION *

It i s a tenet of modern i nterpretive theory that the cases at the mar
gins tel l you a great deal about the core. 1 The personal j urisdiction
hypothetical, in thi s regard, would make Jacques Derrida very happy ,
i ndeed. Like a well-crafted final exam, the case finds all of the major
seams i n current jurisdictional doctrine: what constitutes specific j uris
diction? ; is a stream of commerce theory still viable?; how much con
tact is required for general j urisdiction?; may contacts with other states
be considered in evaluating j urisdiction over a foreign defendant?
The problem ' s effect on the paneli sts resembles the "Unrecoverable
System Error - Division by Zero" message that my computer seems to
generate whenever I try to load some new Windows application. 2 While
the panelists are unanimous i n finding personal j urisdiction on the facts
presented, all of the opinions but two 3 find the need to overrule, or at
least l imit, cases at the very core of modern doctrine in order to get
there. Cumulatively, it seems the panelists would overrule: International
Shoe v. Washington, 3 26 U.S. 3 1 0 ( 1 945 ) ;4 World- Wide Volkswagen v.
Woodson , 444 U . S . 286 ( 1 980) ; 5 Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U . S .
604 ( 1 990) ; 6 and Shaffer v. Heitner, 4 3 3 U . S . 1 86 ( 1 977). 7 Indeed, i t

*

Allan R. Stein: Professor o f Law, Rutgers School o f Law-Camden.
I . See J . M . Balkin, The Footnote, 83 Nw. U . L . Rev . 275 ( 1 989).
2. For those not having the pleasure of working with W indows, this message, or
some variant on it, means that your computer is not working the way it is supposed
to, and you probabl y have just lost the last five pages of work that you spent the
previous day working on.
3 . Onl y Professors B RUSSACK and MULLENIX find the resolution of the hy
pothetical u nder existing doctrine relatively comfortable. While
Professor
S ILBERMAN does not explicitly cal l for the reversal of any case, her suggestion for
legislative reform woul d be at tension with much of existing doctrine. See
S ILBERMAN, infra, at 66 1 .
4. Professor B ORCHERS .
5 . Professors WEINTRAUB and COX.
6. Professor MAIER.
7. Professor COX, (in suggesting that whenever court could apply its own law it
m ay constitutionall y assert jurisdiction) .
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would be hard to identify any major j urisdictional pronouncement by
the Supreme Court that would not be u ndermined by at least one of the
opinions here. S uch a striking pattern should lead all but the most stoi
cally anti-theoretical observer to ask: what gives, Jacques?
The answer may simply be that swashbuckling law professors would
not be content to simply appl y the law as they find it. Some dramatic
flair, like ovenuling a major precedent, is de rigueur. (It is remarkabl e
how even imaginary power c a n g o t o people' s heads?) There i s surely,
as Professor MULLENIX implies, some of that going on here.
Such an account, I think, would be i ncomplete. I want to s uggest
that the panelists' reaction is symptomatic not of a character trait, but
of a pathology in the law itself. The intriguing questions raised by the
hypothetical cannot be resolved by extrapolating existing doctrine be
cause existing doctrine fails to provide a convincing answer to a fun
damental question : what j ustifies the assertion of personal j urisdiction
over a defendant? The responses of the panelists all, in different ways,
attempt to provide an answer to that question. Without such an answer,
the questions raised cannot be resolved.
A.

B ACKGROUND

In this hypothetical, plaintiffs are suing over the death of I n nocent
Victim, who was kil led in an automobile accident allegedly caused by
defective brake parts manufactured by defendant Brake-0 Corporation i n
South Korea. Innocent Victim, a citizen o f State Y , was killed i n State
Y when the anti-lock brakes on another car, a "Fishfin," allegedly
failed, causing the accident.
B rake-0 is a South Korean corporation. Approximatel y 30% of its
revenues are derived from the sale of its products in the U nited States.
Unlike the defendant is Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Cou rt, 480
U . S . 1 02 ( 1 987), B rake-0 does have a presence in State Y . However,
that presence is not directly related to the product alleged to have
caused the accident. The B rake-0 personnel located in State Y distribute
"B rakeman" replacement brake pads. State Y is a maj or m arket for
those pads . There is no allegation that the brake pads contributed to the
accident. As far as we know, this is the only product that B rake-0
retails in the United States. Its other sales are as component parts . H

8. The facts are ambiguous as to how the component parts find their way to the
U nited States . While 30% of B rake-O 's revenues are said to derive from sales i n the
United States, it i s unclear whether B rake-0 actually ships the bulk of its products
directly i nto the United States, or whether they are purchased abroad and im ported
by a U nited States manufacturer, as apparently happened to the brake components
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The brake parts at issue here were sold F.O . B . South Korea to
Suregrip, a manufacturer of brakes. The brakes were assembled else
where i n the United States, and then sold to Fishfin, also presumably an
American manufacturer. B rake-0 knew that many of its parts would end
up as S uregrip brakes in Fishfins, large numbers of which are operated
in State Y. However, the parts were not uniquely designed for Suregrip
or Fishfins.
The defective brakes i n question did not, as i t happens, come to
State Y through commercial distribution at all. The driver of the defec
tive car bought that car out-of-state and brought it, upon moving, to
State Y .
Plaintiffs i nitially sued Fishfin, who then impleaded Suregrip and
B rake-0. Unlike the procedural posture of Asahi, damages were award
ed against the defendant directly for the benefit of the plaintiffs .
B . THE I SSUES RA ISED
The hypothetical manages to elude easy resolution under any estab
l ished precedent. Unlike Asahi, the defendant has a presence in the
forum and is defending a claim directly against the i nj ured plaintiff.
Unlike World- Wide Volkswagen, the victim was a res ident of the forum,
was not responsible for bringing the product i nto the forum, and the
defendant knew exactly where i ts product would end up. Unlike
Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A . v. Hall, 466 U . S . 408
( 1 984), the defendant' s contacts were not temporary, and were not lim
i ted to purchases.
The proper resolution of the hypothetical depends on a series of
i ssues that the Supreme Court has consistently avoided. Plaintiffs '
c l ai ms do not arise out of defendant's direct contacts with the forum i n
the sense that i t was not those contacts that caused plaintiffs' inj uries.
But the contacts were !lot entirely unrelated either. The sale of replace
ment brake pads presumably made their brake parts more attractive to
the United States market, which in turn generated a demand for the re
placement pads . Is that relationship sufficient to assert general j urisdic
tion over B rake-0?
And what of the indirect contact, the "stream of commerce connec
tion?" This contact, the use of defendant' s defective product in the
forum, was c learly the source of plaintiffs ' inj uries. B ut can it be attrib
uted to defendant for j urisdictional purposes? Defendant is tw ice re
moved from that contact. First, these brakes did not come through the

relevant to the litigation.
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stream of commerce at all. Rather, the unilateral action of the other
driver brought the car into the state. A comparable break in the chain
of distribution i n World- Wide Volkswagen was fatal to the stream of
commerce theory advanced by plaintiffs there. However, unlike World
Wide Volkswagen, the defendant here did ship large quantities of the
same product to State Y through the stream of commerce. S ho uld those
contacts be consi dered related to plaintiffs' i nj uries from a product that
did not come in through that network? Second, even if the non-tortious
distribution of defendant' s products in State Y are considered related to
plaintiffs ' claims, does the stream of commerce j urisdictional l y connect
a defendant to the forum? A split in the Asahi Court prevented a defin
itive answer to whether Gray & Standard San itary Corp. v. A me rican
Radiator, 1 76 N.E.2d 76 1 (Ill. 1 96 1 ), is stil l good law after World- Wide
Volkswagen . The Asahi Court thus failed to tell us whether " mere
knowledge" of down-stream commercial distribution is a sufficient j uris
dictional predicate, or whether a defendant has to "seek-out" that m ar
ket. That distinction is c ritical to evaluating the j urisdictional signifi 
cance o f Brake-O' s conduct here.
As for general j urisdiction, the Supreme Court has provided v i rtually
no contemporary guidance as to when j urisdiction may be asserted over
a claim unrelated to defendant' s forum contacts. Brake-0' s presence in
the forum is certainly more extensive than defendant' s presence in
Helicopteros, but that case simply represents a denial of general j uris
diction ; other than the Burnham deci sion upholding j uri sdiction based
on service of process alone, there is no contemporary Supreme Court
decision upholding a finding of general j urisdiction.
Finally, as Professor WEINTRAUB notes, the facts of the h ypotheti
cal arguably place it somewhere between an i nstance of "specific" and
"general j urisdiction ." The case does not appear to "ari se" out of
defendant' s forum contacts, but the claim certainly has a great deal of
connection with the forum : the resident plaintiffs were i nj ured in the
forum by a product simil ar to those products brought into the forum by
a defendant with extensive connections to the forum . If plaintiffs '
c laims are not closely enough related to defendant' s contacts w ith the
forum to support specific j urisdiction, is the only alternative to ask
whether defendant' s contacts are sufficiently pervasive to s up port gener
al j urisdiction ? M ay courts view the relationship between the forum and
the claim on a continuum, or must they choose between the two polar
extremes of specific and general j urisdiction?
C . TH E PANELISTS ' RESPONSE
As outlined above, these issues do not challenge existing doctrine
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per se; the major precedents are all distingui shable. The answer requires
some clarification of existing law. What is the meaning of specifi c and
general j urisdiction, and what is the rel ationship between those two
categories? Why then could not the panelists simply expand upon rather
than overrul e so much existing case law?
The explanation, I think, is that resolution of these issues requires
deeper understanding of why j urisdiction is j ustified than the United
States Supreme Court has been willing to articulate to date. In order to
know whether a c ase is "related" to defendant's contacts for j urisdic
tional purposes, we need to know why we care about rel atedness . In
order to know how much affiliation is required for purposes of general
j urisdiction, we need to know why general j urisdiction is fair. Not only
do the c ases not tel l us, but it is i mpossible to even extrapolate the
answers; the cases yield no consistent conceptual model. As the panel
ists demonstrate, almost any vision of j urisdictional legitimacy will run
afoul of some precedent.
For Professor B ORCHERS , the answer i s very differen t from the
other panelists : the assertion of personal j urisdiction requires no special
constitutional justifi cation. For BORCHERS , constitutional scrutiny of
j urisdictional i ssues is no different from constitutional scrutiny of any
other exercise of a state' s police power; it should generall y be upheld
unless it is irrational, or deprives a defendant of procedural due pro
cess, i. e. , an effective opportunity to be heard. He decl ines to import
i nto the Due Process Clause any function of allocating j urisdiction
among sovereigns. Thus, the wrong turn in Supreme Court doctrine for
Professor B ORCHERS came very early , at least as of International
Shoe, if not Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S . 7 1 4 ( 1 877) .9 Applying this mini
mal scrutiny, Professor BORCHERS is willing to accept any assertion
of j urisdiction that serves a rational purpose, including the efficiency of
consolidating all claims in a si ngle proceeding.
On the opposite pole are Professors COX, MAIER and BRUSSACK
who quite explicitly insist upon testing the assertion of juri sdiction
under a constitutional standard of political legitimacy. What, in Profes-

9. Professor BORCHERS has elsewhere argued that Pennoyer has been generall y
misread a s standing for t h e proposition that there is a constitutionally e nforceable
standard for measuring the adequacy a state ' s j urisdictional claim over a de fe ndant.
See Patrick J . B orchers, The Dearh of Constitutional Law of Personal Jurisdiction:
From Pennoyer ro Burnham and Back Again, 24 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1 9 ( 1 990). The
true meani ng of the constitutional guarantee i n Pennoyer, Professor B ORCHERS
argues, is simply that a defendant has a procedural opportunity to raise objections to
jurisdiction ; the constitution does not in sure any particular jurisdictional foundation.
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sor COX ' s terms, "empowers . . . [a state] to meddle i n our l ives?''
COX, infra, at 647. For Professor COX, there is only one constitution
ally valid reason for asserting j urisdiction : to regulate the underlying
cause of action. Thus, he would not permit the exercise of j urisdi ction
in any case where a state would not be j u stified in applying its substan
tive law to the c ase. While he does not here spell-out a comprehensive
conflicts approach, a decis ion to apply State Y ' s law here could be
j ustified by some combination of State Y ' s regulatory interest i n pro
tecting its i nhabitants from dangerous products, with the foreseeability
on defendant' s part that the product could, in the normal course of
commercial distribution, find its way into the forum . S ince such a the
ory of j urisdictional legitimacy was implicitly rej ected in World- Wide
Volkswagen, that case must give way. So too must go any theory of
j urisdiction based on mere affi liation of the defendant with the forum
where there is no other forum-interest in the underlying transaction; i n
other words, the exercise o f general j urisdiction is never legiti mate.
Professor MAIER similarly resists any assertion of j urisdiction not
j usti fied by a forum interest in the underlying transaction. For Professor
MAIER assertions of general j urisdiction are at odds with an u nderlying
right of defendant to be treated "fairly . " That fairness right, in Professor
MAIER' s view should be defi ned by reference to whether "a c ase will
be heard in a forum whose political and social context is related to the
events in the c ase . . . . " MAIER, infra, at 656. Where those connec
tions are absent, a state unfairly brings to bear its values and preferenc
es on the outcome of the case, even if it were to apply another s tate ' s
law. A t bottom, this position seems quite related to Professor COX ' s
position: the "unfairness" i s not so much that the outcome o f the c ase
will be "distorted"-j udges bring their own values and preferences to
bear on every case-but such influences are "illegitimate" w i thout a
regul atory j ustification.
Professor B RU SSACK, in contrast to Professor COX, accepts the
theoretical constraint of World- Wide Vo lks wa ge n th at a state ' s political
legitimacy is conferred by the defendant through forum contacts that
evince some form of consent or social contract. A mere regulatory
interest is insufficient. B ut, Professor BRUSSAC K asserts there is no
requi rement that such "purposeful availment" be found in the same acts
giving rise to defendant' s claim. Professor B RUSSAC K would take
i ssue with the notion that "specific" j uri sdiction measures the relation
ship between a defendant' s contacts and a plaintiff' s claim. Thus, for
Professor B RUSSACK, this is a relatively easy case : the resident
plaintiffs ' inj uries in the forum bring the case u nder the "spec i fic j uri s
diction" rubric, and defendant' s contacts, related or not, provide pur-
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poseful availment.
A similar approach is evident in Professor SILB ERMAN' s opm10n:
"Brake-0' s high volume of sales should provide sufficient contacts
when the claim ari ses out of an inj ury in the state, and the defendant
engages in additional activity that takes advantage of the forum state ' s
market." S ILBERMAN, infra, at 663 . Like Professor B RUSSACK, she
does not appear to insist that plaintiff' s claim be related to defendant' s
activities i n the forum . I t i s sufficient that the claim ari ses i n a forum
in which defendant has purposely availed itself. While not critical to
this case, she finds it anomalous that a foreign defendant c an do mas
sive amounts of business cumulatively in the United S tates, but might
avoid j urisdiction because its contacts with any particular state are in
sufficient. 1 0 At l east for foreign defendants, Professor SILB ERMA N
rejects t h e notion that j urisdictional legiti macy must b e established on a
state-by-state basis . S he urges, as a matter of legislative reform, that
foreign defendants be subject to suit in any country where their product
causes i nj ury, and in which the product ' s import was foreseeable. Ven
ue, in such cases would be based in the place of inj ury. Her test re
quires a fairly narrow construction of World- Wide Volkswagen . In that
case, the Court rej ected the notion that mere foreseeability of a
product' s entry i nto a state justi fied the assertion of j urisdiction over a
defendant who did not avail itself of that market. Thus, Professor
S ILB ERMAN puts a great deal of weight on the distinction between the
stream of commerce and the stream of traffic. She is prepared to impute
to a defendant a commercial distributer' s contact with the forum, but
not the foreseeable actions of other parties outside of the chain of com
mercial distribution.
Outright rejection of World- Wide Volkswagen is central to Professor
WEINTRAUB ' s approach. While Professor WEINTRAUB ' s theoretical
foundations are less explicit than Professor COX ' s, the notion of regula
tory need as a j urisdictional j ustification pervades Professor
WEINTRAUB ' s opinion. The spectrum between general and specific
j urisdiction for Professor WEINTRAUB is a measure of the state ' s
regulatory interest in the case: "The more the action arises out o f o r i s
related t o acts o r consequences in the forum, the less the requirement
for additional nexus between forum and defendant ." WEINTRAUB ,

1 0. As professor SILBERMAN points out, the recent amendment to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 4(k)(2) aggregates national contacts only where j urisdiction is
premised on a federal questi on. Professor S I LB ERMAN urges legislation applying
s u c h an approach to all claims against foreign defendants in both state and federal
coun.

634

NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:627

infra, at 665 . This regulatory need j ustifies j urisdiction wholly apart
from defendant ' s purposeful avail ment: "an y forum with an interest in
providing a remedy to the plai ntiff should have j urisdiction over the
defendant, subject to a cogent showing of unfairness." WEINTRAUB,
infra, at 665 . Of course, dependi ng on Professor WEINTRAU B ' s under
standing of "unfairness," he may either be radical l y reconceptualizing
j urisdiction on a par with Professor B ORCHERS ' s due process test, or
simply i mporting all of the Court ' s purposefu l availment requ irement
i nto the concept of "fairness ."
Perhaps most comfortable with existing doctrine is Professor
MULLENIX. Professor MULLENIX finds even the heightened stream
of commerce standard advocated by Justice O ' Connor satis fied by
Brake-0' s knowledge that large numbers of its products would "wind
up i n the state." S he contrasts this with Asah i ' s position that the corpo
ration never contemplated that its l imited sales of valves to C heng Shin
in Taiwan would subject it to lawsuit i n Californ ia. Implicit i n her
approach is that a defendant should expect to be subject to juri sdiction
where its products foreseeably cause harm. However, i t i s unclear why
mere knowledge of a product' s u ltimate destination would satisfy Justice
O ' Connor' s position that "a defendant ' s awareness that the stream of
commerce may or will sweep the product into the forum State does not
convert the mere act of placing the product into the stream i nto an act
purposefully directed toward the forum State." Asahi, 480 U . S . at 1 1 2.
Similarly, Professor MULLENIX ' s application of World- Wide Volkswag
en to these facts might be consi dered opti mi stic. Professor MULLENIX
reads that case as accommodating j urisdiction where there i s : high state
regulatory interest, low inconvenience to the defendant, effi c ient resolu
tion in the forum , and a "shared interests . . . in furthering fundamental
substantive policies." MULLENIX, infra, at 659. She thus finds it un
necessary to grapple with the difficult issue of whether a stream of
commerce connection between the defendant and the forum sati sfies
World- Wide Volkswagen 's "purposeful avail ment" requirement. Professor
MULLENIX conc ludes that "[b ]ecause this case may be resolved under
the standards set forth in Asahi and World- Wide Volkswagen, it does
not seem necessary to exami ne whether the state ' s assertion of j uri sdic
tion i s supportable under either a theory of general j urisdiction or spe
cific j urisdiction." MULLENIX, infra, at 660. S ince Asahi and World
Wide Volkswagen are generally understood to be cases about s pecific
j urisdiction, she presumably means that specific j urisdiction is appropri
ate here. If so, one might take issue with her claim that she does not
have to resolve whether the clai m is sufficiently related to the j urisdic
tional contacts to be classified as a c ase of speci fic j urisdiction.
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* * *

FACTS
Brake-0 is a South Korean corporation which makes component
brake parts, including brake part kits for anti-lock brake systems. Brake0 also manufactures replacement brake pads for do-it-yourselfers, which
it retails u nder the "Brakeman" name in the United States. B rake-0
sells its anti-lock brake components and kits to c ar and brake manufac
turers throughout the world, as well as to companies that service or sell
repl acement anti-lock brakes . Total sales of all Brake-0 products in the
United States amount to about $30,000,000.00 annually, which repre
sents approxi mately 30% of Brake-0' s total sales.
The l itigation involves an automobile accident. Innocent Victim, a
State Y resident, was hit in State Y by Driver, also a State Y resident
(although a recent arrival), and killed. I nnocent Victi m ' s Survivors
sought recovery for wrongfu l death against Driver, Fishfi n (the manu
facturer of Driver' s car), and any and all defendants impleaded and
cross claimed against (see next paragraph). The complaint pled many
theories of recovery in the alternative and/or in combination agai nst the
various defendants, including: allegations that Driver negligently operat
ed the vehicle; that the vehicle was negl igently constructed; and that the
vehicle was manufactured in a dangerously defective or unsafe condi
tion. The accident occurred on wet roads on August 1 8, 1 992, when
Driver' s anti-lock brakes locked and Driver swerved i nto Innocent
Victim' s car. Assume sufficient evidence to allow each cau se of action
to go to the j ury under State Y law. As to Brake-0, there was no alle
gation that the Brake-0 pad in the anti-lock system malfunctioned, but
rather that other physical elements of the Brake-0 system were defec
tive.
Survivors initiated suit in November, 1 992. Although the original
complaint named only Driver and Fishfin, Fishfin quickly impleaded the
manufacturer of the anti-lock brakes, Suregrip. Suregrip quickly im
pleaded the manufacturer of the component parts, Brake-0. Only Brake0 has raised the defense of personal j urisdiction.
The Fishfin vehicle invol ved i n this accident was manufactured in
early 1 992 in State M , and was purchased new by Driver in State K in
July, 1 992, before moving to State Y. Brake-0 sales to Suregrip in
mid- 1 99 1 through mid- 1 992 (components that went i nto 1 992 models)
amounted to 7 % of total Brake-0 company sales by dollar amount
($7 ,000,000.00) . Approximately 60% of these Brake-0 components were
purchased by Suregrip. These same components were u sed to assemble
the anti-lock brakes sold to Fishfin and were incorporated into Fishfin
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vehicles. State Y, the state where the inj uries occurred, is a populous
state and is one of B rake-O ' s l arger United States markets ( 1 5 -20%) for
Brakeman replacement parts. Brake-0 has some personnel i n one office
related to the Brakeman enterprise in State Y and, on occasion, con
ducts negotiations and routing of other Brake-0 business through its
State Y office. The parties have stipulated that the Brake-0 p arts al
leged to have malfunctioned were not distributed by B rake-0 to
Suregrip through State Y; these parts were p urchased by S uregrip
F.O. B . South Korea and incorporated b y S uregrip into anti-lock brakes
manufactured in States P and Q (both states are at least two time zones
from State Y). It is further stipulated that all significant Suregri p/Brake0 negotiations involved principals from South Korea rather than any
State Y personnel . Brake-0 admits that Suregrip disclosed, in connec
tion with the negotiations of the B rake-OiSuregrip contract, that most of
the components it sold to Suregrip would be incorporated into Fishfins.
The component parts were not, however, uniquely designed for Fishfins
or for Suregrip . Although the exact number of Fishfins or other vehicles
with B rake-0 components i n State Y is unknown, Plaintiff S urvivors
and Fishfin introduced evidence that as many as 20,000 Fishfins con
taining Brake-0 anti-lock components as original equipment are in S tate
Y. Further, perhaps as many o.s 60,000 other vehicle types which con
tain Brake-0 anti-lock components as original equipment are i n S tate Y.
Brakeman pads are estimated to be on at least 225 ,000 vehicles i n S tate
Y.
The trial j udge denied B rake-0' s motion t o dismiss for l ack of
personal j urisdiction, and scheduled the case for trial. The j ury awarded
total damages of $4,000,000.00 to S urvivors of Innocent Victim, appor
tioning 1 0% blame to Driver for negligent operation of the vehicle, and
30% each to Fishfin, Suregrip, and Brake-0 via strict liability u nder
State Y law. The intermediate State Y appellate court affirmed the trial
court ' s j adgment despite numerous challenges by each defendant. B rake0 sought review of the personal j urisdiction issue before the S tate Y
Supreme Court. The State Y Supreme Court, after emphasizing that
State Y personal j urisdiction law reaches as far as due process permits,
affirmed the intermediate State Y appellate court. In support of its rul
ing, the State Y Supreme Court c ited Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v . Superi
or Court, 480 U . S . 1 02 ( 1 987), and emphasized that State Y traditional
ly has asserted j urisdiction over those corporations which do significant
business within State Y.
As members of the United States S upreme Court, review the State Y
Supreme Court opinion.
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May State Y assert j urisdiction over B rake-0?
* * *
B ORCHERS, J. * :

(affirming)

There should be an affirmance. A state may, consi stent with the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, take j urisdiction
over the sell er of a product causing i nj ury i n that state i n a l awsuit
arising out of that inj ury.
This case presents a very c lose question under the minimum contacts
test as to whether the third-party defendant (Brake-0)-the manufacturer
of one of the component parts in the product causing i nj ury-is subj ect
to j uri sdiction. The product causing the inj ury was neither sold nor
resold in State Y. Under the stream of commerce test, the l ac k of an
in-state sale of the product is probably fatal to obtaining j urisdiction on
that theory. See Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U . S .
1 02 ( 1 987); World- Wide Volkswagen v . Woodson, 444 U . S . 2 8 6 ( 1 980).
Perhaps, though, the large nu mber of B rake-0 products that are other
wise sold in State Y is sufficient to allow j uri sdiction under the rubric
of "general j urisdiction." Cf Helicopteros Nacionales de Columbia, S.A.
v . Hall, 466 U.S. 408 ( 1 984) (large amount of in-state purchases u nre
lated to claim not sufficient to establish personal j urisdiction) .
The "contacts" debate, however, ought be irrelevant. Cases l ike this
point out two of the great failings of the mini mum contacts test. First,
it is maddeningly difficult to predict which types of activities will allow
for j urisdiction, making appel late litigation on this subject a common
and expensive phenomenon. Second, a case l ike this cries out for one
forum to resolve all related disputes. Yet, by requiring that the "con
tacts" of each party be evaluated separately, the constitutional aspect of
personal j urisdiction makes multiple fora necessary in many cases. See,
e.g., Asahi, 480 U . S . at 1 02 (indemnity action in products case dis
missed) ; World- Wide Volkswagen, 444 U . S . at 286 (action against seller
and retailer in a products case dismissed) .
The notion that the D ue Process Clause operates as a direct restraint
on state power to assert j urisdiction is an historical accident based, in
all probability, on a misreading of Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U . S . 7 1 4
( 1 877). See Patrick J. Borchers, The Death of the Constitutional Law of
Personal Jurisdiction: From Pennoyer to Burnham and Back Again, 24
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U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1 9 ( 1 990). It is time to break the bonds of this
ancient mi stake and consider anew the c ircumstances in which a state
crosses the constitutional line by taking j urisdiction over priv ate parties.
The truth of the matter is that the Constitution is rarel y j eopardized
by state court assertions of j urisdiction. The Due Process C l ause c hecks
state court j urisdiction in only two c ircumstances. First, a s tate court
assertion of j uri sdiction might offend substantive due process i f lacking
a rational basis. S imply taking j urisdiction over parties does not by
itself implicate any recognized fundamental right such as voting or
speech. Cf Carey v. Brown , 447 U . S . 455 ( 1 980) (state law imposing a
content-based restriction on speech implicates a "fu ndamental right" and,
therefore, must serve a compelling state goal b y the least restrictive
means possible). Thus, state court assertions of j urisdiction require only
minimal rationality to pass constitutional muster. See, e.g. , Williamson v.
Lee Optical of Okla., Inc. , 348 U . S . 483 ( 1 955) (state economic reg
ulation does not violate the Due Process Clau se as long as it bears a
"rational relati onship" to a "legitimate" state goal) .
State Y ' s assertion of j urisdiction passes the rationality test. The
Survivors clearly have j urisdiction over most of the defendants in S tate
Y. Therefore , a consequence of dismissing the third-party action against
B rake-0 is that a separate action for contribution will have to be pur
sued in another forum. It is a legitimate goal of S tate Y to protect
defendants in its courts from having to fight battles on two fronts and
thereby protect them from added cost and the risk of inconsi stent adj u
dications. State Y is the situs of the inj ury, maki ng access to the physi
cal evidence and the witnesses cheaper and easier for all c oncerned.
State Y ' s assertion of j urisdiction is, at a minimum, a rational endeavor,
and thus does not violate substantive due process.
The other circumstance in which a state court ' s assertion of j urisdic
tion might arguably be unconstitutional is if procedural due process
concerns are implicated. If a defendant could show the chosen forum is
so inconvenient that, as a practical matter, the defendant is prevented
from mounti ng a defense, procedural due process would be offended.
Cf Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U . S . 3 1 9 ( 1 976) (test for procedural due
process requires balancing cost of procedure against parties' i nterest in
accurate resolution of the dispute). A consumer haled to a distant forum
on a small di spute might, for instance, be able to show that the choice
of that forum makes defaulting, rather than defending, the economically
rational choice. In such a circumstance a state court assertion of j uris
diction would offend procedural due process. Cf Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 47 1 U . S . 462, 485 ( 1 985) (Supreme Court shares "broader
concerns" of lower court that requiring consumers to defend small dis-
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putes away from home is unfair) ; McGee v. International Life Ins. Co. ,
355 U . S . 220, 223 ( 1 957) ("When [insurance] claims were small or
moderate individual claimants frequently could not afford the cost of
bri nging an action in a foreign forum-thus in effect making the [in
surance] company j udgment proof. ").
Plainly, Brake-O' s si tuation is far removed from our hypothetical
consumer' s situation . Gi ven that the underlying dispute is being litigated
in State Y, and that the physical evidence is located i n State Y, the
chosen forum is undoubtedl y the cheapest place for all concerned (in
cluding Brake-0) to l itigate the case. Further, there is no reason to be
lieve that B rake-0 cannot get competent counsel to represent it in State
Y. Brake-0 has an office in State Y, and conducts some business from
it. An enterprise as large and successfu l as Brake-0 undoubtedl y has
access to legal representation, and has-or can readily find-competent
counsel to handle matters for it in S tate Y. Indeed, the fact that the
case went to trial below belies any suggestion that B rake-0 would be
unable to defend itself. Therefore, Brake-0 cannot show that procedural
due process has been offended.
I would lay down a per se rule that in products l i ability cases the
state of the inj ury may take j urisdiction over all defendants in the chain
of distribution, both on actions against them by the i nj ured party, and
on third-party and cross actions between them for contribution and
indemnity. This case adequately demonstrates why the state of the in
j ury is a rational forum that does not unconstitutionally disadvantage
any party . A per se rule would decrease the i ncentive for appellate
litigation of the mundane and preliminary matter of j urisdiction, and
would afford a single forum for the resolution of all rel ated disputes.
This is the approach taken by the Brussels Convention, 1 which-in tort
cases-confers j urisdiction on the state in the European Union in which
the "harmful event occurred ." See Patrick J. Borchers, Comparing Per
sonal Jurisdiction in the Un ited States and the European Community:
Lessons for American Reform, 40 Am. J. Comp. L. 1 2 1 , 1 44-45 ( 1 992).
For these reasons I would affirm .

l . Brussels Convention on Jurisdiction and the
Civil and Commercial Matters, September 27, 1 968,
vention of the Accession to the 1 968 Convention
Ireland, and the United Kingdom, October 9, 1 97 8 ,
304) 7 7 , reprinted in 1 8 l.L.M. 8, 2 1 ( 1 979).

Enforcement of Judgments in
amended by Luxembourg Con
of Denmark, the Republic of
1 978 O.J. Eur. Comm. (No. L
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* * *

BRUSSACK, J. * :

(affirming)

The question we must answer is whether a foreign corporation that
aggressively markets its products in an American state (doing perhaps
millions of dollars of business there annually) is constitutional l y im
mune from the judicial power of the state in a products l iabi l it y action,
merely because the particular product involved in the case happened to
reach the state through the conduct of a consumer. We hold that State
Y may exercise j urisdiction over Brake-0.
B rake-0 argues that our j urisdictional due process precedents protect
it from having to answer in State Y for the deadly consequences of an
alleged defect in anti-lock brake components that it manu factured, be
cause the facts support neither specific j urisdiction nor general j urisdic
tion. ' There is no speci fic j urisdiction, according to Brake-0, because
the brake p arts that allegedly malfunctioned did not reach S tate Y
through Brake-0' s distribution system. Instead, the brake p arts entered
State Y when Driver, in whose automobile the parts were i nstal led,
moved to State Y. Brake-0 reminds us of our insistence in World- Wide
Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S . 286 ( 1 980), that a company' s
products are not agents for service of process that subject the company
to j uri sdiction wherever consumers decide to take them. /d. at 296.
Moreover, Brake-0 argues, there is no general j urisdicti on over it in
State Y, because general j uri sdiction allows a court to exercise j udicial
power over a defendant in any lawsuit that anyone wi shes to bring
against the defendant, as if the court were a court of the defendant' s
own state or nation. For example, Brake-0 i s right when i t protests that
State Y would not be entitled to exercise j urisdiction over B rake-0 to
resolve a contract dispute between it and a Japanese automobile manu
facturer arising from Brake-O' s alleged fail ure to supply p arts on time
to a factory in Japan.
Brake-O' s argument i s too c lever. Brake-0 skil lfully manipulates
some of the doctrinal details elaborated in our j urisdictional due process
precedents w ithout addressing the principles that drive the precedents.
The principles are principles of political legitimacy . See Robert D .
Brussack, Political Legitimacy and State Court Jurisdiction: A Critique
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of the Public Law Paradigm, 72 Neb. L. Rev . 1 082, 1 083-88 ( 1 993). If
B rake-0 were a corporation chartered u nder the laws of S tate Y, with
its principal place of business in State Y, there would be no question
about State Y ' s authority to resolve this products liabil ity dispute. A
political community may summon its own members to answer in its
courts. Bec ause Brake-0 is a South Korean company, however, State Y
needs some other j urisdiction for deploying j udicial power against
Brake-0 besides the j ustification that Brake-0 is a de jure member of
the political community of State Y . Jurisdictional due process protects
citizens of other states and nations from the j udicial power of state
courts when no such alternative j ustification exists.
The notions of specific j urisdiction and general j urisdiction flow
from two alternative j ustifications for a state ' s deployment of j udicial
power against a political stranger. General j urisdiction recognizes that a
stranger' s contacts w ith a state rna y be so extensive that the stranger is
not reall y a stranger at all. The stranger may be treated as a de facto
c itizen, as vul nerable as any de jure citizen to summonses i ssued by the
state ' s courts, even in lawsui ts whol ly unrelated to the defendant' s in
state activities. !d. at 1 09 3 . Specific j urisdiction recognizes that a state
may summon a stranger when the stranger' s conduct engages a legiti
mate regulatory interest of the state. !d.
B rake-0 concedes that S tate Y may have a legitimate regulatory
interest in resol ving a dispute arising from a deadly collision within its
borders. B ut Brake-0 correctly insists that World- Wide Volkswagen and
other precedents impose an additional requirement for specifi c j urisdic
tion-purposeful availment. We have said that a state court may not
exerc ise j uri sdiction over a nonresident defendant unless the defendant
purposefully has established an affiliation with the forum state. Hanson
v. Denckla , 357 U . S . 235, 253 ( 1 95 8 ) . It is not enough that some con
sumer has brought the defendant' s product to the forum state and that
the product then has caused i nj ury there. The choice to establish an af
fi liation w ith the forum state must be the defendant' s own choice.
Brussack, supra, at 1 094. This requirement reflects a Lockeian, or con
sent-based, element in the overall conception of pol itical legitimacy that
drives our j urisdictional due process precedents . !d. at 1 095-96.
Brake-0 made the choice . Although Brake-0' s very extensive mar
keting in State Y is not enough to subject Brake-0 to general j urisdic
tion in the state, and although the particular brake parts involved in the
collision did not reach State Y through Brake-O ' s distribution system,
Brake-0 decided to do big business in State Y, and even has an office
in the state for prosecuting that business. Brake-0 purposefully estab
l i shed an affiliation with State Y, and because the state also c laims a

N EW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW

642

[Vol. 2 9 : 627

legiti mate regulatory interest in resolving this dispute, the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not stand in the way .
Another factor that influences our decision i n thi s case is a factor
not sufficiently emphasized in our j urisdictional due process precedents.
If we were to rule i n B rake-0' s favor, the decision would present the
plaintiffs with the dilemma of foregoing any c laim against B rake-0 or
pursuing the claim in the courts of some other state or nation. It would
be a dilemma because the courts of S outh Korea or of some American
state besides S tate Y might be more alien to the plaintiffs than the
courts of State Y are to B rake-0. Political boundary l ines m atter as
much, and in the same ways, to plaintiffs as they matter to defendants.
These plaintiffs, j ust l ike B rake-0, want to have their dispute resolved
close to home in a forum governed by familiar laws and procedures
applied by neighbors rather than strangers. There is no sufficien t reason
to automatically prefer B rake-0' s place-of-trial interests over the
plaintiffs ' similar interests. State Y is an attractive foru m because
Brake-0 and the plaintiffs both have very substantial relationships with
the forum. In fact, there may be no other state or nation w ith which the
plaintiffs and B rake-0 both have a substantial relationship.
* * *
COX, J . * :

(affi rming)

Affirmed. Although this case presents a close call, I believe State Y
may apply its substantive law to plai ntiffs' clai ms made against B rake0. Therefore, B rake-0 is not entitled to have the c laims against it dis
missed for lack of j urisdiction.
I.

J URISD ICTION TO A PPLY STATE Y LAW

I agree with my brother WEINTRAUB, and other members of thi s
Court, that our prior (what we have labelled) personal j urisdiction pre
cedents resemble more the trail of an inebriated sleepwalker than a path
headed toward or from any kind of sensible pri nciples. Radical reformu
l ation and clarification of our j urisdiction j uri sprudence is required. We
should use this case as an opportunity to abandon our absurd insistence
that constitutional inquiry for personal j urisdiction is different from how
we determine constitutionality for (what we have labelled) choice of
law. Once we recognize that there is but one inquiry-whether a partic
ular court constitutionally may bind a particular defendant by its
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l aw-our j urisdiction j urisprudence may start to make sense.
If we would recognize the interrelation of all juri sdiction doctrines
and abandon compartmentalization into arbitrary categories we would
stop misleading litigants and commentators into thinking: 1 ) that unfair
ness in one part of the j urisdictional system can be ameliorated by other
j urisdictional doctrines and 2) that different purposes are served b y
different doctrines. We have so long repeated as m antra that the consti
tutional concerns regarding personal j urisdiction are distinct from the
concerns governing choice of l aw, that we have come unthinkingly to
accept our chantings as truth. When pressed to prove the need for the
distinction between doctrines, however, we offer no convincing ratio
nales. In practice we allow choice of law considerations to infl uence
our personal j urisdiction determinations more often than our rhetoric
about absolute distinctions would indicate . See, e.g. , Asahi Metal Indus.
Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U . S . 1 02, 1 1 4- 1 5 ( 1 987) (indicating an
additional reason for not granting j urisdiction, doubtfulness that Califor
nia law should govern the transaction) ; Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 47 1 U . S . 462, 48 1 -82 ( 1 985) (indicating that choice of law
clause supports assertion of personal j urisdiction) .
One problem in getting u s t o rethink our j urisdictional analysis is
that we have accepted our l abel s as truth, and that these conceptualiza
tions prevent us from seeing acros s their boundaries to what the labels
actually seek to identify . In my attempts to persuade m y colleagues that
there is (or at least should be) no distinction between state authority to
assert personal j urisdiction and state authority to (choose and) apply
law, I am compel led to use the different terms "personal j urisdiction"
and "choice of l aw ." Some would argue that this terminology itself
means there is a distinction ; otherwise, why use different words ? Ac
cordingly, I beg the i ndulgence of my colleagues to permit me to use
the term "jurisdiction" to encompass all situations w here a court at
tempts to bind parties by its adj udicati ons .
If we ask, in situations where the complaining p arty w ishes to resist
the court ' s actual j udgment, whether there should be no restrictions on
the "j uri sdiction" of the adj udicating court, I do not think members of
this Court would deny constitutional restrictions on state court j urisdic
tion. What we apparently disagree on, in addition to whether these
restrictions should be strong or weak, is where and how they should be
imposed. I suggest we recognize that whatever we constitutionally im
pose and wherever we impose it, we are placing l imits on the state
court ' s j urisdiction. We should stop viewing, in a vacuum, the place in
the proceedings at which the restrictions are imposed.
Presently, we claim that the concern s of choice of l aw c an be ad-
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dressed separate from personal j urisdiction. As a practical matter, in the
modern age, we rarely have reversed state courts for c hoosing the
wrong l aw . 1 Our choice of l aw test has been criticized for p l acing too
few restrictions on abi lity to choose law. Perhaps more significantly, we
will not reverse a lower court even when i t m isapplies the l aw we
allow it to choose.2 Creative j udges, as a result, realize that they have
de facto power to make whatever law they want most of the time.3
One h ypothetical "solution" would be to impose truly meaningfu l con
straints at the back end of liti gation and to deprive courts of j urisdiction
once it becomes clear that they have formed law i mproperl y to the
facts. Perhaps this is what Justice SILBERMAN meant by her famous
aphorism that it i s more i mportant to know whether one will b e h anged
than where. See Linda J. Silberman, Shaffer v. Heitner: The End of an
Era, 53 N . Y . U . L. Rev . 33, 88 ( 1 97 8 ) . The test for choice of l aw pur
portedly could be made more restrictive than the test for personal j uris-

1 . Compare A llstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 ( 1 98 1 ) (finding application
of M in nesota law constitutional despite arguabl y tenuous contacts); see also id. at 3 2 3
( Stevens, 1 . , concurring) ("[T]he fact that a choice-of-law decision m a y be u n sound as
a matter of confl icts l aw does not necessaril y implicate the federal concerns embod
ied in the Ful l Faith and Credit Clause.") with Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472
U . S . 797 ( 1 98 5 ) (holding that Kansas had insufficient contacts to apply its l a w to a l l
elements o f a class action) with Sun Oil Co. v . Wortman, 4 8 6 U . S . 7 1 7 ( 1 988)
(holding Kansas' s application of its own statute of l imitations to all elements of a
cl ass action constitutional, and upholding Kansas ' s novel i nterpretation of other states'
laws as not reversible).
2. See Wortman, 486 U.S. at 730-3 1 ("To constitute a violation of the [Constitu
tion] it i s n ot enough that a state court misconstrue the law of another State. Rather,
our cases make plain that the m isconstruction must contradict law of the other S tate
that is c learly established and that has been brought to the court' s attention."); see
also id. at 749 (O' Connor, 1 . , concu rring in part and dissenting in part):
Faced with the constitutional obligation to apply the substantive la w of an
other State, a court that does not l ike that law apparently need take only
two steps in order to avoid applying it. First, invent a legal theory so novel
or strange that the other State has never had an opportun ity to reject it;
then, on the basis of nothing but unsupported speculation, "predict" that the
other State would adopt that theory i f it had the c hance.
!d. at 749 (O' Connor, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); cf Fau ntleroy v.
Lum, 2 1 0 U . S . 230 ( 1 908) (requiri n g e nforcement in M ississippi of a M issouri j udg
ment which misconstrued Mississippi l aw ) .
3 . See, e. g., In re "Agent Orange " Prod. Liab. Litig . , 580 F. S upp. 690
(E.D.N.Y. 1 984) (holding-and with a straight face, mind you-that every state court
which would have been faced with the issue wou ld have fashioned the same rule,
that rul e being that Judge Weinstein should fashion national consensus law, which of
course never existed before he decided to make it up, to govern, as a matter of each
state' s law, the consolidated litigation which was before him).
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diction. It may be that this i s what motivates my brother B ORCHERS
to abandon any l imits on personal j uri sdiction. S i mi l arly, in oral confer
ence, Justice REDISH insisted that the only meaningfu l constraints on
personal j urisdiction should involve inconvenience rather than the sover
eignty and regulatory interest issues that are associated with choice of
law. Such arguments, for weak constraints on personal j urisdiction, do
not assume no constraints on "j urisdiction." Rather, these arguments
assume constraints should be l i mited to choice of law.
Neither on practical policy nor sound theoretical grounds can we
successfully i mpose meaningful j urisdictional l imits solely through after
the-fact choice of l aw review. It i s no accident that our recent choice of
law decisions have approved state choices of law. Without endorsing
the result i n A llstate Ins. Co. v . Hague, 449 U.S. 302 ( 1 98 1 ) , our post
A llstate decisions correctly recognize that the most we can do is i nsist
that the l aw of the chosen state have some connection to the l itigation,4
unless we are willing to define for lower courts what is the correct law
that must be applied to a particular controversy.
We repudiated vested rights as a constitutionally required system
sixty years ago in A laska Packers Assoc. v. Industrial A ccident
Comm 'n, 294 U . S . 5 32 ( 1 93 5 ) , and we proclaimed there that "prima
facie every state i s entitled to enforce i n its own courts i ts own statutes,
lawfully enacted." !d. at 547 . Our Allstate test correctly emphasizes
neither the method by which law is selected nor the c ontent of the l aw
selected, but i nstead demands contacts creating state interests i n the un
derlying litigation. 5 The shape or content of state law i n any case i s
something w e have n o business deciding i n the post-Erie age.
If we try to enforce meaningful j uri sdictional l i mits through choice
of law review, we would find ourselves embroiled in controversies
about the shape and content of state law . We have adopted tests which
rarely reverse determi nations about the content of state law because,
post-Erie, we realize as a part of sound j urisdictional theory that it i s
not our job to second-guess states about the content o f state law. Our
choice of law review is limited to determining only that the state had

4. See, e.g., Shutts, 472 U . S . at 823 ("We make no effort to determine for
ourselves which law must apply to the v arious transactions in volved in this lawsuit,
and we reaffirm our observation i n A llstate that in many situations a state court may
be free to apply one of several choices of law.").
S . See A llstate, 449 U . S. at 3 1 2- 1 3 (" [F]or a State ' s substantive law to be
selected in a constitutionally permissible manner. that State must have a significant
contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state i nterests, such that choice
of its law i s neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.").
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sufficient connection to the litigation so that, in l ine with our pro
nouncement in A laska Packers, the forum state would be entitled to
apply its own law in its own courts to the case before it.
I would ful l y imp lement the implications of A laska Packers, Erie
R. R. v. Tompkins, 304 U . S . 64 ( 1 93 8), and International Shoe Corp. v.
Washington , 326 U . S . 3 1 0 ( 1 945) . We should recognize that the only
meani ngfu l restrictions on j urisdiction are imposed when deciding
whether the court has power to appl y law in the first instance, not after
the court has decided the law it w ishes to appl y . As Shutts and
Wortman demonstrate, it does us l ittle good to proclaim that the court
may not apply its own law to all elements of the litigation before it,
when in that same breath we have told the court that it does have j uris
diction to hear the whole case. Shutts, 472 U . S . at 823 . In our next
breath we cannot remove the j urisdiction we have already granted; so
long as the shape of the l aw which the court has fashioned to fit the
facts before it conforms to some state ' s l aw which has connection to
the l itigation, who are we to tell the court what state law should look
like. Wortman, 486 U.S . at 73 1 ; Shutts, 472 U.S . at 823.
If we would recognize that when we approve "j urisdiction" to hear a
case, we are granting power to that court to fashion law to the facts
before it, we would end these needless charades about choice of law
review . If there was a problem in Shutts or Wortman, it was that we
allowed too much j urisdiction to begin with, not that the c ourt abused
the j urisdiction we allowed it to have. The only issue w e have a right
to review is whether the court has power to appl y law it believes is
appropriate to the litigation before it. When we real ize this truth, we
c an start building a more sensible, unified j urisdiction theory . See gen 
erally Stanley E . Cox, Razing Conflicts Facades to Build Better Juris
diction Theory: The Foundation-There is No Law But Forum Law, 28
Val. U . L. Rev . 1 ( 1 993) (making similar arguments in greater detail ) .
My quarrel with those members o f this Court w h o believe w e
should impose few constitutional constraints o n personal j urisdiction and
worry l ater about choice of law is that later is always too l ate to fix the
j urisdictional problem. The real false lore of "law" school is not the
general/specific dichotomy which my brother WEINTRAUB criticizes,
but that courts and defendants are thought to exist in the abstract rather
than the particular. This "lore" manifests itself in the twin fal se j urisdic
tional beliefs that: 1 ) state substantive law exists as an abstract truth
which any law c lerk can apply to any case, and 2) defendants m ust be
fully j urisdictionally present somewhere for plaintiffs and courts to find
them.
The incorrectness of the first belief bears directl y on why we should
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not approve jurisdiction on any basis other than that the forum will be
applying its law to the controversy before it. As my brother MAIER so
persuasively argues, it is not law books that decide cases, but rather
j udges and j uries . The law is what j udges and j uries hearing actual
cases make it to be in response to those cases. An open-ended grant of
j urisdiction allows enormous forum shopping possibilities which expose
the defendant to multiple interpretations and/or application of l aw . The
forum permitted to take j urisdiction will deci de the l aw of the c ase, and
its decision is never the same as another forum's, regardless of what
"book" law it applies.
The j urisdiction argument is more, however, than the luck of the
draw for j udges within the same courthouse or deciding a venires'
empanel ing. The j udge and j ury hearing a case represent the power of
the government. When the grant of j urisdiction is on the basis of con
venience, presence, or some other non-litigation related factor, we are
pretending that a disinterested state tribunal is nevertheless in a proper
position to decide the parties ' fate .
Perhaps we are so used to thinking that "neutral" means "unbiased,"
and that "unbiased" means "good," that a disinterested panel seems a
good idea. B ut do we really want disinterested courts to exercise their
power agai nst defendants? What should these forums do with the parties
under their control ? Create better law? I am not sure even my brother
BORCHERS wishes to authorize courts anywhere in the nation to take
j urisdiction of any and all cases and create law for any and all contro
versies. Instead, the question we should ask is why a particular forum
should be al lowed to hear a particular case.
Convenience should not create state power to meddle in peoples'
lives via litigation. Because my feilow Justices and academics from
around the country can travel to B oston to attend a conference on j uris
diction does not imply that plaintiffs of any and all types should be
able to litigate against us here. What empowers Massachusetts courts
thus to meddle in our lives? We should examine the suit that a plaintiff
brings to determine whether there is j urisdiction.
As my brother KRAMER has explained, regarding the choice of law
inquiry, the question is whether the plaintiff has brought a suit upon
which a claim for relief can be granted. See Larry Kramer, Rethinking
Choice of Lmv, 90 Colum. L. Rev . 277 ( 1 990). The plaintiff brings a
particular suit, not an abstract assertion. If the plaintiff cannot articulate
a claim with sufficient specificity, we instruct lower federal courts to
throw the suit out. 6 In deciding whether there is "j urisdiction" to hear a
6. I do not mean that the plaintiff must plead particular words, but only that the
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case, we should inquire what the case is about. Otherwise, we create
"super" courts which exist with abstract and undefined power. Our
government, incl uding our courts, should not possess such unlimited and
undefined powers.
Thi s emphasis on limited sovereignty leads necessarily to repudiation
of the second fal se idea about j urisdiction-that defendants must exist
in plenary fashion somewhere for plaintiffs and courts to find them.
This i s the territorialist view of j urisdiction that we rejected i n Interna
tional Shoe. We confirmed i n Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 1 86 ( 1 97 7 ) ,
that the minimum contacts approach t o personal j urisdiction constitutes
a replacement of, rather than j ust a supplement to, territorial j urisdic
tion . See, e.g., Stanley E. Cox, Would that Burnham Had Not Come to
be Done Insane! A Critique of Recent Supreme Court Personal Ju risdic
tion Reasoning, An Explanation of Why Transient Presence Jurisdiction
Is Unconstitutional, and Some Thoughts about Divorce Jurisdiction in a
Minimum Contacts World, 5 8 Tenn. L . Rev. 497 , 503-30 ( 1 99 1 ) . When
Shaffer invalidated a form of territorial j urisdiction, this demonstrated
that territorial j urisdiction can in practice be, and as a matter of sound
j urisdictional theory always is, too inclusive and u ndiscriminating an
exerc ise of governmental power. Shaffe r, 433 U . S . at 2 1 2 n . 39.
The replacement of territorial ity by a more l imited version of state
sovereignty means that forums exerc ise limited, rather than p lenary,
j urisdiction over parties. A person is never fully juri sdictionally present,
preci sely because no government has (or at least no government should
be allowed to have) complete control over a person ' s life. It i s absurd
to uphold a totalitarian view of governmental power in our court system
j ust because we previously thought in territorial terms in Pennoyer v.
Neff, 95 U . S . 7 1 4 ( 1 877) , and never completely recovered from our
j urisdictional mal aise. A person should not be counted present before a
court in abstract or in plenary fashion, but only as the particular suit
gives the forum state legitimacy to intrude on that person ' s life.
The mistake in allowing j urisdiction based on presence, convenience,
or any basis other than l itigation related contacts is that a court is given
the authority to decide something about a party without regard to why
the party is before the court. Territoriality was wrong because it held
people captive without regard to what the suits were about. A more
modern and fair view of j urisdiction is to insist that governments exer
cise their power against persons only when there is a legiti mate reason

claim must be based on some spec i fic allegations which implicate some parl i cular
remedy.
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for doing so. Thi s should mean that the only relevant contacts for deter
mining j urisdiction are the contacts which produced the litigation.
If the practical and theoretical reality is, as argued earlier, that we
cannot tel l courts what law they must apply, then the only meaningful
control we can exercise is that j urisdiction be granted only to courts
which we believe could legitimately apply their substantive law to the
u nderlying controversy. Jurisdiction means giving the court power to
fashion J aw that it believes is most appropriate to the l itigation before
it. We should abandon attempts to have one tribunal do another' s bid
ding or to consolidate actions to a forum which does not have a right
to apply its own substantive l aw . Explaining in sufficient detail why
this insistence on forum law or no law would not create i ntersystem
j udicial paralysis or insensitive parochialism is subject for different
opin ions involving different u nderlying facts. In the instant case, State
Y applied only its own law to Brake-0. The question before us I S
whether State Y had j urisdiction to bind Brake-0 by its law.
Jurisdiction over Brake-0 in State Y was appropriate if State Y
legitimately could exercise its power to hold Brake-0 l i able i n its courts
under S tate Y law for an accident which occuned i n State Y and result
ed in the death of a State Y resident. Survivors claimed that third party
defendant, B rake-0, manufactured a brake component that malfunctioned
in S tate Y and caused Innocent Victim ' s death. A State Y j ury deter
mined that, u nder State Y law, the brake component was defectively
manufactured and that B rake-O ' s action (or inaction) contributed to
plaintiffs ' loss. A j udgment to the tune of a $ 1 ,200,000 w as awarded
against B rake-0. We must determine whether State Y h ad a right th us
to apply its products l iabil ity law against Brake-0.
Arguing i n favor of holding B rake-0 responsible u nder State Y law
is that the defective component which contributed to I nnocent Victim ' s
death i n State Y made its way to State Y because of actions which
were entirely foreseeable by Brake-0, since engaged in by those in the
manufacturing and distribution chain. Designing and marketing these
(albeit standard) components for profit, Brake-0 should not be able to
resist State Y j urisdiction when its parts go where they are intended and
cause h arm at that location. Thi s is not a case where the unilateral acts
of a plaintiff are substituted for a defendant ' s purposeful directedness .
Although component manufacturers are i n a different position from
manufacturers and di stributors of finished products (which is why I
consider this a close call), I conclude they should not be able to hide
behind the manufacturing/di stribution chain when their products cause
harm to innocent victims. The state may apply its law agai nst compo
nent parts manufacturers who are aware that their parts will reach that
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state i n a way the marketers of the fi nished products i ntended.
Accordingly, I agree with my brother WEINTRAUB ' s test for
stream of commerce j urisdiction. A defendant who releases its product
for sale is subj ect to j urisdiction in any state where the product causes
harm (for suits based on that harm) i f the product arrives in that state
via the normal course of commercial distribution or as a result of use
the manufacturer reasonably should have expected. I further agree that
World- Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson , 444 U . S . 2 8 6 ( 1 980),
should be overruled to the extent that it is i nconsistent with thi s test.
II.

" G ENERAL" J URISDICTION TO APPLY STATE Y LAW

I emphasi ze, however, that the above l itigation related contacts are
the only relevant contacts for determining whether State Y may bind
B rake-0 by its law . While the fact that Brake-0 conducts u nrel ated
business in S tate Y may be relevant to defeating B rake-0' s motions for
forum non con ven iens dismissal, or may otherwise show that i t i s not
i nconvenient for Brake-0 to defend suit in State Y once j uri sdiction has
been established, these unrelated contacts cannot substitute for the litiga
tion rel ated contacts that Brake-0 must have with State Y i n order for
j urisdiction to be constitutionally reasonable in the first place. 7
I strongly resist the attempts by some members of this Court to
expand notions of "general" j urisdiction i nto the type of presence based
test which I thought we had rej ected with territoriality when we empha
sized i n International Shoe that the question is not "a little more or a
l i ttle less." International Shoe, 326 U . S . at 3 1 9 . If "general" j urisdiction
is taken to mean that a defendant i s "present" for all purposes, this type
of j urisdiction should be found unconstitutional in a post-territorial,
l imited sovereignty world. B ecause most commentators and courts tend
to v iew "general" j urisdiction as a substitute for the type of all-purpose
j urisdiction which existed under Pennoyer, it would be better to discard
the terminology. Nevertheless, si nce the term seems i ngrained in the
case law to describe situations where the forum adjudicates against a
defendant whose conduct elsewhere produced consequences elsewhere, I
emphasize that constitutionally permissible "general" j urisdiction i s
merely a special application o f the minimum contacts rule that the
forum may apply its own law to a defendant' s conduct which implicates
the state ' s regulatory interests, if that defendant is significantly enough

7 . Language in Burger King supports assertions of j urisdiction u pon a lesser
showing of minimum contacts than would otherw ise be required, when purported
convenience factors are high, see Burger King, 47 1 U . S . at 477, i s accordingly
hereby disapproved.
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connected to the foru m for purposes of the i mmediate l i tigation.8
In "general" j urisdiction situations, the defendant' s contacts are
j udged to be so extensive with the state, and the defendant so closely
identified with the state, that i t i s fair for the state to appl y its substan
tive law against this defendant wherever the defendan t may act. Such
powerful regulatory control should be attempted sparingly, and must
involve some level of voluntary, unique, and open-ended affi liation by a
defendant with the forum such that the defendant can expect such open
ended obligations.
Contrary to some commentators' territorially i nfl uenced assumptions,
there is no need to retain a non-litigation related form of general j uris
diction as an insurance policy to guarantee that plaintiffs can sue defen
dants somewhere. Instead, the question must always be "For what pur
pose are you suing the defendant?" Whoever' s l aws are i mplicated by
the defendant' s actions are the forums with constitutionall y presumptive
right to hail the defendant before their tribunals . U ntil the defendant
does somethi ng which violates laws, there is no right to hail the defen
dant before a tribunal anywhere. States which choose to entertai n suits
based on a theory of "general" j urisdiction shoul d only do so only
when they feel comfortable applying their own substantive l aw to the
conduct of which the plaintiff compl ains.
Brake-O' s distribution of Brakeman products i n State Y, with some
minimal administrative presence in S tate Y rel ated to that and other
Brake-0 operations, hardly entitles State Y to apply its laws against
Brake-0 for any and all actions which might occur elsewhere. State Y
may not constitutionally assert "general" j urisdiction over Brake-0. The
fact that its tribunals always have fel t comfortable asserting j uri sdiction
over corporations which do significant business in State Y reveals that
State Y should rethink and u nderstand how j urisdiction constitutionall y
should proceed.

8. Such view of "gen eral" j urisdiction m ight cause us to rethink our analysis,
though not necessarily our holding in Perkins v. Benguet CollSol. Mining Co. , 342
U . S . 437 ( 1 952). S i nce the litigation-rel ated contacts i n that case occurred before the
defendant had established systematic and continuous contacts with Ohio, for Ohio to
assert j uri sdiction over the defendant, under my view of "general j urisdiction," means
that it is fair for a forum with which a defendant uniquely, strongly, and voluntari ly
affi l iates, to hold that defe ndant responsible u nder foru m Jaw for prior actions else
where. Because I believe a "general" j urisdiction forum may indeed l egi timately exer
cise such power, I believe any exercise of "general" j urisdiction must be tightly
reined in .
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(affirming)

I am happy to concur in the result reached in this case b y my
brothers COX and WEINTRAUB . The cause of action and the defen
dant are sufficiently related to the forum to j ustify an exerci se of j uris
diction over the defendant. But their opinions (and others) in this case
raise the question of whether this forum can exercise what w e have
called "general j urisdiction"-j urisdiction j ustified by a continuing rela
tionship between the defendant and the forum state u nrelated to the
genesis of thi s cause of action.
Because I believe that thi s Court' s continuing adherence to the con
cept of general j urisdiction is i ncorrect in the l ight of the poli c ies re
flected i n the line of cases beginning with International Shoe Corp. v.
Washington, 326 U . S . 3 1 0 ( 1 945), I feel compelled to addres s that issue
separately. In that context, I would add my specific disagreement with
my brother WEINTRAUB ' s conclusion that our c ases on this subject
are unintelligible. In my v iew, they would make perfect good sense, if
their logic were followed consistently by thi s Court. A preliminary
review of our most i mportant cases in this l ine will be helpfu l .
The principal test t o determine the validity o f the exercise o f j udi
cial j urisdiction remai ns, of course, the test articulated by this Court i n
International Shoe. There, w e held that whether a state could properly
exercise j urisdiction over a defendant would be determined "according
to our traditional conception of fair play and substantial j ustice." Inter
national Shoe, 326 U . S . at 320. That determ ination woul d be made by
examining "the quality and nature of the acti vity [within the forum
state] in rel ation to the fair and orderly admini stration of the laws
which it was the purpose of the due process clause to i nsure." !d. at
3 1 9. That conclusion was informed by the recognition that the concept
of corporate "presence," reflected in the rubric "doing business," was a
legal fiction. /d. at 3 1 6.
Thus, after International Shoe, j uri sdiction, based on the physical
presence of the defendant i n the forum state, Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U . S .
7 1 4, 7 3 3 ( 1 877), w a s no longer defi nitive with respect t o j urisdiction
over corporations . This power theory of j urisdiction became i mpractical
i n light of the "increasing nationalization of commerce" during the
*
Harold G . M aier: Profe ssor of Law and holder of the David Danie ls Allen
Distinguished Chair i n Law, Vanderbilt U ni versity School of Law. Professor Maier's
research was supported by a summer research gran t from Vanderbilt U n i versity
School of Law.

Spring, 1 995]

CASE THREE

653

Twentieth Century. McGee v. International Life Ins. Co. , 355 U. S . 220,
222-23 ( 1 957). Therefore, beginning w ith International Shoe, this Court
undertook to determine, under the fundamental fairness principle, wheth
er assertions of j udicial j urisdiction w ith respect to a given set of facts
i s due procedure within the meaning of the Due Process C lauses of the
United States Constitution. U . S . Const. amends . V and XIV.
We refined the fair play and substantial j ustice test by identifying
various relationships between the defendant and the forum state from
which the fairness of the exercise of j udicial j urisdiction could be in
ferred. The test could be met when the cause of action had a s ufficient
ly reasonable rel ationship to the forum state making it fair to bring the
defendant i nto that j urisdiction, International Shoe, 326 U . S . at 3 1 7, or
by the defendant' s purposeful availment of the legal system of the
forum state . McGee, 355 U . S . at 220; see Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U . S .
2 3 5 , 25 3 ( 1 95 8 ) .
Despite the rationale o f International Shoe, thi s Court mai ntained the
fiction of corporate "location" within the forum as suffi cient to leg iti
mize the exercise of j udicial j urisdiction. Thus, continuous and system
atic busi ness activity within a state, unrelated to the cause of action,
remained sufficient to support such j urisdiction. Perkins v. Benguet
Canso/. Mining Co. , 342 U . S . 437 , 445 ( 1 952). In Shaffer v. Heitner,
433 U . S . 1 86 ( 1 977), we consolidated multiple categories of j urisdic
tional characterizations-in personam, in rem, quasi-in-rem-into a
single test of fairness. We held that thereafter the validity of all asser
tions of j udicial j urisdiction would be determined by examining the
relationship between the defendant, the forum, and the cause of action
under the fairness and j ustice test of International Shoe. Shaffer, 433
U.S . at 207 . But see Burnham v . Superior Court, 495 U . S . 604, 62 1 -22
( 1 990) . 1
Later cases illustrate that identification of relevant, significant con
tacts to determine j udicial j urisdiction i s only one means of determining
whether trying the c ase i n that forum i s unfair to the defendant.2 In
World- Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 ( 1 9 80) , l ack of

1 . I n Helicopteros Nacionales d e Colombia, S.A . v . Hall, 466 U . S . 408 ( 1 984), we
made it c lear that the availab ility of a forum anywhere in the world would make it
unnecessary to consider whether t h i s Court should designate a forum i n t he U nited
States as acceptable solely on grounds of necessity. ld. at 4 1 9 n. 1 3 ; cf Shaffer v.
Heitner, 433 U. S . 1 86, 1 99 n . l 7 ( 1 977).
2. The fairness to the plaintiff of the forum selected i s not a due process
concern because it is the plaintiff who chooses the forum in the first place. Rush v.
Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 3 3 2 ( 1 980).
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reasonable foreseeability that the defendant might be hailed i nto a given
forum w as a sign of possible unfairness. !d. at 295-98. More i mportant
ly, we pointed out that even though contacts that would satisfy due
process concerns in other cases may exist, the special circumstances of
a case may make the exercise of j udicial j urisdiction by that same fo
rum unfair.
Even if the defendant would suffer minimal or no inconvenience from
being forced to l itigate before the tribunals of another State; even i f the
forum State has a strong interest in applying its l aw to the controvers y ;
even i f the forum S tate i s the most convenient location for l itigation,
the Due Process C lause. acting as an instrument of i nterstate federal
ism, may sometimes act to divest the S tate of its power to render a
valid j udgment.

!d. at 294 (citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U . S . 235, 25 1 ( 1 9 5 8 ) ) .
Thus, w e recogni zed that dueness o f process depended n o t only o n
the defendant' s relationship with the forum state, but also upon the
appropriate allocation of decision making authority among the states,
recognizing a direct relationship between i ndividual l iberty values and
the policy of local self-government that informs the federal structure. !d.
Two years l ater, we noted this rel ationship specifically i n Insurance
Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U . S . 694
( 1 98 2 ) : "The restriction on state sovereign power described i n World
Wide Volkswagen Corp . . . must be seen as ultimately a function of
the i ndividual l iberty interest preserved by the Due Process Clause . " !d.
at 702-03 n . l O. We confirmed that relationship in Keeton v. Hustler
Magazine, Inc. , 465 U . S . 770 ( 1 984) and Burger King Corp. v.
Rudzewicz, 47 1 U . S . 462, 472 n . l 3 ( 1 985 ) .3
In Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U . S . 1 02 ( 1 987),
we weighed the defendant' s burden of appearing i n the forum against
the foru m ' s interests in adj udicating the case and noted a direct p arallel
between the values of the federal system that informed our j udgment i n
World- Wide Volkswagen and the international system values o f the
world community that informed our j udgment i n Asahi. Asahi, 480 U . S .
at 1 1 5 .
The principal concern i n each o f these cases i s fairness to the corpo
rate defendant whether measured by interest in avoiding undue surprise,
i nterest in reaping the benefits of local self-government reflected in the
.

3 . These "liberty val ues" of federalism protected by the Due Process C l ause of
the United States Constitution, Amendments V and XIV, should be distinguished from
the "governmental structure" values of federalism, protected by the Ful l Faith and
Credit Clause of the United States Constitution, Article IV, section 1 . See A llstate
Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 320-32 ( 1 9 8 1 ) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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federal system, or i nterest in having the case adjudicated in a forum
with which the defendant and the cause of action have minimal signifi
cant contacts. The key question in all of these due process cases re
mains w hether the defendant will receive fair p lay and substantial jus
tice through the fair and orderly administration of the laws. This stan
dard has not changed. It is the defendant' s rights that the Due Process
Clause protects ; and it protects the general public interest in preserving
the values of local self-government that inform the federal system when
it does so.
The continued recognition of the concept of general j urisdiction run s
directly counter t o the proposition that the case against a defendant
should not be tried in a forum having no relationship to the cause of
action that is the subject of the suit.4 Any attempt to determine whether
a given forum meets the "fair play and substantial j ustice" test of Inter
nationa l Shoe must reject the fantasy of "corporate presence" in favor
of the recognition of certain i ncontrovertible real world facts. It is the
result in a given case that may be unfair to a defendant, not the words
that are used to justify that result. If the Due Process Clause is de
signed to protect a defendant against u nfairness, it cannot do so unless
all the attributes of a particular forum that i nfluence the results in a
case, and therefore, the relationship of the defendant' s acts to that fo
rum, are taken into account.
The l oc ation of the forum will always i nfluence the outcome of a
lawsuit tried there. Furthermore, different forums will influence the
outcome of a lawsuit differently . The precise impact of that influence
on the suit' s outcome may be difficult or even impossible to determine
in advance; but the fact of i nfluence is incontrovertible. Thi s i s so
because human beings, not rules of law or mechanical formula, decide
lawsuits and the acts of human bei ngs are always influenced by the
environment in which those acts are committed. See H arold G. Maier,
Baseball and Chicken Salad: A Realistic Look at Choice of Law , 44
Vand. L. Rev . 827 , 829 ( 1 99 1 ) . This is no less true for j udges than for
any one else.5 Therefore, the political and social attributes of the forum

4. I n Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U . S . 604 ( 1 990), Justice Scalia concluded
that presence of a defendant within a forum state had always been sufficient to jus
tify the exercise of j udicial j urisdiction; therefore, such presence necessari l y met the
"traditional notions of fair play and substantial j ustice." !d. at 6 1 9 (Scalia, J . ) ; see
International Shoe Corp. v. Washington, 326 U . S . 3 1 0, 320 ( 1 945). But, at least with
respect to corporations, International Shoe c learly rejected the "presence'' test and, by
logic and i mp lication, general j uri sdiction as well. See Shaffer. 433 U . S . at 2 1 6.
5 . "Rules are not self-applying but are wielded by people acting as decision
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as well as its geographical location will necessarily influence the w ay i n
which legal norms are interpreted and appl ied.
The acts of the defendant, not its "corporate personality," c reate the
cause of action that the forum w i l l try . To determine the legal results to
be attached to those acts in a place u nrelated to them is an egregious
form of u nfairness. Thi s effect can not be resolved solely b y careful
choice of law or by application of the principle of forum non conveni
ens, when the relevant differences that affect the total result in the c ase
may have l ittle to do with either the local l aw rules adopted by the
court or the convenience of the parties.
Relevant differences among forums that i nfluence the results i n cases
include the following: juries or j udges may have a propensity to award
different levels of recovery in similar c ases depending upon the political
and social setting i n which the case i s tried; the requirements of forum
rules of evidence may be more advantageous to one side than to the
other; the amount of attorney ' s fees permitted or awarded may be l arger
or smaller in some forums than in others (this may be especially impor
tant when the only other forum available is in a civil law country in
which contingent fees are usuall y nonexistent and attorneys fees are
limited by statute) ; local attitudes toward particular corporate or individ
ual defendants may i nfluence the result in the case; local attitudes to
ward the type of cause of action may i nfluence the result in the case;
and the quality of the bench and bar may vary significantl y among
available forums.
Influences like those above are present wherever a case is tried. 6 A
choice among forums chooses among these result-affecting attributes as
well as among possible choice of law rules or distances to be traveled
by parties and witnesses. Seeking to take advantage of these differences
is the essence of forum shopping.
Given the strength, multiplicity, and, i n some instances, u np redict
abi l ity of these l ocal i nfluences, j urisdictional rules shoul d be designed
and interpreted at least to assure that a case will be heard in a forum
whose political and social context is rel ated to the events in the case, 7

makers." Myres S . McDougal & W. M ichael Reisman, International Law in Contem
porary Perspective: The Public Order of the World Commun ity 5 ( 1 9 8 1 ) .
6 . See Jerome Frank, Preface t o Sixth Printing, Law and the Modern Mind
( 1 949) ; cf Andreas F. Lowenfeld & L inda J. S i l berman, Choice of Law and the
Supreme Court: A Dialogue Inspired by A llstate Insurance Co. v. Hague, 1 4 U.C.
Davis L. Rev. 84 1 , 847-48 ( 1 98 ! ) .
7 . Thi s may, i n fact , be the principal justifi cation for rules limiting j udicial
j urisdiction. See Wendy Collins Perdue. Personal Jurisdicrion and the Beetle in the
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not one that is solely the domicile of the defendant or a place where
the defendant does business unrelated to the cause of action. In thi s
way, all o f the relevant i nfluences on t h e result of the case, not solely
those addressed by choice of law rules or considerations of geographic
i nconvenience, are more l ikely to be related to the defendant' s acts that
generated the cause of action that is subject to the foru m' s adj udication.
Justice WEINTRAUB i s absolutely correct when he points out that
the terms "specific j urisdiction" and "general j urisdiction" characterize
opposite ends of a dichotomy . For this very reason these characteriza
tions are an inadequate guide to protecting the defendant ' s due process
rights to fair play and substantial j ustice. Automatic refusal to consider
case-specific elements related to the propriety of the forum selected by
the plaintiff ignores the fundamental premises of International Shoe and
the cases that have fol lowed it. Mere recitation of the mantra, forum
non conveniens or mechanical reference to the forum court ' s abi lity to
choose relevant legal rules from other j urisdictions will not resolve this
i mportant i ssue. 8
Although I certainly would not attribute this sentiment to my col
leagues on this bench, one cannot help but believe that insistence on
preserving the availability of general j urisdiction to permi t plaintiffs to
shop for favorable forums stems from an unarticulated premise that
corporate defendants should always be l i able for i nj uries caused by their
products, regardless of actual fault. Therefore, any j urisdictional system
that contributes to that plaintiff-favoring result is j ustified. If thi s i nsur
ance principle i s the social policy that supports maintenance of the
general j urisdiction concept, this Court should not partici pate in perpetu
ating that masquerade. Let us either overtly adopt that principle; or
cease applying it without accurate analysis and identification.
I, for one, believe that procedural fair play and substantial justice
are equal rights of both plaintiffs and defendants. Procedural rules
should not be u sed to mask an i napposite social policy designed to

L . Rev. 529, 5 7 1 ( 1 99 1 ) .
8. This unfortunate tendency to lump all considerations concerning u n fairness to
the defendant under the general heading of forum non conveniens may have its roots
in a doctrinal strain in the International Shoe opinion that discussed comparative
inconvenience of available forums. The Court ' s failure to give any serious attention
to these concerns in Kulka v . Superior Court, 436 U.S. 84 ( 1 978) and World- Wide
Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286 ( 1 980), make it clear that inconvenience of
forum is not the sole consideration i n determining whether the defe ndant can rece ive
fair play and substantial justice in the forum that the plaintiff has selected . See
Harold G. M aier & Thomas R. McCoy, A Unifying Theon for Judicial Jurisdiction
and Choice of Law, 39 A m . J. Comp. L. 249, 270 ( 1 99 1 ).
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favor the former while avoiding discussion and evaluation of that
policy' s broader economic and social i mplications. I would abolish the
principle of general j urisdi ction as a means for determining the due
process rights of defendants. To the extent that Burnham i s i nconsistent
with this conclusion, I would overrule it.
The j udgment below is affirmed.
* * *

MULLENIX,

1.* :

(affirming)
I.

I concur with my colleagues that the state constitutional l y may
assert personal j urisdiction over Brake-0 and would affirm the S tate Y
S upreme Court j udgment. I write only to suggest that the Court may re
solve this case comfortabl y w ithi n existing doctrine, without need to
further expand, clarify, modify , or reverse existing precedent .
This case i nvolves a Korean corporate defendant and therefore Asahi
Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court, 480 U . S . 1 02 ( 1 987), provides the
due process considerations for a state' s assertion of personal j urisdiction
over a foreign corporate defendant. However, although Asahi embodies
essentially a cautious approach i n such circumstances, this c ase is suffi
ciently distingui shable as to mitigate any foreign policy concerns evi
dent i n Asahi.
Foremost, the California plaintiff in Asahi settled his claims against
the foreign defendants, leaving only an indemnification cross-claim
between two foreign corporate defendants, Cheng Shin and Asah i . As
Justice O ' Connor' s opinion suggests, Cali fornia' s legitimate i nterest i n
that dispute was then diminished considerably (if not fatall y ) . Asahi,
480 U . S . at 1 1 4. B y contrast, the i nj ured plaintiff in thi s c ase went to
trial and received a favorable verdict. S ince the structure of the l awsuit
remained i ntact, the state retai ned an undiminished interest i n protecting
its citizen .
Moreover, i n order to constitutionall y assert j urisdiction over B rake0, I do not believe that Brake-0' s actions need be measured against a
standard of "purposeful direction towards the forum state" or any show
ing of "additional conduct." Asah i, 480 U.S . at 1 1 2. But even under

*
Linda S. Mullenix: Bernard 1. Ward Centennial Professor of Law, Uni versity
of Texas Law Schoo l ; Visiting Professor, Harvard Law School, 1 994-9 5 ; B . A . , 1 97 1 ,
The City College of New York; M . Phi l . , 1 974, Ph.D., 1 977, Col umbia U n i versity;
J.D. , 1 980, Georgetown University Law Center.

Spring, 1 995]

CASE THREE

659

these heightened stream of commerce standards, there seems to be more
purposeful affiliating conduct than in Asahi. Thus, Brake-0 admitted i t
knew its component parts would b e used i n Fishfins, l arge n umbers of
which wind up in the state . B y contrast, Asahi ' s president declared i n
a n affidavit that the corporation never contempl ated that its limited sales
of valves to Cheng Shin in Taiwan would subject it to l awsuit in Cali
fornia.
II.
I also agree with m y colleagues who urge that some generali zed rule
of reasonableness should govern assertions of personal j urisdiction.
Justice Brennan ' s concurrence i n Asahi supplies such a standard. Thi s
standard requires only a showi ng of "regular and anticipated flow of
products from manufacture to distribution to retail sale," Asahi, 480
U . S . at 1 1 7 (Brennan, J., concurri ng), which i s met on these facts. ("As
long as a p artici pant in thi s process i s aware that the final product i s
being marketed i n the forum S tate, the possibility o f a lawsuit there
cannot come as a surprise.") !d. at 1 1 7 .
In addition, w e need not set forth any new stream o f commerce
theory because this case basically satisfies the analytical factors set forth
i n World- Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U . S . 286 ( 1 980)
(burden on the defendant, i nterests of the forum state, plaintiff' s interest
in obtai ning rel ief, the i nterstate j udicial system' s interest in obtaining
the most efficient resolution of controversies, and the shared interests of
the several states in furthering fundamental substantive policies). 1
A consideration of these factors suggests that the burden on Brake-0
to defend this lawsuit probably is somewhat equivalent to that of Asahi,
although B rake-0 has a greater presence i n State Y than Asahi did in
California. Brake-0 conducted legal business i n State Y, including but
not l i mited to contract negotiations. Thus, Brake-0 probably has a weak
claim to being unfami l iar with either the state law or the American
legal system.
As indicated above, State Y has an interest in the liti gation and i n
protecting i t s citizens from t h e i nj urious conduct o f non-resident domes
tic or foreign defendants. Certainly this i nterest is greater than in Asahi,
i n which California arguably had l i ttle or no i nterest i n an i ndemnity

l . With due respect to my colleagues, this case does not seem to cry out for
overturning World- Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson , 444 U.S. 286 ( 1 980), or for over
ruling the entire body of minimum contacts due process jurisprudence articulated by
this Court in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 3 26 U.S. 3 1 0 ( 1 945 ) , and its
numerous progeny.
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action involving two foreign c orporations.
The inj ured plai ntiff definitely has an interest i n adj udicating his
claims in state cou rt, an interest also absent i n Asahi. Moreover, as my
colleagues sensibly suggest, i f the plai ntiffs here are unable to legiti
mately assert j urisdiction over B rake-0, these inj ured plaintiffs essential
ly will be left w ithout a forum and remedy.
The same interstate considerations that informed the Court in Asahi
are present here. In that case, the Court ' s sensitivity to international and
foreign policy i mplications mitigated against the state' s legitim ate asser
tion of personal j urisdiction. B u t Justice 0' Connor' s opinion also coun
seled that in assessing these shared i nterstate interests, each case is best
served "by a careful inquiry i nto the reasonableness of the assertion of
j urisdiction in the particular c ase," Asahi, 480 U . S . at 1 1 5 , weighing
burdens on the defendant against interests of the plaintiffs or the forum
state. S ince the plaintiffs ' and forum state ' s interests loom l arge here
and were de min imis in Asahi, J ustice O ' Connor' s balancing approach
favors the state ' s assertion of personal j urisdiction in thi s particular
case.
Considering the great i nterests of the inj ured plaintiffs and the forum
state, balanced against the burden on the defendant, and considering the
international context, the state ' s exercise of personal j urisdiction over
B rake-0 woul d not be unreasonable or unfair.
III.
Because this case may be resolved under the standards set forth in
Asahi and World- Wide Volkswagen, it does not seem necessary to ex
amine whether the state ' s assertion of j urisdiction is supportable u nder
either a theory of general j urisdiction" or specific j urisdiction . 3 See

2. The state court's assertion of personal j urisdiction probabl y i s sustainable
under general j urisdiction standards. B rake-0 basically has more affi l iating contacts
with the state than certain l y Asahi had with Cali fornia (such as personnel and con
tract negotiations within the state), but it is a closer call whether B rake-0 has more
affi l iating contacts than Helical with Texas. See Helicopteros Nacionales de Colum
bia, S.A . v. Hall, 466 U . S . 408 ( 1 984 ). In this litigation, the underlying tort occurred
in the state, B rake-0 has a corporate presence (personnel) and sales i n the state,
conducted contract negotiations in the state, deri ved income from its activ i ties i n the
state, and arguably enjoyed the benefits and protections of the state. Additionally,
u n l i ke Helicopteros, the plaintiffs were domiciled in the forum.
3. The underlying record gives no indication whether this state or federal c ircuit
endorses any speci fic j urisdiction standard (e.g. , a "related to," "but for." or "ari sing
out of' test). While some federal circuits endorse various speci fic j urisdiction
standards, the Supreme Court has yet to endorse any particular form u l ation and
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Helicopteros Nacionales de Colombia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U . S . 408
( 1 9 84).
Affirmed.
* * *
S ILBERMAN, J. * :

(affirming)

The j udgment below i s affirmed.
The chaotic state of j urisdictional theory i n the U ni ted States i s
apparent when one employs t h e doctrinal analysis prompted by this case
instead of relying on common sense.
The foreign defendant here, Brake-0, has sales of 30 m i l l ion dollars
in the United States and State Y is one of Brake-0 ' s l arger Uni ted
States markets for its general products. State Y is also a convenient
forum for l itigation since it is the place where the accident occurred.
On w hat basis then does B rake-0 resist j urisdiction? B rake-O ' s
argument stems i n part from the fact that with respect to a product
l iability claim such as this, j urisdiction is determined on the basis of the
defendant' s relationship to an indiv idual state and not the United States
as a whole. Recently, a different standard has been adopted for the fed
eral courts when federal claims are asserted against foreign defendants
not subject to the j urisdiction of any one state. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
4(k)(2). In such a case, j uri sdiction anywhere i n the United States i s
constitutional i f the foreign defendant h a s sufficient aggregate contacts
with the United States.
Although it would be inappropriate to create by j udicial fiat a "na
tional" standard for asserting j urisdiction over foreign defendants , it
would be w ise for Congress to take up that task and revi si t the issue of
j urisdiction over foreign defendants for all types of c laims (both state
and federal) and legislate standards for j urisdiction to be applied in both
state and federal courts. See Linda J. Silberman, Developments in Juris
diction and Forum Non Conveniens in International Litigation:
Thoughts on Reform and a Proposal for a Uniform Standard, 28 Tex.

indeed has twice left t h i s question open for future determination. See Carnival Cruise
v.
Shute, 499 U .S. 5 8 5 , 5 89 ( 1 99 1 ) (declining to address constitutional
due process i ssue when n arrower contract ground for decision available); Helicopteros,
466 U . S . at 4 1 5 n . l 0. I n this case, the Court should again avoid addressing the
validity or consequences of the distinction among forms of specific j urisdiction, since
the issue has not been presented on the facts or prevail i ng law.
*
Li nda J . S i lberman: Professor of Law, New Yark University School of Law;
B .A . University of M ichigan, 1 965 ; J .D. Uni versity of M ichigan, 1 968.
Lines, Inc.
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Int ' l L.J. 50 1 , 5 1 3- 1 6 ( 1 993). S uch a statute could bring some predict
abi lity to the field of j urisdiction by setting forth more precise rules for
the exercise of j urisdiction. S uch rules should be based on the foreign
defendant' s activities with the United States as a whole. Unwitting or
unknowing defendants can be protected by l imiting jurisdiction in p rod
uct l iability cases to defendants who i nj ure U ni ted States claimants i n
the U ni ted States when the foreign defendants "knew o r reasonably
should have known that a product would be i mported for sale or use i n
the United States."' A monetary or quantitative amount o f business
could also be i ncluded in such a statute to protect those foreign defen
dants whose products have only sporadi c use in the United States. The
courts in the state where the i nj ury occurs should be the appropriate
venue for any such action, thus eliminating the possibility of w i despread
forum shopping by an i njured plai ntiff and assuring that the action i s
brought i n a forum convenient for l itigation .
In the i nstant case, a similar result can be achieved u nder existing
doctrinal framework, but not without something of a struggle. The
spl intered opinion by this Court i n A sahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior
Court, 480 U . S . 1 02 ( 1 987), leaves open the question of w hether a
foreign manufacturer has to do something more than just put its compo
nent part into the stream of commerce i n order to meet the "minimum
contacts" threshold required by our cases.2 The present case also adds a
particular wrinkle i n that the specific component part causing the i nj ury
was i ncorporated into a product sold in another state. 3 In addition,

I . Cf S. 1 996, I OOth Cong., I st Sess. ( 1 987) (Bill proposing personal j urisdic
tion over Citizens or Subj ects of Foreign States in Certain Actions ) .
2 . Lower courts have continued t o struggle w i t h t h e issue in t h e aftermath o f
Asahi. Compare Barone v . Rich Bros. Interstate Display Fireworks Co. , 25 F. 3 d 6 1 0
( 8th Cir. 1 994) (Japanese manufacturer of fireworks-who used a network o f United
States distributors to p lace its products in the stream of commerce i n the Mid
west-was subject to j urisdiction in Nebraska where plaintiff was i njured) and
Beverly Hills Fan Co. v. Royal Sovereign Corp . , 2 1 F.3d 1 558 (Fed. Cir. 1 994)
(Taiwanese defendant subject to j urisdiction in Virginia in patent infringement action
where defendant sold fans to New Jersey company who in tum distributed them to
other United States retailers) with Fa/kirk Mining Co. v. Japan Steel Works, Ltd. , 906
F.2d 369 (8th Cir. 1 990) (Japanese manufacturer of single component part not subject
to jurisdiction where its product was incorporated by a third party into a piece of
equipment and sold to plaintiff in forum state).
3 . However, other cars incorporating B rake-O ' s component appear to be sold i n
State Y . Thus, t h is case is n ot like World- Wide Volkswagen v. Woodson, 444 U . S .
286 ( 1 980), where t h e N e w York distri butor a n d New York dealer did not distribute
to the forum state ' s market at all. Cf Vermeulen v. Renault U. S.A., Inc. , 985 F.2d
1 534 ( l i th Cir. 1 993), cert. denied, 1 1 3 S. Ct. 2334 ( 1 993) (Georgia as the p lace of

Spring, 1 995]

CASE THREE

663

Asahi 's i ntroduction of a formal second tier of "reasonableness" brings
i nto play a myriad of other concerns, such as whether there are particu
lar burdens for a South Korean defendant responding in an American
court.4
On these facts, however, the outcome is c lear. Under either Justice
O ' Connor' s or Justice B rennan ' s view in Asahi, B rake-O ' s high volume
of sales should provide sufficient contacts when the claim arises out of
an i nj ury i n the state, and the defendant engages in additional activity
that takes advantage of the forum state ' s market. Nor does there appear
to be anything "unreasonable" about exercising j urisdiction over Brake0. Unlike Asahi, claims brought by the resident plaintiff against a num
ber of defendants did not settle; thus S tate Y is a forum i n which all
parties to the dispute should be joined in a single trial. In addition,
Brake-0 appears to have other connections with State Y . A lthough I
would not go so far as to rely on a theory of general j urisdiction i n
asserti ng j urisdiction over Brake-0 (i. e. , the case might well b e decided
differently i n the absence of the accident i n S tate Y, cf Helicopteros
Nacionales de Columbia, S.A. v. Hall, 466 U . S . 408 ( 1 984)), Brake-O ' s
other activities are not t o be ignored i n assessing either Brake-0 ' s con
tacts with State Y or the reasonableness of the assertion of j urisdiction.
As Justice WEINTRAUB has already observed, the concepts of general
and specific j urisdiction are not necessarily hard and fast categories. At
the same time, however, there is a need to develop better criteria for
identifying where a defendant may be sued without regard to the nature
of the claim. Unlike Justice WEINTRAUB, I do not thi nk the activities
of Brake-0 do or should satisfy such a "general j urisdiction" require
ment. I would endorse something closer to the English rule that requ ires
an overseas company to "establish a p lace of business" within the coun
try for it to be subject to the exercise of general j urisdiction .5

accident permitted t o assert j urisdiction over foreign c a r manufacturer where distribu
tion network exi sted i n Georgia but was unconnected to the plaintiff' s claim since
the car had been purchased elsewhere).
4. The addition of a separate "reasonab leness" tier has been subj ect to substan
tial criticism. See, e. g. , Linda Silberman, Reflections on Burnham v. Superior Court:
Toward Presumptive Rules of Jurisdiction and Implications for Choice of Law, 2 2
Rutgers L ..J. 569, 576-83 ( 1 99 1 ) ; Stephen B . B u rbank, Practice a n d Procedure: The
World in Our Courts, 89 Mich. L . Rev. 1 456, 1 470 ( 1 99 1 ) ; Russe l l J. Weintraub,
Asahi Sends Personal Jurisdiction Down the Tubes, 2 3 Tex. Int' l L .J. 5 5 , 62-63
( 1 98 8 ) .
5 . See, e.g., Sowh India Shipping Corp.

v.

Export-Import Bank of Korea, [ 1 985]
I W.L.R. 585 (CA) ; see also A. V. Dicey & J. H . C. Morris, The Conflict of Laws

306-08 (Lawrence Collins, ed., 1 2th ed. 1 993).
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One last cautionary note : The only issue we decide here today is
one of personal j urisdiction . It is entirely possible that at a l ater time
we might also find application of State Y ' s law appropriate depending
upon the particular issue. B ut the two questions are different, and Jus
tice COX' s attempt to equate them is u nfortunate. Different consider
ations come into p lay with respect to choice of law than for j urisdic
tion, and even when it is appropriate to require a defendant to res pond
in the American forum, it may be nonetheless inappropriate to impose
Americ an standards of liability . I n the context of the international com
munity, it is i nteresting to note that the j urisdictional reach under Eng
lish Order 1 1 (Rules of the Supreme Court (England) Order 1 1 , Rule 1
( 1 ) ( 1 995)) and B russels Convention (Convention on Jurisdiction and
the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial M atters, EC
O.J. c . l 89 (28 July 1 990)) is often more expansive than that of the
United States. And yet, it is American j u risdiction that is so often com
plained about. Certainly, some of that critique has to do with obj ections
to American-style discovery, large j ury verdicts, and contingent fees.
But much of the unhappiness is directed to the perceived view that an
invitation to litigation in an American court may mean an u nfai r asser
tion of American law. Rules which secure convenience of litigation do
not necessaril y take account of the competing interests with respect to
the applicable l aw . Those i ssues remain for another day.
* * *
WEINTRAUB , J. * : (affirming)
Affirmed. A court sitting in State Y may constitutionally exercise
personal j urisdiction over B rake-0.
At l ast, a chance to cleanse the Augean Stables of our personal
j urisdiction leavings. We h ave constitutionalized personal j urisdiction.
Instead of this freeing our courts to experiment within broad boundaries
of civilized reasonableness, in our hands it has imposed restraints that
suggest travel and communication are becoming increasingly more, not
less, difficult.
I . SPECIFIC JURISDICTION AND STREAM OF C OMMERCE
I will divide my analysis u nder the headings of "specific" and "gen*
Russell J. Weintraub: Professor of Law and holder of the John B. Connal ly
Chair i n Civil Jurisprudence, University of Texas at Austin School of Law. Author of
Commentary on the Conflict of Laws (3d ed. 1 986, 1 99 1 supp.); International Litiga

tion and A rbitration ( 1 994 ) .
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era!" jurisdiction, but this should not signal some sharp division be
tween the two. These are analytical tools that lose their utility if we
treat them as ends in themselves. Some l awyers and j udges may have
been brainwashed in law school into thinking that there is a bright line
dividing these two concepts, but that is not the way the world works.
Common sense suggests that specific and general j urisdiction are oppo
site poles of a spectrum of fact situations. At the extreme specific end,
for example, a nonres ident motorist who drives in the state only once
and hits a pedestrian, we properly insist that the action ari se out of that
single contact. At the general j urisdiction end, a defendant who is domi
ciled or h as a principal place of business in the forum, we i nvite the
afflicted of the world to come with their distant complaints, subj ect to a
wise use of forum non conveniens. The vast number of cases i n the
middle ranges of this spectrum properly receive different treatment. The
less the cause has to do with events in the forum, the more additional
forum contacts should exist. The more the action arises out of or is
related to acts or consequences i n the forum, the less the requirement
for additional nexus between forum and defendant.
Even this may not be sensible enough. For interstate suits, particu
larly suits involving companies whose commercial activities are far
ranging and are likely to be represented by an insurer doing bus iness in
all states, perhaps any forum with an interest in providing a remedy to
the plaintiff should have j urisdiction over the defendant, subj ect to a
cogent showing of unfairness . S uch unfairness would include choice of
a forum for its lunatic contlict of laws rule-such as the now abrogated
Mi ssi ssippi rule that regarded its tort statute of limitations, longest in
the states, as "procedural . " 1 For international suits, such as this one, a
decent respect for friendly foreign countries requires that the defendant
have some contact with the United States, not any individual state, that
makes it reasonable u nder the c ircumstances to order the foreigner to
appear and defend here. This idea has received l imited and halting
recognition in Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(k)(2), which took effect on December

I . Mississippi was a target forum because it had a six-year tort limitations
period and regarded l i mi tations as "procedural" so that the M ississippi period applied
to any suit brought i n M ississippi , even though the i njury occurred in a state with a
shorter period that had run before suit i n Mississippi. See Ferens v. John Deere Co. ,
494 U.S. 5 1 6 ( 1 990). Mississippi has shortened its tort l imitations to 3 years (Miss.
Code Ann. � 1 5- 1 -49 ( S upp. 1 994)) and has passed a ''borrowi ng" statute that would
app ly the shorter statute of l i mitations of the place where the cause of action ''ac
crued" if the plaintiff were not a M i ssissippi resident (Miss. Code Ann. § 1 5 - 1 -65
(Supp. 1 994 ) ) .
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1 , 1 99 3 . For federal law claims, that rule permits accumulatin g n ational
contacts. It does so, however, in a manner that exhibits an unexpected
sense of humor. As a condition precedent, the defendant must "not [be]
subject to the j urisdiction of the courts of general jurisdiction of any
state." !d. This puts the plaintiff in the position of contending that it
could not get j urisdiction over the defendant i n a state court, and the
defendant in the posture of saying "yes you could." Marvelous . This
undoubtedly is a result of tracking the Parthian shot of Justice
B lackmun, in Omni Capital Int 'l v. Rudolf Wo lff & Co. 2 Not incidental
ly, since 1 987, Australian courts have had nation-wide j urisdiction with
transfer for demonstrated inconvenience. Austl . Acts P., Jurisdiction of
Courts (Cross-Vesting) Act 1 987 (No. 24) . Be that as it may, it is not
necessary to take such heroic measures to find j urisdiction over Brake0.
First, let us give its deserved quietus to the attempt in Asahi Metal
Indus. v. Superior Court, 480 U . S . 1 02 ( 1 987), supported by four Jus
tices, to convert the stream of commerce to a pathetic dribble. Although
this part of the opinion got only four votes, Boit v. Gar-Tee Prods. ,
Inc. , 967 F.2d 67 1 , 683 ( l st Cir. 1 992) declared that "those c ircuits that
have squarely addressed the stream-of-commerce issue since Asahi have
adopted Justice O ' Connor ' s plurality view ." !d. at 683. Apparently, the
First Circuit' s Westlaw and Lexis programs do not incl ude the Fifth
Circuit. See Irving v. Owens- Corning Fiberglas Corp. , 864 F.2d 383
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 823 ( 1 989). At least this Court h ad
the good sense not to grant certiorari i n Irving to "clarify" the matter
and resol ve the split between circuits. Now that the AALS has marched
upon the Court and replaced its members with this panel, we can act
decisively. A defendant that releases a product for sale is subj ect to
jurisdiction in any state where the product causes harm if the product
comes there either in the normal course of commercial distribution or is
brought into that state by someone using that product as it i s intended
to be used. Insofar as World- Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444
U . S . 286 ( 1 980), is inconsistent with this formulation, it is overruled.
Thus, we end the danger springing from the four-Justice opinion in
Asahi, that we would turn the clock back fifty years so that manufactur
ers could proclaim in the words that Tom Lehrer gave to Wern her von
Braun : "Once the rockets are up, who cares where they come down?

2 . 484 U.S. 97, I l l ( 1 987), suggesting " [a] narrowly tailored servi ce of process
provision. authorizing service on an alien in a federal-question case when the alien i s
not amenable t o service under the applicable state long-arm statute
. " /d.
.

.

.

Spri ng, 1 995]
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That ' s not my department." Tom Lehrer, Wernher von Braun (Warner
Bros. Records 1 965).
Once again, our conclusion i s bolstered by the wise counsel of our
European cousins. Convention on Jurisdiction and Enforcement of Judg
ments (Official J.E.C. 1 89, v. 3 3 , July 28, 1 990, at 1 -34, reprinted 29
I.L.M. 1 4 1 3 ; 28 I . L.M. 620 [E.U.-E.F.T.A. Convention] . The European
Union and European Free Trade Association Conventions on Jurisdiction
and Enforcement of Judgments provide for jurisdiction "in matters rel at
ing to tort . . . in the courts for the place where the h armful event
occurred. " This has been interpreted liberally. In Handelskwekerij G. J.
Bier B. V. v. Mines de Potasse d 'A lsace S. A. , 1 976 E.C.J. 1 73 5 , the
Court of Justice of the European Communities permitted a Netherlands
horticultural company to sue in the Netherlands for damage to its
seedbeds, located there, cau sed by defendant' s alleged discharging of
pollutants i nto the Rhine in France. Moreover, article 6(2) of the Con
vention permits "any . . . third party proceedings, in the court seised of
the origi nal proceedings, unless these were instituted solely with the
object of removing [the third-party defendant] from the j urisdiction of
the court which would be competent in his case." E . U.-E.F.T.A. Con
vention, supra, at art. 6(2).
II. GENERAL JURISDICTION
It would be sufficient here to say that any doubts we might have
concerning suit against Brake-0 based on the harm in State Y, are al
layed by B rake-O ' s continuous and systematic contacts with S tate Y.
We elect to go further. Innocent Victim could sue B rake-0 in S tate Y
even if I nnocent Victim, a State Y resident, had been inj ured while
sojourning in State M or State K . United States courts have been criti
cized abroad for taking too expansive a view of general j urisdiction. In
the E . U .-E.F.T.A. Convention, the only basis for general j urisdiction is
domicile (art. 2), which for a corporation is its "seat." E.U.-E.F.T.A.
Convention, supra, at art. 53. The Convention is fine for specific j uris
diction when there is b lood on the ground, but it may be too solicitous
of commercial interests in other matters . Not only is its basis for gener
al j uri sdiction narrow, but also the speci fic jurisdiction provision for
contract actions is limited to "the court for the place of performance of
the obligation i n question." E.U.-E.F.T.A. Convention, supra , at art.
5 ( 1 ) . It should give us pause to move where others do not tread. On
reflection, however, in this day of jet travel and instantaneous voice and
televi sion communication, the time has come to declare that a victim
may sue at home if the defendant' s contacts with that forum are suffi
ciently continuous and systematic to make this reasonable. If, though
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unlikely, any unfairness result:-> from evidentiary problems, the doctrine
of forum non conveniens i s the necessary palliative.
Japan would find general j urisdiction over B rake-0 on these facts.
In Goto v. Malaysian A irline Sys. Berhad, 3 5 M inshu 1 224 ( 1 98 1 ) , the
Japanese S upreme Court upheld j urisdiction over the Malay s i an Airline
i n a suit for breach of an air transportation contract resulting in the
death of plaintiffs ' husband and father. The crash occurred in Malaysia
on a domestic Malaysian flight. The court indicated that i n i nternational
cases, j urisdiction i s based on rules of reason for maintaining impartiali
ty, fairness, and speediness. These requirements are met i f the J apanese
court has j urisdiction over the foreign party in accordance with the
J ap anese Code of Civil Procedure ' s venue provisions i ncluding the
defendant' s residence (art. 2, CCP), the place w here the defendant has a
place of business ( art. 4, CCP) (the provi sion applicable i n Goto - the
defendant had an office in Tokyo although this office had no connec
tion to the relevant transportation contract), where the defendant' s prop
erty is located (art. 8, CCP), and "a place of tort" (art. 1 5 , CCP
(Minsoho)) . The decision i n Asahi must have provoked gales o f laughter
in Japan.

